Photo of Atli Stannard

Atli Stannard

Atli Stannard is special counsel in the firm's Public Policy practice. He guides clients in highly regulated industries through complex EU policymaking processes, protecting and advancing their core business and regulatory priorities.

Atli’s practice covers all aspects of EU policymaking and legislative advocacy, including the regulation of the tech, food and beverage, pharmaceutical and medical devices, and industrial sectors, and on EU trade, environmental and ESG, and competition policy. He has handled matters before the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the EU, and Member State and UK governments. Clients rely on him to identify regulatory risks and opportunities, and engage in the policy process to defend and promote their business interests. 

  • Technology: Atli has worked extensively for clients on matters relating to EU data, content, platform, Artificial Intelligence, and competition policy.
  • Food and beverage: Atli helps clients developing novel plant-based foods to secure the necessary regulatory authorizations and engage in broader EU food policymaking. He regularly engages with EU and national authorities to ensure that health and environmental regulations are based in rigorous scientific evidence. He has drawn on his trade policy expertise to assist clients seeking to import food products into the EU.
  • Drug & medical devices: Atli has counseled clients and engaged with the EU institutions on matters relating to genomics, the regulation of medical devices and in vitro diagnostics, health technology assessment, orphan medicines, and pricing.
  • Industrial: Atli helps clients engage with EU and national bodies on the environmental benefits of their innovative technologies, and on EU plastics, chemical, and product regulation.

In his EU trade policy work, Atli regularly advises clients facing on EU market access and customs classification issues, trade defense actions (tariffs and safeguard measures), and non-tariff barriers (including sanitary and phytosanitary measures). He helps clients engage in the EU’s negotiation of new trade agreements. He counsels clients on the impact of the upcoming Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and how to shape and comply with its requirements.

Atli is a member of the firm’s ESG and Business and Human Rights Practices, and works with clients to assess the impact of and engage with new and upcoming Environmental, Social and Governance rules, including the EU Green Deal, supply chain diligence and the EU’s developing sustainable finance rules.

Atli’s competition policy advocacy work encompasses mergers, challenges under Articles 101 (anticompetitive agreements) and 102 (abuse of dominance) TFEU, and referrals under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation.

Atli has counseled international investors extensively on the EU’s proposals for a regime on foreign subsidies, and on the EU’s new FDI screening rules and coordination mechanism, as well as on EU tax policymaking. He also works closely with litigation colleagues to protect clients’ legitimate interests in multiple venues.

Contact:Read more about Atli StannardEmail

As the world anticipates the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the European Union (“EU”) braces for significant impacts in various sectors. The first Trump administration’s approach to transatlantic relations was characterized by unpredictability, tariffs on imported goods, a strained NATO relationship, and withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement. If past is prologue, the EU must prepare for a renewed era of uncertainty and potential adversarial policies.

Trade Relations

Trump’s self-proclaimed identity as a “tariff man” suggests that trade policies would once again be at the forefront of his administration’s priorities. His campaign promises, which include imposing global tariffs on all goods from all countries in the range of 10 % to 20%, signal a departure from traditional U.S. trade policies. Such measures could have severe repercussions for the EU, both directly through increased tariffs on its exports and indirectly via an influx of dumped products from other affected nations, particularly China. Broad-based tariffs of this nature would likely provoke retaliatory measures from the EU.

The EU’s response toolkit would likely mirror many of the actions it employed between 2018 and 2020 in reaction to U.S. tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration. These measures would include retaliation on U.S. products to maximize political pressure by targeting Trump-supporting constituencies, pursuing chosen legal challenges against the U.S. at the World Trade Organization, and implementing safeguards to shield the EU market from an influx of Chinese and other diverted goods following U.S. tariff hikes. Very practically, the EU has suspended tariffs on US exports of steel and aluminum to its market worth €2.8 billion. The suspension expires on 1 March 2025, requiring an active decision on whether to reintroduce them or not.

In executing these measures, the EU is expected to collaborate with allies such as the UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, and South Korea to amplify its response. The EU may also explore smaller trade agreements or informal “packages” with the U.S. as part of a negotiated tariff truce. Broader protective measures could also be pursued, focusing on subsidies and industrial policies aimed at strengthening Europe’s strategic sectors, beyond actions specific to the U.S. Some cooperation with the U.S. on China may also be possible in areas like export control, investment control, and dual-use technologies.Continue Reading Policy Implications for Europe Under a Second Trump Administration

November 25, 2024, Covington Alert

The inauguration of President Trump on January 20 is expected to bring important changes to U.S. trade policy that are likely to affect companies that supply international customers, or are reliant on global supply chains. As discussed in our prior client alert, international trade is expected to be a key focus of President Trump, who has repeatedly expressed a preference for using tariffs as a policy tool to create perceived leverage for dealmaking with international partners on both economic and non-economic issues. Recent announcements by the Trump transition team regarding cabinet and staff appointments reinforce the view that trade policy under a second Trump administration could involve significant unilateral U.S. action, including the imposition of substantial new tariffs and a hawkish stance toward China. These new tariffs could be implemented swiftly after Trump takes office, or could alternatively be subject to more extensive investigative and reporting procedures, depending on the legal authority invoked. New tariff measures, as well as other trade actions Trump has proposed, could lead to retaliatory responses by U.S. trading partners, including key U.S. allies. This alert explores how trade policy may be implemented by a second Trump administration, and considers how companies may prepare for and mitigate the risks associated with these developments.

Cabinet Nominations and Other Economic Appointees

In recent weeks, Trump has announced several cabinet and staff appointments for his second administration, including individuals responsible for implementing trade policy. Key among them is Howard Lutnick, chairman and CEO of a Wall Street investment firm and co-chair of Trump’s transition team, whom Trump has selected to be Secretary of Commerce. Echoing Trump’s own views, Lutnick has been a strong advocate for using tariffs as an industrial policy tool and bargaining chip to rebalance U.S. trade, though he has suggested tariff measures under a second Trump administration may be more “targeted” than the universal 10 to 20 percent tariffs proposed by Trump during his campaign. In announcing Lutnick’s forthcoming nomination, Trump noted Lutnick would lead the administration’s “Tariff and Trade agenda,” and that he would have direct responsibility over the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”). As USTR is a separate agency established by Congress within the Executive Office of the President to lead on trade issues, it is uncertain if the announcement was referring to informal oversight over USTR or a formal restructuring of the agency. Should Trump seek to consolidate USTR within or under the Commerce Department, he may face opposition from Congress, whose approval would be required for such a reorganization. Continue Reading Trade Policy Under a Second Trump Administration and Implications for Business

On 18 July 2024, Ursula von der Leyen, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second term. Ahead of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, accompanied by a 30-page program (the “Guidelines”) that lays down the next five-year policy agenda she proposes for the Commission. This blog outlines the key points to look out for in the “mission letters” she is expected to issue to her Commissioners-designate later this week.

A European “Christmas Tree”

The Guidelines were designed to secure a majority in the European Parliament ahead of the crucial 18 July vote. They affirm that the “priorities set out draw on […] consultations and on the common ideas discussed with the democratic forces in the European Parliament” (a reference to the cordon sanitaire – the agreed common exclusion of far-right parties from political discussions).

However, whilst the Commission has the monopoly on the right of initiative in EU law-making, the European Council (the strategic body that comprises the EU heads of state and government) defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. Hence, the European Council is the ultimate agenda-setter. At their 27 June 2024 meeting, the European Council agreed on a draft 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda (“Strategic Agenda”). This sets in stone the European Council’s policy priorities and invites the Commission to put these “into action during the next institutional cycle”. Thus, the Strategic Agenda acted as the basis upon which Von der Leyen prepared her Guidelines.

Other workstreams also influenced the drafting of the Guidelines. Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the EU Single Market advocated for the Commission to propose the establishment of the European Savings and Investments Union. Mario Draghi’s report on competitiveness (published on September 9, 2024) also fed into the Guidelines. Finally, the Guidelines seek to establish a sense of continuity, allowing von der Leyen’s second mandate to build on her first, notably with regards to the Green Deal: “we have achieved a lot together in the last five years, […] we must and will stay the course on all of our goals, including those set out in the European Green Deal”.Continue Reading What do European Commission President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines Mean for the 2024-2029 Mandate?

On July 18, 2024, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second five-year term. As part of the process, she delivered a speech before the Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which outlines the Commission’s political guidelines and…

Continue Reading The Future of EU Defence Policy and a Renewed Focus on Technology Security

The second round of France’s snap parliamentary elections delivered a surprising result on Sunday: with 182 seats, the coalition of left-wing parties—the Nouveau Front populaire (“NFP”) emerged as the unexpected victor. Centrist parties supporting President Emmanuel Macron finished second with 168 seats altogether, whereas the far-right Rassemblement National (“RN”) and its allies—which in the first round had seemed to be within striking distance of an outright victory—secured only 143 seats, thwarting its hopes of being able to form the next government. With 289 seats needed for any single party to reach a majority in the lower house and form a government, President Macron’s decision to call early legislative elections has delivered an outcome that threatens gridlock in the EU’s second-largest economy.

There seems to be limited scope out of this deadlock: either a government formed of a grand coalition spanning from the centre right to the centre left, but excluding both the extremes (the RN on the far right and La France insoumise, “LFI”, on the far left); or to the formation of a caretaker, technocratic government until a political situation is found. Either way, the negotiations to form the next government threaten to be lengthy and torturous and the French Constitution prevents new parliamentary elections being held within the next 12 months. This situation will have profound implications not only for France but also for decision-making in the EU.

Background Context

In 2017, Emmanuel Macron’s unexpected yet victorious bid in the presidential elections had reshuffled the cards of the French political landscape, with traditional governing parties marginalised by a powerful central force, which vowed to overcome old cleavages. Surfing on a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections following his own election, the President’s first mandate (2017-2022) was marked by a willingness to boost France’s economic attractiveness: a labour reform, a single 30% tax rate on capital gains, the abolition of a wealth tax, and the reduction of corporate taxes have all contributed to curbing unemployment levels.

The French President’s approach to power, sometimes seen as vertical, was perceived to have prevented flagship reforms from being passed. In late 2018, the Yellow Vest movement provoked a political crisis and a year later, President Macron withdrew a pensions reform bill due to a prolonged national strike movement. The Covid-19 outbreak heralded further complications, with France’s unmatched fiscal measures to buffer the impact of the crisis leading to deteriorated public finances: the government deficit rose to 8.9% of GDP, while public debt rose by almost 20 percentage points, to 114.6% of GDP in 2020.

President Macron’s re-election in 2022 against Marine Le Pen, albeit by a smaller margin than in 2017, confirmed his strong ability to mobilise his electoral base. Yet, he was able to muster only a limited majority in the National Assembly. This was notwithstanding the alignment of presidential and parliamentary mandates (in a 2000 revision of the Constitution) that until now had mechanically enabled the President to obtain an absolute majority in the Parliament (called the “fait majoritaire”).Continue Reading France drifts towards uncertainty after snap elections

Last month, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) met in Paris-Saclay for the second time since its launch in June 2021. (The first ministerial took place in Pittsburgh in September. France hosted this session as holder of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.) The meeting was co-chaired by Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Commerce Raimondo, and U.S. Trade Representative Tai, and European Commission Executive Vice Presidents Vestager and Dombrovskis. European Commissioner Breton also joined the discussions and the French ministers for foreign affairs, economy, and trade (Le Drian, Le Maire, and Riester) hosted the opening dinner.

The TTC is a new model of economic integration through regulatory coordination. Although both sides reserve their “regulatory autonomy,” they have also invested significant political capital, time, and effort into this process. The TTC spans broad policy areas including tech standards, climate, supply chains, export controls, and investment screening. It operates through ten working groups, which meet at staff working levels and seek input from outside stakeholders. For instance, the European Commission sponsors a “Trade and Technology Dialogue” facility to conduct outreach to the private sector and civil society. Through this technical work, the TTC’s aim is to shape the “rules of the road” for the global economy to favor liberal democracies, leveraging the transatlantic community’s half of global GDP. The ministerials set the themes and political direction for the working groups.

Against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. and EU noted that the TTC has become a “central pillar” of the transatlantic partnership, “indispensable” in facilitating coordination on sanctions and export controls. It will serve as a forum to monitor and discuss the Russia sanctions and may coordinate their eventual removal. Indeed, the TTC has arguably become more of a geopolitical tool than originally intended. Its 48-page joint statement reflects the breadth and depth of the underlying discussions and signals various future policy directions.Continue Reading U.S.-EU Trade and Tech Council: Paris Takeaways and Next Steps

The UK Government recently announced that it is developing legislation that would make it illegal for large businesses operating in the UK to use certain commodities that have not been produced in line with local laws, and require in-scope companies to conduct due diligence to ensure that their supply chains…
Continue Reading UK: new “world-leading” deforestation and ecosystem supply chain law

Last week marked a hand-over from the technical Brexit negotiations back to the negotiators’ political masters.  After four rounds of talks on the future EU-UK relationship, it appears that the UK and the EU are increasingly talking past each other.  With both sides seeming to accept that the transition period will finish at the end of this year, a no-deal exit from current arrangements at year-end looks increasingly likely.  It will take significant political will on both sides to step back from the brink, yet their focus is on the more immediate challenges of COVID-19.

This blog post outlines the negotiations to date, the main points on which the UK and EU disagree, the prospects for the “high level meeting” that will follow this June, and the principal considerations in whether a deal can be reached this year.  If no deal is reached, the UK will either have to trade with the EU on World Trade Organization terms – which would hit UK businesses and consumers hard – or accept an extension of transitional arrangements with the EU – which it has repeatedly ruled out.

Opening Positions

Both UK and EU had to expedite the preparatory work on their initial positions.

Thanks to informal “seminars” conducted in January, the Commission was able to present proposals for the negotiating mandate, which would then be given to the EU negotiator, Michel Barnier.  These “Negotiating Directives” were approved by the Council on February 25 (see here).

These are very similar to the initial mandate given by the Council in 2018, and focus on preserving the EU’s internal market. The EU, however, had to adapt to the UK’s new position, set out in the Political Declaration of October 17, 2019, asking for a trade relationship “on the lines of the FTAs already agreed by the EU in recent years with Canada and with other friendly countries”. The EU stated that it was prepared to offer a “zero tariffs, zero quotas” agreement, but on the condition that the UK commits to a “balance of rights and obligations, and a level playing field”. It also insisted that the entire deal should fall under an “overall governance framework”.

Two days after the presentation of the EU mandate, the UK published its own “negotiating strategy” (see here).  This makes it clear that London is not prepared to compromise on the recovery of its full national sovereignty.  It confirms the UK Government’s strong intention to fully regain its “legal autonomy” and the “right to manage (its) own resources”.  The UK “will not agree to any obligations for our laws to be aligned with the EU’s, or for the EU’s institutions, including the Court of Justice, to have any jurisdiction in the UK”.  As to the structure of the deal, the UK would also like to see the comprehensive free trade agreement concluded separately, and “supplemented by a range of other international agreements covering, principally, fisheries, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, transport, and energy”.

The distance between these two positions showed just how difficult a negotiation this was likely to be.

The Negotiations’ Terms of Reference

On February 28, the two sides agreed on the “Terms of Reference” for their talks – essentially, their format and calendar (see here).

  • The negotiations are led by the Commission’s chief Negotiator (Michel Barnier), Head of the Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom (UKTF) and on the UK side by the UK’s Chief Negotiator (David Frost), Head of Task Force Europe (TFE).
  • Several “negotiating groups” meet alongside the plenary negotiating sessions, working under the guidance of the Chief Negotiators and/or Deputy Chief Negotiators. There are 11 such groups: on “Trade in goods”, “Trade in Services and Investment and other issues”, “Level Playing Field for open and fair competition”, “Transport”, “Energy and Civil Nuclear Cooperation”, “Fisheries”, “Mobility and Social Security Coordination”, “Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”, “Thematic Cooperation”, “Participation in Union Programmes”, and “Horizontal arrangements and governance”.
  • Full rounds of negotiations were, in principle, supposed to take place every two to three weeks, alternating between London and Brussels.

Continue Reading The Brexit Negotiation – In Deadlock?

Every new team entering the Berlaymont to head up the European Commission starts out with bold and ambitious plans. Time after time, reality intervenes, and their plans are upended.

This was true for the second Barroso Commission in 2010, when the aftershocks of the Global Financial Crisis and the Greek…
Continue Reading The EU Post-COVID-19: Regulating for Recovery and Revival

On September 10, Ursula von der Leyen, President-elect of the European Commission, presented her new team. If approved by the European Parliament, they will take over from the Juncker Commission on November 1, 2019.

This blog outlines the proposed structure of the new Commission, each Commissioner’s portfolio, and the key regulatory priorities that the President set for each member of her team.

A Three-Tier Commission

The new President of the Commission was confronted with the same problem as her predecessor: each Member State sends a Commissioner to Brussels, but there are not 27 substantive portfolios to dole out. (The UK does not intend to send a Commissioner to Brussels, reflecting Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s stated aim of leaving the EU on October 31, before the new Commission takes office, “come what may”.)

President Juncker addressed the issue by establishing a “cluster” system, with seven Vice Presidents and 20 “simple” Commissioners. In practice, however, Juncker’s Vice Presidents were not given control of specific Commission Directorates General (“DGs”), meaning that they were often relegated to “coordinating” the work of other Commissioners, without the support of officials needed to develop their own policy priorities.

President von der Leyen has only slightly modified this structure, and focused on restructuring the various Commissioners’ competences to fit her “political guidelines”—the new Commission’s policymaking priorities.

The new College will effectively have three “tiers” of Commissioner:
Continue Reading The New European Commission 2019-2024