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Corinne Goldstein

Corinne Goldstein has decades of experience advising clients on the application to their worldwide operations of U.S. economic sanctions, export controls, and antiboycott programs.

She has particular expertise advising on the primary and secondary sanctions programs administered by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Her clients include leading U.S. and non-U.S. companies in the oil and gas, financial services, pharmaceutical, general manufacturing, and other sectors that must navigate these sanctions regimes in their day-to-day businesses. Because of her deep expertise, Corinne is able to provide thoughtful and practical advice to difficult questions these industries face.

In her work with multinational companies, Corinne regularly:

  • Advises clients on novel and complex interpretive issues relating to the application of new and existing U.S. sanctions regimes,
  • Prepares corporate trade controls policies and procedures,
  • Develops trade controls compliance and training programs,
  • Secures U.S. government licenses,
  • Conducts internal investigations of potential violations of applicable regulations, and
  • Represents clients in enforcement proceedings.

Corinne has been consistently ranked by Chambers Global and Chambers USA, as well as Legal 500, as a knowledgeable leader in the fields of economic sanctions and export controls who is “responsive,” “has her fingers on the pulse of the government," and provides extremely practical advice in these areas. The BTI Consulting Group also named Corinne to its 2020 “Client Service All-Stars” list, which recognizes “attorneys who stand above all the others in delivering the absolute best in client service.”

Contact:Read more about Corinne GoldsteinEmail

June 18, 2024, Covington Alert

On June 12, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued additional measures to counter Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine. The measures, announced in advance of the G7 summit in Italy last week, are intended to “continue to drive up costs for the Russian war machine.”

The actions taken by OFAC and BIS include new prohibitions on providing certain information technology- and software-related services to persons located in Russia, establishing additional sanctions designed to target the Russian financial infrastructure, strengthening secondary sanctions that can be applied to non-U.S. persons (including in particular non-U.S. financial institutions), and expanding export controls restrictions on items destined for Russia and Belarus (including with respect to certain types of software). Along with the new rules, OFAC designated for property-blocking sanctions more than 300 individuals and entities (including parties identified for sanctions by the U.S. State Department), while BIS used its authority to make additions to the Entity List, issue Temporary Denial Orders, and notify U.S. distributors of additional restrictions on shipments to parties known to be supplying items to Russia. Significantly, BIS altered its Entity List rules to permit certain address-only designations to the Entity List and, among other designations, added to the Entity List eight addresses in Hong Kong with a high diversion risk. Exports, reexports, or transfers of certain items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) to purchasers, intermediate or ultimate consignees, and end ­users who use those addresses generally will require authorization from BIS.

Separately, on June 13, 2024, the UK Government imposed a new round of asset-freezing sanctions on a number of notable Russian entities. The European Union is also considering a 14th package of sanctions measures relating to Russia, although as of this writing the EU has not yet enacted the new package.

New U.S. Sanctions

Prohibition on Certain Information Technology and Software Services

As part of the joint actions, OFAC issued a determination pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 14071 (the “IT and Software Services Determination”) that prohibits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a U.S. person, wherever located, of (i) information technology (“IT”) consultancy and design services, and (ii) IT support services and cloud-based services for enterprise management software and design and manufacturing software (collectively, “Covered Software”) to any person located in the Russian Federation, unless licensed or otherwise authorized by OFAC. The IT and Software Services Determination is effective beginning at 12:01 eastern daylight time on September 12, 2024. “U.S. persons” include U.S. legal entities and their non-U.S. branches; U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, no matter where located or employed; and persons present in the United States.Continue Reading U.S. Government Issues New U.S. Sanctions and Export Controls Targeting Russia and Belarus for Continued Aggression Against Ukraine; Update on European Sanctions Developments

In recent weeks, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has further expanded the scope of sanctions targeting Russia in response to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its purported annexation of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Commerce also has expanded export controls against Russia and Belarus. These measures are in addition to the new EU and UK sanctions and export controls announced last week and covered in our October 10 client alert.

On September 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued guidance that the United States is prepared to more aggressively use its existing authorities to impose sanctions against persons who provide material support to or for sanctioned persons or sanctionable activity, with a particular emphasis on entities and individuals in jurisdictions outside of Russia that provide political or economic support for Russia’s purported annexation of Ukrainian territory. This guidance was accompanied by a series of new designations to OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”), including a Chinese firm and an Armenian firm that were designated for having provided material support to a Russian firm that specializes in procuring foreign items for Russia’s defense industry.

On September 15, OFAC issued two new determinations: a determination pursuant to Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024 and a determination pursuant to E.O. 14071. The first authorizes the imposition of property-blocking sanctions against persons determined to operate in, or to have operated in, the quantum computing sector of the Russian economy. The second prohibits U.S. persons, with limited exceptions, from providing quantum computing services to any person located in Russia.

On September 9, OFAC issued preliminary guidance concerning a ban on a broad range of services related to the maritime transportation of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products (collectively “seaborne Russian oil”). The ban will take effect on December 5, 2022 with respect to maritime transportation of Russian crude oil and on February 5, 2023 with respect to maritime transportation of Russian petroleum products. The ban will include an exception for the receipt of services by jurisdictions or actors that purchase seaborne Russian oil at or below a price cap to be established by a coalition of countries including members of the G7, the EU, and the United States.

Additionally, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) amended the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) on September 15 to (i) expand the scope of the Russian industry sector export restrictions to cover additional items, including quantum computing and advanced manufacturing-related hardware, software, and technology, and to apply the industry sector export restrictions to Belarus; (ii) add dollar value exclusion thresholds to some earlier restrictions on luxury goods exports to Russia; and (iii) expand the scope of the military end-user and military-intelligence end-user rules to reach entities in third countries, with a particular focus on entities that support military or military-intelligence end users or end uses in Russia or Belarus. On September 30, following Russia’s announcement that it would annex the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya regions of Ukraine, BIS added dozens of entities to its Entity List, which imposes BIS licensing requirements for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to such entities of any goods, technology, and software that are subject to the EAR.Continue Reading The United States Imposes Additional Sanctions and Export Controls Against Russia and Belarus

On June 6 and June 9, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued additional guidance on the sanctions that prohibit U.S. persons from making a “new investment” in Russia and from providing accounting, trust and corporate formation, and management consulting services to any person located in Russia.

Separately, from June 15, 2022, the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”) gained new powers to impose financial penalties for breaches of UK sanctions regulations (including, but not limited to, the UK sanctions regulations with respect to Russia) on a strict liability basis and to publish reports of cases where it is satisfied that a breach of financial sanctions has occurred but where no penalty is imposed.

This alert summarizes these new sanctions developments.

New U.S. Sanctions Developments

Guidance on the Prohibitions on “New Investment” by U.S. Persons in Russia

On June 6, 2022, OFAC issued guidance in the form of responses to new frequently asked questions (“FAQs”) to clarify certain aspects of the prohibitions on “new investment” in Russia by U.S. persons that were imposed under the following executive orders (“E.O.s”):

  • E.O. 14066, issued on March 8, 2022 (prohibiting new investment by U.S. persons in the energy sector of the Russian Federation, as described in our March 10 alert); 
  • E.O. 14068, issued on March 11, 2022 (prohibiting new investment by U.S. persons in any sector of the Russian Federation economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State); and 
  • E.O. 14071, issued on April 6, 2022 (prohibiting “all new investment in the Russian Federation by U.S. persons, wherever located” as well as “any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by E.O. 14071 if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States,” as described in our April 11 alert.

Continue Reading Recent Developments in U.S. and UK Sanctions: OFAC Guidance on “New Investment” and Prohibition on the Provision of Certain Services to Any Person in Russia; UK Sanctions Enforcement Developments

Introduction

On October 14, 2019, President Trump issued an Executive Order Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria. This Order provides authority for the imposition of sanctions (including secondary sanctions) on certain entities and individuals in response to Turkey’s military operations in Syria, which the Order states endanger innocent civilians, destabilize the region, and undermine the campaign to defeat the Islamic State.

The Executive Order provides authority to impose sanctions on parts of the Government of Turkey, current and former officials of the Government of Turkey, sectors of Turkey’s economy, and persons who are otherwise determined to be involved in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria. The Executive Order provides additional authority to impose sanctions on foreign persons engaged in a range of activities that disrupt or prevent a ceasefire in northern Syria, the voluntary return to Syria of displaced persons, or efforts to promote a political solution to the conflict in Syria, or involve the commission of serious human rights abuses in relation to Syria. It further authorizes various secondary sanctions (a) for certain dealings in support of persons whose property is blocked pursuant to the Executive Order, and (b) against foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate any significant financial transaction on behalf of such a blocked party.

Relying on the Executive Order, the Administration blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, as well as the property and interests in property of the Minister of National Defense, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, and Minister of the Interior.Continue Reading United States and European Union Impose Additional Sanctions in Response to Actions by Turkish Government

On February 15, 2018, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA) introduced bipartisan legislation—the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (“ECRA”)⸺to modernize U.S. export control regulation of commercial and dual-use items. The bill is co-sponsored by the committee’s ranking Democratic member, Eliot Engel (D-NY). The proposed legislation seeks to establish a permanent statutory basis for export control of commercial, dual-use, and less sensitive defense items.

Introducing the ECRA, Chairman Royce emphasized that the need for export control reform is dictated by aggressive Chinese government policies that have increasingly forced U.S. companies to hand over sensitive technology as a cost of doing business in China. In response, the ECRA establishes a framework to protect critical and emerging U.S. technology and know-how. The same issue also has been taken up through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (“FIRRMA”), a bipartisan effort to control outbound technology transfers (among other issues) through the expansion of the authority and operation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). It remains to be seen whether Congress will proceed with the ECRA or FIRRMA, or potentially combine the two efforts.

Key Aspects of the Export Control Reform Act

If enacted as introduced, the potential impact of the ECRA on export controls would be far- reaching:

  • The ECRA on its face would significantly expand U.S. jurisdiction to regulate the transfer abroad by U.S. and foreign persons of commodities, software, or technology regardless of any U.S. content.
  • The ECRA would for the first time apply U.S. deemed export controls to transfers of controlled technology to U.S. companies unless they are majority-owned by U.S. natural persons.
  • The ECRA would establish control over release of technology that includes information at any stage of its creation, such as “foundational information” and “know-how,” in order to protect emerging technology and sensitive intellectual property. To that extent, the bill would require the president to establish an interagency process to identify emerging technologies that are not identified in any U.S. or multilateral control list, but nonetheless could be essential to U.S. national security.

Continue Reading Export Control Reform Act Introduced in Congress

During the past two weeks, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the U.S. Department of State have taken a number of steps toward implementing aspects of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”), a major piece of sanctions legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in July and signed by President Trump in early August. These steps are in addition to those described in our client alert last month.

Specifically, as called for by CAATSA, OFAC on October 31 issued a revised Russia sectoral sanctions Directive 4 that expands the restrictions on U.S. person support for certain unconventional oil projects to reach new such projects being undertaken anywhere in the world where a sectorally sanctioned Russian energy company has a majority voting or 33 percent or greater ownership interest in the project. OFAC also issued related guidance on this expanded sanction. In addition, OFAC issued guidance on the application of secondary sanctions to foreign financial institutions and on the implementation of other measures in CAATSA.

Also with respect to CAATSA, the U.S. Department of State has issued guidance on the imposition of secondary sanctions relating to Russia’s energy export pipelines, investments in special Russian crude oil projects, and a CAATSA provision that requires the President to sanction persons who knowingly engage in significant transactions with parties affiliated with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors.

With respect to Iran, OFAC issued amended regulations on October 31 implementing CAATSA’s requirement to impose terrorism-related sanctions with respect to officials, agents, or affiliates of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”).

Primary Sectoral Sanctions Targeting Russia’s Energy Sector

Since September 12, 2014, OFAC Directive 4 has prohibited U.S. persons from providing goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in Russia or its territorial waters and that involve a sectorally sanctioned Russian energy company or an entity owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, by one or more such companies. “U.S. persons” are legal entities organized under U.S. law and their non-U.S. branches; individual U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (“green-card” holders), wherever located or employed; and any persons when physically present in the United States.Continue Reading Russia and Iran Sanctions: Recent Developments

Administration Also Revises Russia Sanctions, Terminates Most Sudan Sanctions

On October 13, President Trump announced that he would no longer certify to Congress that the suspension of U.S. sanctions against Iran pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) is “appropriate and proportionate” to the steps that Iran has taken to terminate its illicit nuclear program. The President’s much-anticipated announcement does not mean that the United States is withdrawing from the JCPOA, nor does it automatically result in the re- imposition of any U.S. sanctions against Iran. Rather, the President’s announcement gives the Congress 60 days to introduce legislation to re-impose U.S. sanctions that could be considered under expedited procedures. Importantly, although President Trump did not call on Congress to re-impose the pre-JCPOA U.S. nuclear-related sanctions, he did threaten to terminate U.S. participation in the JCPOA in the future if Congress and U.S. allies do not take action to address perceived flaws in the agreement.

At the same time, the Trump Administration expanded sanctions against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), and designated four additional entities for sanctions for their support of Iran’s weapons proliferation activities. Further, Senators Bob Corker and Tom Cotton announced that they would be introducing legislation to address perceived shortcomings in the JCPOA, consistent with President Trump’s request.

The developments of late last week follow several other recent changes in U.S. sanctions involving Russia and Sudan.

On September 29, the Trump Administration, as expected, revised key aspects of the U.S. sectoral sanctions against Russia relating to dealings in debt of certain parties operating in Russia’s financial services and energy sectors. The move was required by the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”) discussed in our alert of July 28, 2017.

Finally, on October 12, the Trump Administration terminated most U.S. sanctions against Sudan, which had been substantially suspended since January 2017 pursuant to an Executive Order that President Obama issued in the waning days of his Administration.

Iran
Failure to Make INARA Certification 

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (“INARA”) requires that the President certify to Congress every 90 days that: (1) “Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing” the JCPOA; (2) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the JCPOA, or if it has committed a material breach, then it has cured that breach; (3) Iran has not taken any action that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and (4) suspension of U.S. sanctions against Iran in connection with the JCPOA is “appropriate and proportionate” to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program and is “vital to the national security interests of the United States.”Continue Reading Developments in U.S. Iran Sanctions

On January 16, 2016, the United States and the European Union (“EU”) significantly eased their sanctions against Iran, following verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) that Iran had carried out its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), the multilateral agreement signed in mid-July 2015 in…
Continue Reading United States, EU Implement Significant Iran Sanctions Relief

There are no changes in the application of US sanctions against Iran as a result of the framework parameters regarding Tehran’s nuclear program announced on April 2.  Additional sanctions relief will come only if there is a final agreement concluded among Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia,…
Continue Reading Prospects for Iran Sanctions Under the April 2 Nuclear Framework