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Peter Camesasca

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Peter D. Camesasca is a partner in Covington’s Brussels and London offices, with 25 years of experience in all major aspects of EU competition law. Peter also co-chairs the firm’s Foreign Direct Investment Regulation initiative, and, has a particular focus on in- and outbound aspects of the Asia/Europe interface.

Peter’s experience includes cases under Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU, national and multijurisdictional merger and joint venture notifications (including FDI assessments), investigations by multiple enforcement authorities and global antitrust litigation and monopolization issues (including IP cross-over issues). In addition, he advises and litigates on horizontal and vertical cooperation issues, prepares and executes various compliance and dawn raid programs and participates in the installation of in-house training programs, and heads a vibrant private enforcement practice.

Peter has acted before the European Commission, the European courts, the German Bundeskartellamt, the UK Office of Fair Trading and the Competition and Markets Authority, the Belgian Competition Council, and various national courts.

Contact: Read more about Peter CamesascaEmail

On the heels of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions, and U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan, 2022 accelerated a sweeping effort within the U.S. government to make national security considerations—especially with respect to China—a key feature of new and existing regulatory processes. This trend toward broader national security regulation, designed to help maintain U.S. strategic advantage, has support from both Republicans and Democrats, including from the Biden Administration. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s remarks in September 2022 capture the tone shift in Washington: “…[W]e have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining ‘relative’ advantages over competitors in certain key technologies…That is not the strategic environment we are in today…[w]e must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

This environment produced important legislative and regulatory developments in 2022, including the CHIPS and Science Act (Covington alert), first-ever Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines promulgated by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or the “Committee”) (Covington alert), President Biden’s Executive Order on CFIUS (Covington alert), new restrictions under U.S. export control authorities targeting China (Covington alert), and proposals for a new regime to review outbound investments by U.S. businesses (Covington alert). The common thread among these developments is the U.S. government’s continuing appetite to use both existing and new regulatory authorities to address identified national security risks, especially where perceived risks relate to China.

With a Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives riding the tailwinds of this bipartisan consensus, 2023 is looking like a pivotal moment for national security regulation—expanding beyond the use of traditional authorities such as trade controls and CFIUS, into additional regulatory domains touching upon data, communications, antitrust, and possibly more. In parallel, the U.S. focus on national security continues to gain purchase abroad, with foreign direct investment (“FDI”) regimes maturing in tandem with CFIUS, and outbound investment screening gaining traction, for example, in the European Union (“EU”). It is crucial for businesses to be aware of these developments and to approach U.S. regulatory processes with a sensitivity towards the shifting national security undercurrents described in greater detail below.…

Continue Reading Will 2023 Be an Inflection Point in National Security Regulation?

European Union (“EU”) Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”), a new state aid instrument adopted at the end of 2022, will have a significant impact on transactions in the EU. The FSR impacts any company that is present in or wants the enter the EU, and has received financial support in any form from non-EU governments. 

The FSR is game-changing — it imposes notification obligations on companies on subsidies received from non-EU countries and, when those subsidies are considered to distort the internal market in the EU, the European Commission (“EC”) can impose remedies.

Companies will now have notification obligations if they have received foreign financial contributions above a certain amount and are:

(1)    acquiring a company that has a turnover of at least EUR 500 million in the EU, or

(2)    participating in a public tender with a value of EUR 250 million.

These notification obligations will start to apply on 12 October 2023.…

Continue Reading EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation – Key Takeaways

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) entered into force on 12 January 2023 and will start to apply as of 12 July 2023.

The FSR creates a brand new instrument to fill a regulatory gap, by preventing foreign subsidies from distorting the European Union (EU) internal market. Whereas companies receiving public support in the EU are subject to strict State aid rules, companies obtaining public support outside the EU are generally not. This was perceived as putting companies in the EU at a disadvantage compared to companies that obtained subsidies outside the EU, but that also engaged in economic activity in the Union.

The FSR’s scope extends far beyond the obvious State support, to cover common types of benefits that are granted all over the world, including in countries driven by a market economy. Its obligations will inevitably place an additional administrative burden on companies engaging in an economic activity in the EU. Acceptance of a foreign subsidy distorting the EU internal market may have far-reaching consequences for the company. The FSR places additional compliance obligations on companies, and for many will entail a thorough assessment to identify and justify foreign subsidies received. For companies considering transactions in the EU, the FSR effectively creates a third layer of deal conditionality, besides merger control and Foreign Direct Investment laws. This is adding a further unique set of thresholds, timings and factual considerations, to be included in companies’ strategies to invest in the EU. This will require expertise in EU antitrust and State aid law, and a good understanding of the details of the FSR.

Key things you need to know:…

Continue Reading The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation enters into force

On October 26, 2022, the German government permitted (with conditions) an investment by Chinese state-owned COSCO Shipping Group (“COSCO”) in one of Hamburg’s four shipping container terminals. Pursuant to foreign direct investment (“FDI”) laws, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, “BMWK”) had been notified of the proposed acquisition by COSCO of a 35% minority interest in the port terminal, a strategic location on the German coastline. The BMWK ordered that COSCO’s acquisition of voting rights must remain below 25%. The details of the decision remain confidential, but the BMWK justified its partial prohibition on the grounds that the acquisition of 35% as notified would constitute a “threat to public order and security”. According to the BMWK’s press release, the partial prohibition decision prevents COSCO from acquiring a ‘strategic’ shareholding, and reduces the acquisition to a mere financial participation. As a safeguard in this respect, the decision contains provisions prohibiting COSCO from acquiring any additional influence, for example, through a grant of rights that would be atypical for a holder of a less than 25% interest. Furthermore, under the German FDI regime, any follow-on acquisition of additional voting rights by COSCO would be subject to a new notification requirement.

Facts and Background

According to public sources, the transaction has been highly debated within and outside Germany since the announcement of the transaction in September 2021. Parties closely related to the commercial development of the Hamburg port (including the selling Hamburg port operator, the current mayor of the city of Hamburg, and the trade union) favoured an unconditional approval pointing to the economic significance of the investment. But a number of stakeholders, including apparently the European Commission, which provided an opinion within the framework of the EU FDI Regulation, would have preferred an outright prohibition of the transaction.…

Continue Reading COSCO FDI Review: Germany partially prohibits Chinese investment in a Hamburg container terminal – Spotlight on minority investments

Over the summer, the UK Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”) delivered the first decisions, in the form of final orders, under the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (“NSIA”).  We consider these decisions and other cases in the context of the first nine months of the UK’s new (quasi) Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) regime.

Key takeaways:

  • The NSIA has broad reach, and BEIS has shown willingness to exercise the powers to review transactions that can stretch beyond mergers and acquisitions, for example, to licensing agreements.
  • NSIA review involves the weighing of a number of factors relating to the target, the acquirer and the level of control being obtained.  Early decisions suggest that target’s products/services and activities are just as important a factor as the acquirer’s identity, among the cases that have engaged the attention of the Investment Security Unit (“ISU”).
  • “Behavioural” undertakings, e.g. involving implementation of security controls or granting of audit rights to regulators appear to be a continuation of trends seen in the predecessor UK ‘public interest’ regime, and similar to other EU FDI procedures.

…
Continue Reading UK FDI: Decision-making practice emerging under the National Security and Investment Act

 On 30 June 2022, the Council of the EU (the “Council”) and the European Parliament (the “Parliament”) reached a much awaited agreement on the proposal of the European Commission (the “Commission”) for the Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the “FSR”) (see our alert on the proposal). This political agreement swiftly concludes the trilogue discussions initiated in the beginning of May this year, after the Council (see our blog post) and the Parliament (see our blog post) each adopted their own positions. The agreement has been approved by the Permanent Representatives Committee (“COREPER”) of the Council on 13 July and the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament on 14 July.

The FSR grants substantial new powers to the Commission and “will help close the regulatory gap whereby subsidies granted by non-EU governments currently go largely unchecked”, according to remarks from Executive Vice-President of the Commission, Margrethe Vestager. It will be deeply transformative for M&A and public procurement in the EU.

The agreement on the FSR did not lead to any major changes in the proposal made by the Commission. The most notable points of discussion between the Parliament and Council and the outcome of this agreement are:

  • The thresholds above which companies are obliged to inform the Commission about their foreign subsidies remain unchanged compared to the Commission’s proposal;
  • The time period in which the Commission has to investigate foreign subsidies in large public procurement has been reduced. In the same way, the retroactive application of the FSR has been limited to foreign subsidies granted in the five years prior to the application of the regulation;
  • The Commission will issue guidelines on the existence of a distortion, the balancing test and its power to request notification of non-notifiable transactions, at the latest three years after the entry into force of the FSR; and
  • A commitment to a multilateral approach to foreign subsidies above the FSR and the possibility for the Commission to engage in a dialogue with third countries has been included.

…
Continue Reading The Council of the EU and the European Parliament agree on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation

The UK government has reported a successful start to the implementation of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (the “NSIA” or “Act”). During the first three months (Jan-March 2022) in which the new NSIA regime has been active, the Investment Screening Unit (“ISU”) received 222 filings and reviewed 17 transactions in depth. Of those 17 transactions, three have been cleared unconditionally, with the other 14 transactions still under review at the end of the reporting period.

Mandatory NSIA filings, which represented 196 of the total flings, were most commonly made in six sectors: defence, military and dual-use, critical suppliers to government, artificial intelligence, data infrastructure and advanced materials.  There were significantly fewer filings in other sectors, with fewer than five filings per sector in areas such as synthetic biology, civil nuclear, advanced robotics and transport.

Collectively, these figures and other data suggest that the NSIA regime is operating, so far, broadly in line with expectations. While there are fewer filings than expected overall, this may reflect a broader global slowdown in M&A and investment activity. The ISU further reports that it is meeting, and often working well within, the maximum statutory time periods for the assessment of filings. The ISU indicates its willingness to complete reviews expeditiously where possible, including for in-depth assessments.…

Continue Reading UK National Security and Investment Regime Working Well

On 4 May 2022,  the European Parliament (the “Parliament”) adopted its position on the proposal of the European Commission (the “Commission”) for a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the “Foreign Subsidies Regulation”) (see our alert on the proposal). It confirms the Commission’s powers to investigate and remedy the potential negative effects of…

Russia’s continued invasion of Ukraine is broadly impacting foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening. A range of governments have announced they will apply close scrutiny to investments from Russia and its allied countries in general, and not only to investors that are subject to sanctions or other restrictive measures. The European Commission (“Commission”) has published guidance on the screening of investments from Russia and Belarus.

The German government has already intervened, appointing a fiduciary for an operator of critical gas infrastructure. Canada issued a policy statement targeting Russian investors and Italy permanently broadened its FDI regime. Our blog provides a summary of these developments below.

Commission Communication calls for systematic assessment of Russian and Belarusian investments

On 6 April 2022, the Commission published a Communication (“Communication”) with guidance on screening of FDI from Russia and Belarus. The Communication emphasizes greater vigilance towards Russian and Belarusian investments into the EU and stresses that FDI screening goes beyond investments by persons or entities that are subject to sanctions. While the Communication is a direct response to the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, it also elaborates on more general principles of FDI screening in the EU.

The Commission calls upon Member States to systematically assess and prevent threats related to Russian and Belarusian investments. In particular, the Commission encourages Member States to ensure close cooperation both on the national and EU level in relation to FDI screening activities, as well as in the implementation of EU sanctions. The EU FDI Regulation already provides for such cooperation and facilitates information exchange among Member States and the Commission. In particular, Member States may learn about a transaction through the cooperation mechanism and assess FDI filing requirements within their own jurisdiction. As discussed in our blogpost concerning “One Year of the EU FDI Regulation”, Member States have found the cooperation mechanism to be “a very useful instrument” and to have fostered valuable discussions in relation to transaction screening and critical sectors.

But a number of Member States do not have FDI screening regimes in place, including Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Where FDI regimes are not yet in place or do not allow for pre-investment screening, the Commission calls to urgently set up a comprehensive FDI screening mechanism and in the meantime to use other suitable legal instruments to address security or public order risks. For those Member States that are in the process of setting up a screening mechanism, the Commission calls on them to accelerate adoption and prepare implementation, including supporting it with appropriate resources.

The Communication notes the potential screening of FDI after the completion of a transaction. While FDI screening is usually undertaken before closing of a transaction, the EU FDI Screening Regulation also allows for the screening of FDI post-closing. If a Member State launches the formal screening of an FDI, it is subject to EU cooperation mechanism irrespective of its planned or completed status. Furthermore, the cooperation mechanism may be initiated within 15 months after the investment has been completed when an investment is not subject to screening at national level. This may occur when the Member State does not have a screening mechanism or when the Member State maintains a screening mechanism but the specific FDI transaction was not submitted by the parties for ex-ante screening.

The Commission reports that based on 2020 data, Russian individuals or entities control about 17,000 EU companies, and have potentially controlling stakes in another 7,000 companies and minority stakes in a further 4,000 companies. The Commission strongly encourages Member States to apply FDI screening to intra-EU investments that are ultimately controlled by Russian or Belarusian persons or entities. In that context, the Communication describes the conditions under which Member States may be permitted to impose restrictions on the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment.
Continue Reading FDI regulators show their teeth – Close scrutiny and firm intervention in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine

The English High Court (“High Court”) has issued an important judgment in the claim that Gemalto group companies (“Gemalto”) brought against Infineon (“Infineon”) and Renesas Electronics (“Renesas”) companies, for damages arising from the smart card chips cartel (Gemalto NV and others v Infineon Technologies AG [2022] EWHC 156 (Ch), the “Judgment”).  The claim arises…