Photo of Shara Aranoff

Shara Aranoff

Shara helps clients navigate trade remedies, tariffs, and customs regulations in support of their U.S. and global market strategies.

Shara is the Chair of Covington’s International Trade Practice Group, and co-leads the Customs practice.

Drawing on her 20 years of service in the U.S. government, she develops legal and public policy strategies to assist clients engaging with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Congress, and the courts. In high-stakes antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, Shara helps global manufacturers, distributors, and retailers protect their access to the U.S. market. She assists technology, life sciences and manufacturing companies enforce and defend their intellectual property rights in cross-border Section 337 investigations. Chambers praises her for bringing “behind-the-curtain knowledge to the private sector” in proceedings before the ITC by leveraging her experience as a decision maker.

Shara also regularly advises clients in a wide range of industries on Customs compliance and tariff mitigation, including:

Providing legal opinions or seeking Customs rulings on classification, valuation, country of origin, and product marking/labelling.
Conducting internal compliance reviews, drafting compliance policies, and providing training.
Responding to CBP audits and inquiries and filing voluntary disclosures.
Developing strategies to reduce tariffs and take advantage of trusted trader programs.

Prior to joining the firm, Shara was a Commissioner and Chairman of the ITC, where she was a decision-maker in hundreds of Section 337, antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations.

She previously served as Senior International Trade Counsel for Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) at the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, where she was responsible for legislative and policy issues including Trade Promotion Authority; negotiations involving the World Trade Organization and free trade agreements; and trade remedy and customs laws. She was also an attorney-advisor in the Office of the General Counsel at the ITC, where she was lead counsel in litigation before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade.

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On February 20, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) announced that it is seeking public comments on any unfair trade practices and non-reciprocal trade arrangements implemented by foreign trading partners. The comment period is currently open and the deadline for submitting comments is March 11, 2025.

According to the Federal Register notice, comments can be submitted through a portal accessible at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/, under docket number USTR-2025-0001. USTR will accept comments from any interested party, including businesses, individuals, and trade associations, among others. Interested parties are able to include business confidential information in their submissions, which will not appear in the public version of their comments.

USTR’s announcement also stated that the public comment process is not the only opportunity to provide information to the agency on these issues, and that USTR “welcomes ongoing engagement with and information from any interested party.”

This comment period offers a new opportunity for U.S. exporters to seek the Administration’s  potential support in eliminating foreign market access barriers. If you are interested in submitting comments to USTR as part of this process, Covington can assist in the preparation and transmission of these comments. We would also be happy to assist in crafting a broader strategy for engaging USTR and other relevant agencies on these or other trade-related issues.

Background

USTR’s launch of this public comment process follows the issuance of the “America First Trade Policy” memorandum by President Trump on his first day in office, which directed USTR to lead a review of unfair foreign trade practices and to recommend appropriate remedies. USTR also linked the comment process to President Trump’s “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs” memorandum issued on February 13, which directed USTR and the Commerce Department to investigate “the harm to the United States from any non-reciprocal trade arrangements adopted by any trading partners” and to recommend actions in response. Covington’s alert on this memorandum is available here.

Scope of Requested Comments

USTR has invited comments on a country-by-country basis (or also on an economy-wide basis in the case of the European Union) regarding (i) “any unfair trade practice by a foreign country or economy”; or (ii) “any non-reciprocal trade arrangements.” USTR has defined unfair trade practices broadly, to include “policies, measures, or barriers that undermine or harm U.S. production, or exports, or a failure by a country to take action to address a non-market policy or practice in a way which harms the United States.” USTR has also requested that comments quantify the harm caused by such practices—ideally with a corresponding dollar amount—and to explain the underlying methodology used to calculate that figure.Continue Reading USTR Seeks Public Comment on Unfair or Non-Reciprocal Trade Practices

On February 1, President Trump issued three executive orders (“EOs”) imposing broad tariffs on U.S. imports from Canada, Mexico, and China, initially to be effective on February 4. Invoking Presidential authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), the EOs expand the national emergency declared by…

Continue Reading Trump Administration Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico, and China

On January 8, 2025, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) published in the Federal Register a Final Rule that significantly changes the requirements for filing certificates of compliance for imported products under the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”). The publication of the Final Rule followed the CPSC’s vote to approve the Final Rule on December 18, 2024.

The Final Rule is intended to provide the CPSC and Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) with significantly more information about imported products, which will likely enhance enforcement against noncompliant products. Companies should take proactive measures to ensure that all imported products comply with the CPSA. They should also prepare for increased scrutiny of products upon import, which may result in delays and potential seizures of products, and ensure that they have processes in place for complying with all aspects of the Final Rule.

The Final Rule makes two major changes to existing CPSC requirements for filing certificates of compliance, which will take effect on July 8, 2026 (except that for products entering from a foreign trade zone for consumption or warehousing, the rule will take effect on January 8, 2027).

First, the Final Rule requires that for all imported products subject to a mandatory safety standard under the CPSA, importers must electronically file (“eFile”) the requisite certificate of compliance at the time of entry with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), which will then share the certificate with CPSC. Notably, products claiming a de minimis duty exemption under 19 U.S.C. § 1321 (“Section 321”)—i.e., products valued at less than $800—are also subject to this eFiling requirement. By requiring eFiling of certificates of compliance, including for de minimis products, the Final Rule is intended to improve the CPSC and CBP’s ability to collect data on imported products and bolster their monitoring and enforcement capabilities.

Second, the Final Rule newly defines the term “importer” in the CPSC regulations to be synonymous with the importer of record (“IOR”). This change places the responsibility for filing certificates of compliance for most imported products on the IOR. However, if the IOR is a customs broker, the broker is responsible for filing the certificate but can designate the “owner, purchaser, or consignee” as legally responsible for complying with the CPSC’s testing and certification requirements, including for the accuracy and validity of the data submitted on the certificate.

For mail and de minimis shipments, which do not have an IOR, the Final Rule clarifies that the “importer” can be an owner, purchaser, consignee, or authorized customs broker. Similar to products that do not fall under the de minimis exemption, the customs broker may file the certificate for a de minimis shipment but identify the owner, purchaser, or consignee as the party responsible for compliance. Continue Reading CPSC Revises Requirements for Certificates of Compliance

Alert December 19, 2024

As discussed in our prior client alert, President-elect Trump’s second term is expected to bring important changes to U.S. trade policy, including with respect to U.S. tariffs. Among the tools Trump may use to modify existing U.S. tariffs is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 301”), which provided the vehicle for imposition of tariffs against China under the first Trump administration. More recently, the Biden administration has initiated new proceedings under Section 301, while also modifying existing Section 301 tariffs against China. This alert provides an overview of Section 301, explores how Section 301 has been used by recent administrations to increase tariffs on imports from China, and surveys other Section 301 actions, including currently pending investigations. This alert also examines how a second Trump administration could reactivate or modify Section 301 tariffs that were previously announced, but have been suspended or terminated.

Overview of Section 301

Section 301 is an investigative tool under U.S. trade law that allows the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to pursue unilateral trade retaliation against countries that impose unfair trade barriers against the United States. USTR may launch Section 301 investigations in response to the filing of a petition submitted by an “interested party,” or upon USTR’s own initiative. Once a Section 301 investigation is launched, the statutory deadline for completion is typically between 12 and 18 months. Under the first Trump administration, USTR often did not use the full period provided under the statute, instead completing certain investigations several months before the statutory deadline.

As part of the investigative process, USTR must request consultations with the foreign government whose conduct is at issue, and it will generally also solicit public comments and hold a hearing as part of its investigation. At the end of the investigation, USTR is authorized to impose duties or other trade restrictions where it has determined:

  1. that the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being denied;
  2. that an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country violates, is inconsistent with, or otherwise denies the United States the benefits of any trade agreement; or
  3. that an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.

Once imposed, Section 301 tariffs must be terminated after four years unless an extension is requested. As explained below, USTR under certain conditions can also modify existing Section 301 duties or reinstitute previously suspended or terminated Section 301 actions.Continue Reading Section 301 Tariffs and Proceedings: Recent and Potential Developments

November 25, 2024, Covington Alert

The inauguration of President Trump on January 20 is expected to bring important changes to U.S. trade policy that are likely to affect companies that supply international customers, or are reliant on global supply chains. As discussed in our prior client alert, international trade is expected to be a key focus of President Trump, who has repeatedly expressed a preference for using tariffs as a policy tool to create perceived leverage for dealmaking with international partners on both economic and non-economic issues. Recent announcements by the Trump transition team regarding cabinet and staff appointments reinforce the view that trade policy under a second Trump administration could involve significant unilateral U.S. action, including the imposition of substantial new tariffs and a hawkish stance toward China. These new tariffs could be implemented swiftly after Trump takes office, or could alternatively be subject to more extensive investigative and reporting procedures, depending on the legal authority invoked. New tariff measures, as well as other trade actions Trump has proposed, could lead to retaliatory responses by U.S. trading partners, including key U.S. allies. This alert explores how trade policy may be implemented by a second Trump administration, and considers how companies may prepare for and mitigate the risks associated with these developments.

Cabinet Nominations and Other Economic Appointees

In recent weeks, Trump has announced several cabinet and staff appointments for his second administration, including individuals responsible for implementing trade policy. Key among them is Howard Lutnick, chairman and CEO of a Wall Street investment firm and co-chair of Trump’s transition team, whom Trump has selected to be Secretary of Commerce. Echoing Trump’s own views, Lutnick has been a strong advocate for using tariffs as an industrial policy tool and bargaining chip to rebalance U.S. trade, though he has suggested tariff measures under a second Trump administration may be more “targeted” than the universal 10 to 20 percent tariffs proposed by Trump during his campaign. In announcing Lutnick’s forthcoming nomination, Trump noted Lutnick would lead the administration’s “Tariff and Trade agenda,” and that he would have direct responsibility over the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”). As USTR is a separate agency established by Congress within the Executive Office of the President to lead on trade issues, it is uncertain if the announcement was referring to informal oversight over USTR or a formal restructuring of the agency. Should Trump seek to consolidate USTR within or under the Commerce Department, he may face opposition from Congress, whose approval would be required for such a reorganization. Continue Reading Trade Policy Under a Second Trump Administration and Implications for Business

October 28, 2024, Covington Alert

The upcoming U.S. presidential election on November 5 will have important implications for U.S. trade policy that are likely to affect companies reliant on international supply chains. There are important differences in how former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris approach the use of trade tools to advance U.S. policies and priorities, including whether such tools should be deployed unilaterally, or as part of a collective action with U.S. allies.

For instance, a victory by Harris will likely signal continuity in the current approach of the Biden administration, in which trade has not been a central policy priority, but has instead taken a backseat to—and been used as a tool to support—other key policies on climate, technology, human rights, and industrial development. While a Harris administration is therefore unlikely to pursue new trade initiatives aimed at increased market access, a Harris administration may consider joint action with U.S. allies and likeminded trading partners, or at least be receptive to input from such partners in pursuing trade-related actions.

In contrast, trade is expected to take center stage under a second Trump administration, with unilateral action expected to be the preferred approach. Trump has repeatedly referred to tariffs as his policy tool of choice, and views tariffs as important in creating leverage for dealmaking with international partners on both economic and non-economic issues. Trump and his economic advisors also view the U.S. trade balance as an important measure of economic performance, and bilateral trade deficits are likely to face scrutiny and provoke potential action.

This alert explores certain key trade issues to be confronted by the next administration, assesses how each candidate may approach these issues differently, and considers how companies may prepare for and mitigate the risks associated with each candidate’s approach.

Divergent Approaches to U.S. Tariffs

While Congress has primary constitutional authority over tariffs and other trade policy matters, the President has broad authority to adjust tariffs and impose other import restrictions under certain statutes, without approval from Congress. The outcome of the U.S. election will determine to a great extent the importance that tariffs will play as a U.S. policy tool over the next four years.Continue Reading The Impact of the U.S. Elections on Trade and International Supply Chains

Background

As we previously reported, President Biden and Congress took steps in March 2022 to revoke Russia’s most-favored-nation (or “MFN”) trade status, known as Permanent Normal Trade Relations (“PNTR”) status under U.S. law.  As a result of these actions, the Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act (“Suspending NTR Act”) entered into force on April 8, 2022, formally revoking PNTR status for Russia and Belarus.  Under the terms of the Act, imports into the United States of products from Russia and Belarus became subject to tariff rates set out in column 2 of the U.S. tariff schedule, rather than the column 1 rates that had previously applied.  Column 2 tariff rates are often higher—sometimes much higher—than MFN tariff rates in column 1, and as a result of this change, tariffs on U.S. imports from Russia increased from an average of approximately three percent to 32 percent.  In addition to implementing this immediate change in applicable tariff rates, the Suspending NTR Act also temporarily authorized the President, through the end of 2023, to increase even further tariffs applicable to imports from Russia and Belarus.

On June 27, pursuant to the authority granted under the Suspending NTR Act, President Biden issued Presidential Proclamation 10420, announcing that the United States would further increase tariffs applicable to certain categories of imports from Russia, worth approximately $2.3 billion annually.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) recently issued guidance on these tariff increases, which will apply effective July 27, 2022.  This alert provides additional information on the forthcoming tariff increases, and discusses potential implications for importers of Russian goods.

Overview of July 27 Tariff Rate Increase on Certain U.S. Imports from Russia

Since revocation of PNTR status in April, products imported into the United States from Russia and Belarus have been subject to tariff rates set forth in column 2 of the U.S. tariff schedule.  Under the terms of Presidential Proclamation 10420, however, duty rates of 35 percent ad valorem will apply to 570 categories of Russian products in lieu of column 2 rates, beginning July 27, 2022.  These product categories have an estimated value of approximately $2.3 billion annually.  The Proclamation does not impact imports from Belarus, which will remain subject to column 2 tariff rates.Continue Reading Increased Tariffs on Certain U.S. Imports from Russia Effective July 27, 2022: What Companies Need to Know

Importers of merchandise into the United States must use “reasonable care” in the importation process, which includes providing accurate and complete information necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) to process and release the merchandise into the United States.[1]  Importers who fail to take this obligation seriously do so at their peril, because catching importer mistakes that result in duty underpayments is an enforcement priority for CBP.  If CBP determines that an importer has failed to exercise reasonable care, CBP may impose substantial civil penalties, even if an error was unintentional.[2]  However, where importers discover their own import compliance errors before CBP does, they may significantly reduce their exposure to penalties by proactively and voluntarily disclosing such errors to CBP with a “prior disclosure.”  This article summarizes the fundamentals of a prior disclosure, and reports on recent efforts by CBP to standardize prior disclosure practices across U.S. ports of entry.

Prior Disclosure Fundamentals

CBP encourages importers to file prior disclosures,[3] and it often makes sense for an importer to do so.  The statutes, regulations and procedures that govern the importation of merchandise into the United States are complex and constantly changing, such that even the most experienced and vigilant importers make mistakes.  A prior disclosure allows an importer to disclose its violations of Customs laws and regulations to CBP and pay any unpaid duties or fees owed.  In exchange, the importer limits exposure to otherwise applicable penalties, by limiting the penalty to the interest owed.  CBP benefits as well, receiving prompt payment of duties owed (plus interest) without using internal resources to conduct an investigation of the reported violations and enforce a penalty order. Continue Reading Voluntary Disclosures to CBP: What Importers Need to Know About the Changing Landscape

Presidential Action Triggered by Crisis in the U.S. Solar Industry

In recent months, the U.S. solar industry has been in the midst of an existential crisis, triggered by the threatened imposition of retroactive and future tariffs on a significant portion of U.S. imports. That crisis began on April 1, 2022, when the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) initiated an inquiry to determine whether solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are circumventing antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) orders on solar cells from China. Solar cells from these countries generally accounted for approximately 80% of U.S. solar module imports in 2020.[1] If Commerce finds circumvention, solar cells and modules from the four target countries could not only be subject to combined AD/CVD tariffs approaching 250%, but Commerce’s regulations also allow for the agency to apply these tariffs retroactively to merchandise entering on or after April 1, 2022 (and potentially as far back as November 4, 2021). This threat of AD/CVD tariffs triggered a steep decrease in imports of solar cells and modules from Southeast Asia, and caused parts of the U.S. solar industry to come to a stand-still, furthering domestic reliance on coal.[2] Given this paralysis in the solar industry, lawmakers and others urged the President to provide relief from potential AD/CVD tariffs.[3]

The President’s Response

On June 6, 2022, President Biden issued a declaration of emergency (the “Declaration”)[4] pursuant to section 318(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1318), and issued a determination pursuant to section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. § 4533) (“the DPA Determination”)[5]. The Declaration finds that an emergency exists “with respect to the threats to the availability of sufficient electricity generation capacity” and authorizes Commerce to issue a moratorium on tariffs on solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam for up to a 24-month period, while the DPA Determination aims to “expand the domestic production capability” for solar cells during this 24-month period. The Declaration itself does not prevent the imposition of tariffs on imported solar cells and modules from the Southeast Asian countries, rather it authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to “take appropriate action” to permit the duty-free importation of solar cells and modules for 24 months after the Declaration’s issue date.[6]Continue Reading President Acts to Prevent Import Tariffs on Solar Cells and Modules from Southeast Asia

On March 11, 2022, President Biden announced that the United States, acting in coordination with the European Union (“EU”) and leaders of major economies belonging to the Group of Seven (“G7”), would begin taking steps to revoke most-favored-nation (or “MFN”) trade status for Russia. MFN trade status—known as Permanent Normal Trade Relations (“PNTR”) status in the United States—is a term used to describe the nondiscriminatory treatment granted among most of the world’s trading partners. Days after the President’s address, on March 16, the House passed to formally revoke PNTR for Russia, and also stripping Belarus of MFN treatment. The bill now moves to the Senate, where timing for its consideration is uncertain.

MFN status is a fundamental principle in the international trading system established under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), and as a general rule, WTO Members are required to accord MFN status to all other WTO Members. Having acceded to the WTO in 2012, Russia is generally entitled to MFN treatment by other WTO Members. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, several other WTO Members have joined the United States, the EU, and the G7 in stating an intent to revoke MFN treatment for Russia, invoking an “essential security” exception that permits WTO-inconsistent measures where a Member considers such measures to be “necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.” Statements issued by the White House and G7 Leaders emphasized the coordinated nature of the initiative across economies, and the intent to continue to pursue additional collective action to deny Russia the benefits of WTO membership.

While certain G7 countries, such as Canada, have already withdrawn Russia’s trade benefits by means of executive action, revocation of Russia’s PNTR status in the United States will require congressional action. While the House has passed a bill to do so, specific timing for consideration of that legislation in the Senate is still unknown. A revocation of Russia’s MFN status will increase tariff rates applicable to certain U.S. imports from Russia, and may also provoke Russia to take responsive, retaliatory actions against international firms. This alert provides background on Russia’s current trade status, analyzes congressional action to date on the issue, and describes the potential international trade implications for U.S. firms of a change in Russia’s trade status.

Background on Russia’s Trade Status

Under the principle of MFN treatment, WTO Members are required to treat imports of goods and services from any WTO Member as favorably as they treat the imports of like goods and services from any other WTO Member. In practice, this means that MFN treatment is the basic “non-discriminatory” treatment to which all WTO Members are generally entitled. Russia has been accorded MFN treatment by most major economies since it became a WTO Member in August 2012.
Continue Reading Revocation of Russia’s Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status: What Companies Need to Know