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On March 30, the Lula administration officially presented its proposed new fiscal policy framework for Brazil.

Minister of Finance Fernando Haddad and Minister of Planning and Budget Simone Tebet presented the framework to the press after several rounds of negotiation within the administration and with the congressional leadership, in particular the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate.

Key takeaways:

  1. The new framework tries to strike a balance between fiscal responsibility and social responsibility, combining fiscal adjustment measures with the preservation of budget for key social policies, in particular the conditional cash transfer to the poor, minimum wage, healthcare and income tax exemption for workers and the middle class.
  • The new framework’s ‘fiscal anchor’ is based on an annual primary budget surplus target (excluding debt interest payment), from -0.5% of GDP in 2023 to 1.0% of GDP in 2026, growing in 0.5 pp increments per year.
  • The annual primary budget surplus target will be pursued within a tolerance range between +0.25% and -0.25% of GDP of that year’s target (e.g., if the target for the year is 0.5%, the range will be from 0.25% to 0.75%). This tolerance range mechanism mirrors the existing inflation target mechanism used by the Central Bank.
  • In addition to the target, growth in spending will be pegged to revenue increase at 70% (e.g., if revenue increases BRL 10 billion, spending can increase only up to BRL 7 billion). If the annual primary budget surplus target is not achieved, the spending growth peg is reduced to 50% to slow down further spending.

Continue Reading Brazil’s Lula Administration Presents New Fiscal Framework

FCA Issues Reminder on Board and Executive Management D&I Disclosure Obligations

The UK Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has provided a reminder to primary market participants in its Primary Market Bulletin 44 of the need to make diversity and inclusion-related (“D&I”) disclosures in their annual reports. The obligations were introduced last year through amendments to the Listing Rules  and the Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules (“DTRs”), as set out in the FCA’s Policy Statement PS 22/3 (and covered in our previous blog post here).

At a glance, the amendments to the Listing Rules oblige in-scope companies to disclose annually on a “comply or explain” basis whether they meet specific board diversity targets, and to publish standardised data on the composition of their board and senior management, in each case in relation to sex or gender and ethnic background.

Changes to the corporate governance rules were introduced (through the amendments to the DTRs) to encourage a broader consideration of diversity at a board level, including with respect to a wider pool of diversity characteristics, spanning ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, and socio-economic background

The rules are intended to increase transparency with better, more comparable information on the diversity of companies’ boards and executive management. The FCA believes that greater transparency will provide improved data for companies and investors to assess progress in this area, and inform shareholder engagement and investment decisions, thereby enhancing market integrity and promoting greater D&I.Continue Reading FCA Primary Market Bulletin No. 44

On February 22, 2023, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the Nasdaq Stock Market (“Nasdaq”) filed rule proposals[1] to adopt new listing standards implementing Rule 10D-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That rule, which the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted in October 2022, requires national securities exchanges to implement standards to require listed companies to adopt and publicly file so-called “clawback” policies to recover erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation following accounting restatements. Rule 10D-1, which was first proposed in 2015 and re-opened for comment twice, implements Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

The proposed listing standards are subject to a 21-day comment period once published in the Federal Register before the SEC can approve them, and must, in any event, become effective by November 28, 2023. Listed companies will be required to adopt clawback policies that comply with the new standards within 60 days of the effective date of the applicable listing standards (the “Adoption Deadline”).

The listing standards proposed by both NYSE and Nasdaq are materially consistent with Rule 10D-1 and its adopting release. Among other things, both proposed listing standards provide for the commencement of delisting proceedings for listed companies that fail to either adopt a compliant clawback policy or comply with such policy after a clawback obligation arises. These delisting provisions are discussed below, and, for an in-depth discussion of Rule 10D-1’s requirements, please refer to our previous alert.

NYSE – Delisting for Noncompliance

Failure to Adopt a Policy: As proposed, a company listed on NYSE that fails to adopt a compliant clawback policy by the Adoption Deadline will have five days to notify NYSE, after which the exchange will send a written delinquency notification to the company. Upon receipt of this notification, the company would have five days to contact NYSE to discuss the delinquency and to issue a press release disclosing the company’s delinquency, the reason for the delinquency and, if known, the anticipated date on which a clawback policy will be adopted. If the company fails to issue such a press release in time, NYSE will issue a press release stating that the company has received a delinquency notice.Continue Reading NYSE and Nasdaq Propose Clawback Listing Standards

On October 26, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted a long-awaited rule that will require listed companies to adopt and publicly file so-called “clawback” policies.  As we discuss in more detail in this alert, the rule requires listed companies to adopt clawback policies to recover, reasonably

Continue Reading Executive Compensation Implications of SEC’s Final Rule on Clawback Policies

On October 26, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted a long-awaited rule[1] that will require listed companies to adopt and publicly file so-called “clawback” policies to recover erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation following accounting restatements. Companies with securities listed on national securities exchanges, including NYSE and Nasdaq, will be required to implement such policies within 60 days of the effective date of new listing standards, which the exchanges must adopt within 12 months of the new rule’s publication in the Federal Register. Companies who fail to comply will be subject to delisting.

The most significant deviation from the SEC’s initial proposal of the clawback rule in 2015 is that Rule 10D-1 will require companies to conduct a clawback analysis not only for “Big R” accounting restatements, which must be disclosed under Item 4.02(a) of Form 8-K, but also for “little r” accounting restatements, which involve the correction of errors in prior period financial statements when those financial statements are included in a current period filing.

Clawback Policy Requirements

Under the new rule, a listed company’s clawback policy must require the company to recover, reasonably promptly, erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation from persons who served as an executive officer at any time during the performance period for such incentive-based compensation and who received such compensation during the three fiscal years preceding the date on which the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement. The compensation to be recovered is the amount in excess of what would have been paid based on the restated results.Continue Reading SEC Requires Clawback Policy

Last week Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors and Development Ministers from around the world descended on Washington for the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  What did they say, what did they do and what does it mean for international businesses?

Volatility was the

Continue Reading World’s Economic Leaders Meet in Washington: Drawing the Implications for International Business Executives

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) last week announced settlements with four investment advisory firms regarding alleged violations of the SEC’s pay-to-play rule, illustrating that federal regulators continue to aggressively pursue such cases.   The rule at issue, Rule 206(4)-5 (“the Rule”), prohibits investment advisors from, among other things, receiving compensation from certain government entities for two years after a person affiliated with the investment advisor makes a covered campaign contribution to an official of the government entity.  While the involved firms did not admit or deny the allegations in the settlement orders, an examination of the cases is instructive in assessing the current landscape of SEC pay-to-play rule enforcement.  Together, the four settlements are noteworthy in two major respects: (1) the circumstances of the underlying contributions that highlight the wide-reaching application of Rule 206(4)-5; and (2) the fact that one of the SEC Commissioners issued a sharp dissent that expressed deep concern about the breadth of the Rule.

The settlements involved covered associates at four different firms making contributions to four different recipients: an unsuccessful candidate for Mayor of New York City; the incumbent Governor of Hawaii ; an unsuccessful candidate for Governor of Massachusetts; and to a then-candidate for Governor of California.  In two cases, the firms managed public pension money and, in the other two, the firms managed state university endowments, an often overlooked category of government entity investors. 

While the SEC Rule is intended to prevent fraud, it seems highly unlikely that any of the contributions at issue in these four cases could have influenced state investment decisions: 

  • All four investment advisory firms had preexisting business relationships with the relevant government entities before the prohibited contributions were made and no new business was solicited after the contributions. 
  • One of the donors was not even a covered associate at the time of the contribution.
  • Only one of the four prohibited recipients was an incumbent officeholder at the time of the contribution. 
  • Two of the four recipients failed to win election to the offices they sought. 
  • Two of the cases involved situations where the donor either received a refund or requested a refund. 
  • The contribution amounts were a drop in the bucket in proportion to the tens of millions of dollars raised in these elections – three cases involved a single $1,000 contribution and the fourth involved a contribution of $1,000 and another $400. 

Continue Reading SEC Commissioner Says It’s “Past Time” To Reform Overly “Blunt” Pay-to-Play Rule

In the wake of rulings upholding federal regulators’ “valid when made” rules, a new lawsuit serves as a reminder that state regulators and class-action plaintiffs’ lawyers may continue to challenge the bank partnership lending model under the “true lender” doctrine.

In early March, the fintech OppFi filed suit to stop
Continue Reading Fintech Lawsuit Highlights True Lender Risk for Bank Partnership Lending Model


Continue Reading The French Competition Authority gives its views on the competition issues arising from Fintech

Sustainable Finance Package: Context and CommentThe Commission’s intention with its Sustainable Finance Package is twofold: (1) in the short term, to set a clear regulatory framework to encourage investments that will contribute to a sustainable and inclusive economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) in the long term, to ensure the transition to a carbon neutral EU economy by 2050, in accordance with the 2020 European Climate Law.  Following the adoption of the EU Taxonomy Regulation (explained further below), the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, and the Benchmark Regulation, which enhances the transparency of benchmark methodologies, the Commission has in this legislative package laid out the next building blocks for its envisioned sustainable finance ecosystem.

In addition to the impact on financial institutions and investors directly subject to the new laws, the Sustainable Finance Package may impact corporates in the following ways:

  • Corporates may be more likely to receive requests for data on their environmental and other sustainability practices as upstream capital markets participants grapple with new obligations to distinguish between green, “light green,” and other investments;
  • Corporates may be subject to direct requirements to report on activities relating to their environmental, social, and governance objectives;
  • Longer-term, the package may form the basis of a “blueprint” for wider stakeholders, meaning that corporates may need to improve performance against the standards, not just to attract capital, but also to remain competitive; and
  • On a global level, these EU sustainability measures have real potential to become gold standards and influence the investment market outside of the EU, a phenomenon known as the ‘Brussels Effect’.[1]

Continue Reading The EU’s Green Capitalism Takes Shape: Taxonomy Screening Criteria and Corporate Sustainability Reporting