The second round of France’s snap parliamentary elections delivered a surprising result on Sunday: with 182 seats, the coalition of left-wing parties—the Nouveau Front populaire (“NFP”) emerged as the unexpected victor. Centrist parties supporting President Emmanuel Macron finished second with 168 seats altogether, whereas the far-right Rassemblement National (“RN”) and its allies—which in the first round had seemed to be within striking distance of an outright victory—secured only 143 seats, thwarting its hopes of being able to form the next government. With 289 seats needed for any single party to reach a majority in the lower house and form a government, President Macron’s decision to call early legislative elections has delivered an outcome that threatens gridlock in the EU’s second-largest economy.
There seems to be limited scope out of this deadlock: either a government formed of a grand coalition spanning from the centre right to the centre left, but excluding both the extremes (the RN on the far right and La France insoumise, “LFI”, on the far left); or to the formation of a caretaker, technocratic government until a political situation is found. Either way, the negotiations to form the next government threaten to be lengthy and torturous and the French Constitution prevents new parliamentary elections being held within the next 12 months. This situation will have profound implications not only for France but also for decision-making in the EU.
Background Context
In 2017, Emmanuel Macron’s unexpected yet victorious bid in the presidential elections had reshuffled the cards of the French political landscape, with traditional governing parties marginalised by a powerful central force, which vowed to overcome old cleavages. Surfing on a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections following his own election, the President’s first mandate (2017-2022) was marked by a willingness to boost France’s economic attractiveness: a labour reform, a single 30% tax rate on capital gains, the abolition of a wealth tax, and the reduction of corporate taxes have all contributed to curbing unemployment levels.
The French President’s approach to power, sometimes seen as vertical, was perceived to have prevented flagship reforms from being passed. In late 2018, the Yellow Vest movement provoked a political crisis and a year later, President Macron withdrew a pensions reform bill due to a prolonged national strike movement. The Covid-19 outbreak heralded further complications, with France’s unmatched fiscal measures to buffer the impact of the crisis leading to deteriorated public finances: the government deficit rose to 8.9% of GDP, while public debt rose by almost 20 percentage points, to 114.6% of GDP in 2020.
President Macron’s re-election in 2022 against Marine Le Pen, albeit by a smaller margin than in 2017, confirmed his strong ability to mobilise his electoral base. Yet, he was able to muster only a limited majority in the National Assembly. This was notwithstanding the alignment of presidential and parliamentary mandates (in a 2000 revision of the Constitution) that until now had mechanically enabled the President to obtain an absolute majority in the Parliament (called the “fait majoritaire”).
The lower house of the French Parliament was now home to an emboldened opposition, with the far-right National Rally gaining an unprecedented 88 seats and the radical-left Unbowed France dominating the alliance of left-wing parties. As such, Macron had to govern with an eclectic house, with conservative opposition group Les Républicains acting as kingmakers.
The unpopular 2023 pensions reform, passed via controversial article 49.3 of the Constitution (which allows the government to force passage of a bill without a vote unless the parliament passes a motion of no confidence) sparked political turmoil, with the motion of no confidence falling short of nine votes. Later in the year, the National Assembly adopted a motion to reject a bill on immigration without even debating it, prompting uproar after being finally adopted with more stringent measures and with the support of right-leaning Senate and the National Rally in the National Assembly. Marine Le Pen claimed that the reform represented an “ideological victory” for her party.
In this already difficult political context, President Macron abruptly called for snap parliamentary elections, in the aftermath of a crushing defeat in the European Parliamentary elections on the same day, also anticipating a looming non-adoption of a budget bill threatening the government later in the year.
Next steps
Following the elections, the National Assembly now sits for a fifteen-day period to elect its President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors, and to allocate its members within different committees, friendship groups, working groups and delegations. Under article 28 of the Constitution, the Parliament will only meet in a new ordinary session on the first working day of October, meaning parliamentary work will be suspended between the end of the current session and its return in October. This scheduling will give the President some breathing space to assess the political dynamics at play and identify a potential Prime Minister, and allow political negotiations to take place among parties to attempt forming a government. The National Assembly must then start examining the budget bill in the autumn.
Policy Implications
Following the failure of the President’s centrist alliance to win the elections, the French Prime Minister Gabriel Attal tendered his resignation, but Macron asked him to remain in place as a caretaker until a new government could be formed.
Since the creation of the Fifth Republic, France’s experience of “grand coalition” government has been strictly limited. This lack of experience compounds the difficulty of finding a solution to the current political impasse. The NFP was a marriage of electoral convenience—a centre-left to far-left coalition thrown together to oppose the growing power of the RN. The grouping already shows signs of fracture. Macron’s centrist supporters refuse to negotiate with LFI, and hope to form a coalition by picking off Deputies from the Greens, the Socialist Party and the centre Right Republican Party (or that part of it that did not choose to align with the RN). For its part, the LFI refuses point blank to enter coalition discussions with any other party, drawing sharp condemnation from Macron’s centrist grouping.
If this coalition proves impossible, an institutional deadlock, threatening political paralysis, could lead to the appointment of a technocratic, caretaker government. This could hobble French leadership in the EU—itself threatened with stasis following the shift to the right in the elections. The Council is usually the most stable of the EU institutions through the ongoing change-over, with the cadence of Member State governments by and large not related to the EU elections and the negotiations over the new Commission. But with France weakened—and Germany also facing political challenges in its governing coalition—it is likely to be harder to make decisions in the Council.
The French Constitution reserves foreign and defence policy to the President of the Republic—including the power to negotiate and ratify treaties. (Indeed, unlike the U.S. and many other countries, some international agreements do not need to be ratified by the Parliament—as was the case for the Agreement on Security Cooperation between France and Ukraine signed in February.) The President also manages France’s bilateral relations with the U.S., China, and Russia. However, other elements of France’s international relations cannot be ratified without Parliament’s consent—including peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international organizations, and those committing state finances. This means that it is unclear whether President Macron’s pledge to Ukraine to deliver Mirage fighter jets and other weapons systems can be met.
When it comes to forming the new Commission, the outcome of the French elections may have given a little more clarity. President Macron is now said to back the current French Commissioner, Thierry Breton, for a second term in office. However, there is no clear rule in the French constitution (or the EU treaties) as to whether it is the President or the Government that nominates France’s Commissioner. However, with either a coalition still formed around Macron’s centrist bloc, or a technocratic government, the President is likely to be able to insist on his candidate. Breton’s “Europe-first” approach to policymaking is likely to still hold some sway in Brussels. But Macron’s ability to drive the EU agenda forward is likely to continue to fade over the years between now and the end of his term in 2027. With Germany also struggling, the two motors of EU progress appear to be running on empty, with potentially important consequences for the EU.
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The global public policy team at Covington is well placed to advise you on these policy developments, and how to engage with the relevant decision-makers on these questions.
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Clovis de Bryas and Pol Revert Loosveldt of Covington & Burling LLP contributed to the preparation of this article.