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Daniel Feldman

Dan Feldman co-chairs the firm's ESG and Business & Human Rights practices.

Drawing on his prior positions in government service spanning multiple Administrations, former Ambassador Dan Feldman’s practice focuses on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) counseling, business and human rights (BHR), global public policy, as well as broader international regulatory compliance. He is a member of the firm’s Global Problem Solving initiative.

As Chief of Staff and Counselor to Secretary John Kerry when he was appointed the first Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (SPEC) by President Biden, Dan helped drive the U.S. government’s international climate agenda, coordinating high level interagency policy-making, engaging with corporate stakeholders, and contributing to key bilateral and multilateral climate discussions, including the 2021 Leaders' Summit on Climate and the landmark UN Conference of Parties (COP26) in Glasgow.

Previously, Dan served as deputy and then U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State in the Obama Administration, as Director of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council in the Clinton Administration, and as Counsel and Communications Adviser to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. He also has served as a senior foreign policy and national security advisor to a number of Democratic presidential and Congressional campaigns.

Dan has extensive experience counseling multinational corporations on mitigating risk and maximizing opportunities in the development and implementation of their ESG and sustainability strategies, with a particular background in advising on BHR matters. He was one of the first attorneys in the U.S. to develop a practice in corporate social responsibility, and has been cited by Chambers for his BHR expertise. He assists clients in strategizing about their engagements with a range of key stakeholders, including Members of Congress, executive branch officials, foreign government officials and Embassy representatives, multilateral institutions, trade and industry associations, non-governmental organizations, opinion leaders, and journalists.

On June 12, 2026, the European Commission (“Commission”) launched its public consultation on guidelines (“Guidelines”) that will significantly shape the implementation of the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (“CSDDD;” more details about the CSDDD available here). The consultation, presented in the form of a detailed questionnaire, is open

Continue Reading European Commission Seeks Public Input on CSDDD Guidelines: What to Watch

The European Commission (“Commission”) has launched a four-week feedback period — open until June 3, 2026 — on a draft delegated act to revise the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (“ESRS 2.0”).  Ultimately, EU companies in scope of the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSRD”) will have to draft their annual sustainability statements in accordance with the ESRS 2.0.  Non-EU ultimate parent companies may also use the ESRS 2.0 to publish one globally consolidated CSRD sustainability statement.

Continue Reading European Commission Publishes “ESRS 2.0” for Public Consultation: Draft Closely Follows EFRAG’s Technical Advice with Additional Simplifications for Companies

Europe has switched to a wartime mindset and is surging defense spending to levels not seen since the Cold War: 20% growth in 2024 and in 2025, and a total of around $450 billion across the EU. Europe is also ramping up defense production locally, and seeking to accelerate this process through preferential funding schemes. Ukraine has become a military powerhouse and a global leader in defense tech, such as drones and counter-drone systems. And the tech Ukraine has other countries need, particularly in the Middle East. The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara in July and the prospective EU-GCC summit later this year in Saudi Arabia will continue to shape investment priorities across EMEA. For private equity firms, technology companies, prime defense contractors, and scale-ups operating in the defense sector, this shift creates opportunities to meet rising demand, while also introducing additional regulatory complexity that must be navigated carefully to secure market access and long-term strategic positioning.

Continue Reading Future of Defense Across EMEA

On February 26, 2026, the European Union published Directive (EU) 2026/470 on the simplification of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (“CSDDD”) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (“CSRD”) in its Official Journal, clearing the final step in the Omnibus I legislative process.

This blog post: (i) summarizes the substance

Continue Reading EU CSDDD/CSRD Omnibus Published in Official Journal: Transposition, Delegated Acts, and Guidelines Are Next

When the UK Modern Slavery Act (“MSA”) came into force in 2015, it was hailed as a landmark for supply chain transparency on a key human rights risk. Today, there is widespread recognition among stakeholders that the UK may have fallen behind in its approach to corporate human
Continue Reading UK Business and Human Rights Landscape: 2026 Outlook

On May 29, 2025, the European Union established its new €150 billion defense fund through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) regulation.  The European Commission will soon launch a call for interest for SAFE loans and EU Member States will have up to two months to submit their

Continue Reading Launching 150 billion euro for defense and technology

In March 2025, the European Union published a white paper for European Defense Readiness 2030, which identifies defense needs and envisions a massive €800 billion four-year “ReArm Europe” investment plan. This initiative is a significant step change from the EU’s prior defense industrial strategy and earlier funding programs.

Rearming Europe would be financed by €150 billion in EU common debt made available as loans to Member States and €650 billion in national spending that EU fiscal rules would not constrain. This new package is intended to support EU Member State efforts to ramp-up defense capabilities and, if implemented, it would effectively double the overall amount of defense spending in Europe. Covington is working with clients in defense industry sectors across the wider West to maximize business opportunities created by this new funding.

Unleashing Europe’s Defense Potential

Given the “rapid deterioration of the geopolitical context and rising tensions,” the white paper pledges to unleash the EU’s resources and latent industrial and technological power on defense. It aims to swiftly increase support for Ukraine and deter Russia’s further aggression, while reducing dependency on U.S. military support. Further, it paves the way to tackle long-term security threats such as the “systemic” challenge posed by China and growing hybrid threats.

The EU seeks to support collaborative capability development among Member States, to enhance coordination and generate economies of scale.  Here, joint procurements will be a privileged tool, notably by setting up a European Military Sales Mechanism. This mechanism will support manufacturing capabilities and deliver more complex projects through aggregated demand and increasing predictability for the sector. To do so, it will incentivise long-term common procurements, as envisioned also by the European defense common procurement act.

In the near-term, investments and procurements on defense industrial capabilities will focus on rebuilding Europe’s depleted stocks of military hardware and equipment. Key capability domains include air and missile defense, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, military mobility, artificial intelligence, quantum, cyber & electronic warfare, strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection.

To quickly expand its defense capabilities, Europe is also exploring strengthening its defense industrial collaboration with trusted partners such as the Republic of Korea, Norway, and Japan (with which the EU signed Security and Defence Partnerships last year), as well as its traditional allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.

Continue Reading Rearming Europe with Trusted Partners

The second round of France’s snap parliamentary elections delivered a surprising result on Sunday: with 182 seats, the coalition of left-wing parties—the Nouveau Front populaire (“NFP”) emerged as the unexpected victor. Centrist parties supporting President Emmanuel Macron finished second with 168 seats altogether, whereas the far-right Rassemblement National (“RN”) and its allies—which in the first round had seemed to be within striking distance of an outright victory—secured only 143 seats, thwarting its hopes of being able to form the next government. With 289 seats needed for any single party to reach a majority in the lower house and form a government, President Macron’s decision to call early legislative elections has delivered an outcome that threatens gridlock in the EU’s second-largest economy.

There seems to be limited scope out of this deadlock: either a government formed of a grand coalition spanning from the centre right to the centre left, but excluding both the extremes (the RN on the far right and La France insoumise, “LFI”, on the far left); or to the formation of a caretaker, technocratic government until a political situation is found. Either way, the negotiations to form the next government threaten to be lengthy and torturous and the French Constitution prevents new parliamentary elections being held within the next 12 months. This situation will have profound implications not only for France but also for decision-making in the EU.

Background Context

In 2017, Emmanuel Macron’s unexpected yet victorious bid in the presidential elections had reshuffled the cards of the French political landscape, with traditional governing parties marginalised by a powerful central force, which vowed to overcome old cleavages. Surfing on a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections following his own election, the President’s first mandate (2017-2022) was marked by a willingness to boost France’s economic attractiveness: a labour reform, a single 30% tax rate on capital gains, the abolition of a wealth tax, and the reduction of corporate taxes have all contributed to curbing unemployment levels.

The French President’s approach to power, sometimes seen as vertical, was perceived to have prevented flagship reforms from being passed. In late 2018, the Yellow Vest movement provoked a political crisis and a year later, President Macron withdrew a pensions reform bill due to a prolonged national strike movement. The Covid-19 outbreak heralded further complications, with France’s unmatched fiscal measures to buffer the impact of the crisis leading to deteriorated public finances: the government deficit rose to 8.9% of GDP, while public debt rose by almost 20 percentage points, to 114.6% of GDP in 2020.

President Macron’s re-election in 2022 against Marine Le Pen, albeit by a smaller margin than in 2017, confirmed his strong ability to mobilise his electoral base. Yet, he was able to muster only a limited majority in the National Assembly. This was notwithstanding the alignment of presidential and parliamentary mandates (in a 2000 revision of the Constitution) that until now had mechanically enabled the President to obtain an absolute majority in the Parliament (called the “fait majoritaire”).

Continue Reading France drifts towards uncertainty after snap elections

In early March, the EU released its first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), accompanied by a proposed regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). The aim is to boost defence capabilities in Europe through greater and more efficient spending. In particular, the strategy seeks to reverse recent trends, whereby 78% of defence acquisitions by EU countries since Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine were made with non-EU producers, with U.S. firms accounting for 63%. It also addresses recent concerns by the defence industry over ESG constraints on obtaining private financing.

The ultimate benchmark for success, as recounted by one EU foreign minister, is whether these measures will help deter Russia and other adversaries. Nonetheless, it reflects greater operational focus of the EU on defence and security issues, and what in practice the European Commission and other EU institutions can do to bolster capabilities in a policy area that will remain the primary prerogative of EU Member States.

Plugging Defence Gaps

Since the end of the Cold War, European defence has suffered from perennial underinvestment and lack of policy support for the defence industry. Whereas Europe collectively spent on defence over half of the U.S. totals in the early 1990s, it now spends about one-third compared to the United States—arguably at a time of much greater security threats to Europe compared to America. There are simply not enough soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, missiles, guns, and ammunition in Europe, nor domestic facilities to produce the necessary weapons systems and materiel. Moreover, EU countries have procured defence products at a national level, exacerbating fragmentation within the European market. This fragmentation has led to the creation of national industrial silos and numerous defence systems that often lack interoperability.

Continue Reading Mobilizing Greater Defence Capabilities in Europe: the EU’s Defence Industrial Strategy

This year’s Munich Security Conference reemphasized the need for Europe to invest in greater defense capabilities and foster a regulatory environment that is conducive to building a defense and technological industrial base. In Munich, President Ursula von der Leyen committed to appointing a European Commissioner for Defence, if she is reselected later this year by the European Council and European Parliament. And the EU is also due to publish shortly a new defense industrial strategy, mirroring in part, the first-ever U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) released earlier this year by the Department of Defense.

The NDIS, in turn, recognizes the need for a strong defense industry in both the U.S. and the EU, as well as other allies and partners across the globe, in order to strengthen supply chain resilience and ensure the production and delivery of critical defense supplies. And global leaders generally see the imperative of working together over the long-term to advance integrated deterrence policies and to strengthen and modernize defense industrial base ecosystems. We will continue tracking these geopolitical trends, which are likely to persist regardless of electoral outcomes in Europe or the United States.

These developments across both sides of the Atlantic follow on a number of significant new funding streams in Europe over the past couple of years, for instance:

  • The 2021 revision of the European Defense Fund Regulation allocated €8 billion for common research and development projects, meant to be spent during the 2021-2027 multi-annual financial framework (MFF).
  • As a direct response to Ukraine’s request for assistance with the supply of 155 mm-caliber artillery rounds, the EU adopted the 2023 Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), with a €500 million fund to scale up production of ammunition and missiles.
  • Most recently, the EU adopted the 2023 European Defense Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), introduced a joint procurement fund of €300 million to facilitate Member States’ collective acquisition of defense products.
  • The European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget instrument, with an overall financial ceiling exceeding €12 billion, is primarily destined toward procurement of military material and large-scale financing of weapon supplies to allied third countries (including €6.1 billion for Ukraine).
Continue Reading Insights from the Munich Security Conference: Towards an Expanding U.S.-EU Defense Taxonomy?