Defense Issues

In March 2025, the European Union published a white paper for European Defense Readiness 2030, which identifies defense needs and envisions a massive €800 billion four-year “ReArm Europe” investment plan. This initiative is a significant step change from the EU’s prior defense industrial strategy and earlier funding programs.

Rearming Europe would be financed by €150 billion in EU common debt made available as loans to Member States and €650 billion in national spending that EU fiscal rules would not constrain. This new package is intended to support EU Member State efforts to ramp-up defense capabilities and, if implemented, it would effectively double the overall amount of defense spending in Europe. Covington is working with clients in defense industry sectors across the wider West to maximize business opportunities created by this new funding.

Unleashing Europe’s Defense Potential

Given the “rapid deterioration of the geopolitical context and rising tensions,” the white paper pledges to unleash the EU’s resources and latent industrial and technological power on defense. It aims to swiftly increase support for Ukraine and deter Russia’s further aggression, while reducing dependency on U.S. military support. Further, it paves the way to tackle long-term security threats such as the “systemic” challenge posed by China and growing hybrid threats.

The EU seeks to support collaborative capability development among Member States, to enhance coordination and generate economies of scale.  Here, joint procurements will be a privileged tool, notably by setting up a European Military Sales Mechanism. This mechanism will support manufacturing capabilities and deliver more complex projects through aggregated demand and increasing predictability for the sector. To do so, it will incentivise long-term common procurements, as envisioned also by the European defense common procurement act.

In the near-term, investments and procurements on defense industrial capabilities will focus on rebuilding Europe’s depleted stocks of military hardware and equipment. Key capability domains include air and missile defense, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, military mobility, artificial intelligence, quantum, cyber & electronic warfare, strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection.

To quickly expand its defense capabilities, Europe is also exploring strengthening its defense industrial collaboration with trusted partners such as the Republic of Korea, Norway, and Japan (with which the EU signed Security and Defence Partnerships last year), as well as its traditional allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.Continue Reading Rearming Europe with Trusted Partners

On April 9, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”), “Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation In the Defense Industrial Base,” that may have significant implications for federal government contractors doing business with the Department of Defense (“DoD”), and particularly those with touchpoints to Major Defense Acquisition Programs (“MDAPs”).

The EO requires DoD to take a number of actions, including:

  • Within 60 days (i.e., June 8th), the Secretary of Defense must submit to the President a plan to reform the DoD acquisition process to eliminate inefficiencies.  The plan must prioritize commercial solutions and the use of Other Transactions Authority (“OTA”) agreements and Rapid Capabilities Office mechanisms.  The plan must also eliminate redundant tasks and approvals, centralize decision-making, and incorporate effective risk management for all acquisition programs through a governance structure referred to as a Configuration Steering Board. 
  • Under no specified timeline, DoD is generally directed to revise internal regulations and implementation guidance — including the DoD Financial Management Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement — utilizing the principle from the “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation” EO (Jan. 31, 2025) that for every new regulation proposed, ten existing regulations should be repealed.
  • Within 90 days (i.e., July 8th), the Secretary of Defense must review all MDAPs and consider for “potential cancellation” programs that are: (1) more than 15% behind schedule; (2) more than 15% above cost; (3) “unable to meet key performance parameters”; or (4) otherwise not aligned with DoD mission priorities.  Following this review of MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense will conduct a similar review for all remaining major systems.
  • Within 120 days (i.e. August 7th), the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Military Departments, must propose a plan to overhaul the defense acquisition workforce by restructuring performance metrics, assessing workforce sizing requirements, and deploying expert-led field training teams to enhance familiarity with innovative acquisition authorities.  These reforms are intended to incentivize prudent risk-taking and expand the workforce’s fluency in commercial solutions and adaptive acquisition strategies.  
  • Within 180 days (i.e., October 6th), the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, must complete a comprehensive review of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (“JCIDS”), with the aim of streamlining and accelerating acquisition.[1] 

We address the EO’s directives for acquisition process reform and MDAP review in greater detail below. Continue Reading Trump Administration Issues Executive Order Aimed At Modernizing Defense Acquisitions And Spurring Innovation

President Trump recently issued two separate Executive Orders (EOs) that will have implications for how federal agencies seek to promote the administration’s goal of attracting domestic and foreign investment to industrial projects in the United States, with particular implications for the semiconductor and critical minerals industries. 

  1. An EO on March 31st establishes an “Investment Accelerator” office within the Department of Commerce that will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the CHIPS Program—including the negotiation of agreements under the CHIPS Act.  This office will also provide technical and regulatory support for investors, and seek to facilitate research collaborations between private industry and national labs. 
  2. An earlier EO issued on March 20th seeks to mobilize federal lending and leasing authorities at the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and other federal agencies to support the development of domestic critical mineral projects.  Per an accompanying fact sheet, the White House is taking a broad interpretation of covered minerals under this March 20th Order and will seek to include materials such as coal. 

Both EOs are notable efforts by the White House to align federal spending and financial assistance programs with the Trump Administration’s priorities, which have variously included calls to promote self-sufficiency in critical materials and promoting “energy independence” and “energy dominance.”  These efforts come against a backdrop under which the Administration is also pursuing the use of tariffs to promote U.S. manufacturing, and taking steps to review and in some cases modify or terminate infrastructure or energy-related grants from the Biden-era.  More details are provided below.  Continue Reading Trump Administration Issues Executive Orders that Seek to Shape CHIPS Program and Promote Domestic Mineral Production

Last month, DeepSeek, an AI start-up based in China, grabbed headlines with claims that its latest large language AI model, DeepSeek-R1, could perform on par with more expensive and market-leading AI models despite allegedly requiring less than $6 million dollars’ worth of computing power from older and less-powerful chips.  Although some industry observers have raised doubts about the validity of DeepSeek’s claims, its AI model and AI-powered application piqued the curiosity of many, leading the DeepSeek application to become the most downloaded in the United States in late January.  DeepSeek was founded in July 2023 and is owned by High-Flyer, a hedge fund based in Hangzhou, Zhejiang.

The explosive popularity of DeepSeek coupled with its Chinese ownership has unsurprisingly raised data security concerns from U.S. Federal and State officials.  These concerns echo many of the same considerations that led to a FAR rule that prohibits telecommunications equipment and services from Huawei and certain other Chinese manufacturers.  What is remarkable here is the pace at which officials at different levels of government—including the White House, Congress, federal agencies, and state governments, have taken action in response to DeepSeek and its perceived risks to national security.  

Federal Government-Wide Responses

  • Bi-Partisan Bill to Ban DeepSeek from Government Devices:  On February 7,Representatives Gottheimer (D-NJ-5) and LaHood (R-IL-16) introduced the No DeepSeek on Government Devices Act (HR 1121).  Reps. Gottheimer and LaHood, who both serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, each issued public statements pointing to grave and deeply held national security concerns regarding DeepSeek.  Rep. Gottheimer has stated that “we have deeply disturbing evidence that [the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) is] using DeepSeek to steal the sensitive data of U.S. citizens,” calling DeepSeek “a five-alarm national security fire.”  Representative LaHood stated that “[u]nder no circumstances can we allow a CCP company to obtain sensitive government or personal data.”

While the details of the bill have not yet been unveiled, any future DeepSeek prohibition could be extended by the FAR Council to all federal contractors and may not exempt commercial item contracts under FAR Part 12 or contracts below the simplified acquisition (or even the micro-purchase) threshold, similar to other bans in this sector.  Notably, such a prohibition may leave contractors with questions about the expected scope of implementation, including the particular devices that are covered.Continue Reading U.S. Federal and State Governments Moving Quickly to Restrict Use of DeepSeek

Barely noticed in the firehose stream of presidential activity since the inauguration was a brief Oval Office mention of cutting a deal with Ukraine for access to its critical minerals. Securing steady access to uranium, the rare earth elements, and other critical minerals is a natural priority for an America First agenda, so President Trump’s February 3 statement is unlikely to be his last. Changes to the tax code, permitting reform, regulatory incentives, and partnerships with allies as well as troubled nations are among the actions to watch for.

A Bipartisan Issue

Leaders of both parties agree that action is needed. “Whether it’s critical minerals with China … or uranium from Russia, we can’t be dependent on them,” Secretary of the Interior Doug Bergum asserted in his confirmation hearing. “We’ve got the resources here. We need to develop them.” Virginia Senator Mark Warner (D, VA) recently charged, “China dominates the critical mineral industry and is actively working to ensure that the U.S. does not catch up.” He urged, “The U.S. must, alongside allies, take meaningful steps to protect and expand our production and procurement of these critical minerals.” President Biden’s State Department was even more blunt, asserting that China is intentionally oversupplying lithium to “lower the price until competition disappears.”

Several recent developments have increased U.S. policymakers’ concerns about future supplies of critical minerals. New technologies, including artificial intelligence, promise to dramatically boost demand. China, meanwhile, is using new export control laws to curtail exports to the United States. A resurgent war in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), ostensibly over tribal rivalries, is actually a fight over the country’s rich mineral resources. These include gold and diamonds, but also coltan, an ore from which tantalum is extracted. Tantalum is extremely valuable for its use in the capacitors found in smartphones, laptops, and medical equipment.

The number of minerals in question (51), the usual number of steps in the production chain (4), and the variety of international agreements, public laws, private initiatives, and emerging technologies add up to a dizzyingly complex set of issues. Nevertheless, the bipartisan alignment evident in the above statements signals that impacted industries should watch closely for fast-moving legislative and regulatory developments.

Market Overview

Critical minerals are essential for a long list of industrial and defense-related needs. Attention is often focused on the 17 ‘rare earth elements,’ (REEs) but the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has a broader list of 50 mineral commodities that are critical to the nation’s economy and national security. Uranium is excluded by a statutory definition but is often tracked in parallel. Together, these 51 elements are used for a far wider array of products than is often recognized. The 17 REEs alone are also needed for oil refining, guided missiles, radar arrays, MRI machines, computer chips, hydrogen electrolysis, lasers, aluminum manufacturing, cameras, jet engines, satellite manufacturing, and a long list of other advanced applications.Continue Reading What President Trump Might Do on Critical Minerals

This is the first blog in a series covering the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (“FY 2025 NDAA”).  This first blog will cover: (1) NDAA sections affecting acquisition policy and contract administration that may be of greatest interest to government contractors; (2) initiatives that underscore Congress’s commitment to strengthening cybersecurity, both domestically and internationally; and (3) NDAA provisions that aim to accelerate the Department of Defense’s adoption of AI and Autonomous Systems and counter efforts by U.S. adversaries to subvert them. 

Future posts in this series will address NDAA provisions targeting China, supply chain and stockpile security, the revitalized Administrative False Claims Act, and Congress’s effort to mature the Office of Strategic Capital and leverage private investment to accelerate the development of critical technologies and strengthen the defense industrial base.  Subscribe to our blog here so that you do not miss these updates.

FY 2025 NDAA Overview

On December 23, 2025, President Biden signed the FY 2025 NDAA into law.  The FY 2025 NDAA authorizes $895.2 billion in funding for the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and Department of Energy national security programs—a $9 billion or 1 percent increase over 2024.  NDAA authorizations have traditionally served as a reliable indicator of congressional sentiment on final defense appropriations. 

FY 2025 marks the 64th consecutive year in which an NDAA has been enacted, reflecting its status as “must-pass” legislation.  As in prior years, the NDAA has been used as a legislative vehicle to incorporate other measures, including the FY 2025 Department of State and Intelligence Authorization Acts, as well as provisions related to the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs, among others.

Below are select provisions of interest to companies across industries that engage in U.S. Government contracting, including defense contractors, technology providers, life sciences firms, and commercial-item suppliers.Continue Reading President Biden signs the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025

This is part of a series of Covington blogs on the implementation of Executive Order 14028, “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” issued by President Biden on May 12, 2021 (the “Cyber EO”).  The first blog summarized the Cyber EO’s key provisions and timelines, and the subsequent blogs described the actions taken by various government agencies to implement the Cyber EO from June 2021 through October 2024.  This blog describes key actions taken to implement the Cyber EO, the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy, and other actions taken that support their general principles during November 2024. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Publishes Draft “Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information”

On November 13, 2024, NIST published a draft of Special Publication (“SP”) 800-172 Rev. 3 that “provides recommended security requirements to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of [Controlled Unclassified Information] when it is resident in a nonfederal system and organization and is associated with a high value asset or critical program.”  In particular, the draft requirements “give organizations the capability to achieve a multidimensional, defense-in-depth protection strategy against advanced persistent threats . . . and help to ensure the resiliency of systems and organizations.”  The draft requirements “are intended for use by federal agencies in contractual vehicles or other agreements between those agencies and nonfederal organizations.”  In the publication, NIST stated that it does not expect that all requirements are needed “universally.”  Instead, the draft requirements are intended to be “selected by federal agencies based on specific mission needs and risks.”

These requirements serve as a supplement to NIST SP 800-171, and apply to particular high-risk entities.  To that end, the current version of this NIST SP 800-172 (i.e., Rev. 2) is used by the U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”) for its forthcoming Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (“CMMC”) program, which we discussed in more detail here.  Specifically, contractors must implement twenty-four controls that DoD selected from SP 800-172 Rev. 2 in order to obtain the highest level of certification – Level 3.  Just as the CMMC Final Rule incorporated Rev. 2 of SP 800-171 (rather than Rev. 3), the CMMC program will not immediately incorporate SP 800-172 Rev. 3 requirements.  However, the draft requirements provide insight into how CMMC could evolve.Continue Reading November 2024 Developments Under President Biden’s Cybersecurity Executive Order and National Cybersecurity Strategy

From January to June 2025, Poland will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, presenting an ambitious agenda organized around the concept of security to tackle some of the EU’s most pressing challenges. This blog outlines the announced focus areas for technology, trade, defense, and ESG. Each of these topics is pivotal to ensuring the EU’s competitiveness, resilience, and sustainability in an increasingly complex global landscape.

Technology: Driving Innovation and Digital Transformation

The EU’s technological landscape is at a crossroads, driven by competition with the U.S. and China, and regulatory reforms such as the Digital Markets Act and the AI Act. The Polish Presidency will advance digital resilience by focusing on cybersecurity and AI governance. It commits to “promote the strengthening of European AI research, development and competence centres across the EU and support EU activities for entrepreneurs implementing disruptive technologies.” Poland also pledges to develop a “a comprehensive and horizontal approach to cybersecurity” by holding “a discussion on best practices in Member States on investing in cybersecurity” and creating a “new EU cybersecurity strategy.”

The EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which has facilitated transatlantic cooperation, faces uncertain prospects under evolving political landscapes. If disbanded, new bilateral arrangements like a UK-EU TTC may emerge. In technology diplomacy, the EU will likely prioritize collaborations on export control, investment screening, and dual-use technologies with allies​, including the U.S.

Trade: Enhancing Competitiveness and Reducing Dependencies

The EU’s trade policy faces heightened complexities in balancing openness with economic security. Amidst Russia’s destabilizing actions and the economic decoupling from China, the Polish Presidency prioritizes reinforcing the EU’s economic sovereignty. Enhancements to the EU Customs Union and trade components of the Association Agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are expected, aligning economic cooperation with strategic resilience.Continue Reading “Security, Europe!” Priorities of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council

On November 15, 2024, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“Proposed Rule”) entitled “Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Disclosure of Information Regarding Foreign Obligations.”  The Proposed Rule would impose new disclosure obligations on “Offeror[s]” (pre-award) and “Contractor[s]” (post-award) that are triggered in certain circumstances by review or by an obligation to allow review of their source or computer code either by a foreign government or a foreign person.  If the Proposed Rule takes effect, the obligations would apply to any “prospective contractor” or any existing contractor.  The Proposed Rule also does not distinguish between companies based in or outside the United States.

The Proposed Rule would implement the requirement of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (“NDAA”) section 1655 which states that “[DoD] may not use a product, service, or system procured or acquired after the date of the enactment of this Act relating to information or operational technology, cybersecurity, an industrial control system, or weapons system provided by a person unless that person” makes certain disclosures related to: (1) foreign government or foreign person access to computer or source code, and (2) the person’s Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) or International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) applications or licenses.  Importantly, per the NDAA, these disclosure obligations include activities dating back to August 13, 2013.

A summary of the obligations and key definitions as described by the Proposed Rule are below.

Disclosure Obligations

Disclosure of Source or Computer Code

The Proposed Rule would require any “Offeror” or “Contractor” for defense contracts to disclose in the Catalog Data Standard in the Electronic Data Access (“EDA”) system (https://piee.eb.mil) “[w]hether, and if so, when, at any time after August 12, 2013,” they (1) “allowed a foreign person or foreign government to review” or (2) “[are] under any obligation to allow a foreign person or foreign government to review, as a condition of entering into an agreement for sale or other transaction with a foreign government or with a foreign person on behalf of such a government”:

  • “The source code for any product, system, or service that DoD is using or intends to use; or
  • The computer code for any other than commercial product, system, or service developed for DoD.”

When this clause is included in a solicitation, by submitting its offer to the government or higher tier contractor, an “Offeror” is representing that it “has completed the foreign obligation disclosures in EDA and the disclosures are current, accurate, and complete.”  For post-award disclosures, the requirements would most likely first be added in new task orders, delivery orders, and options. Continue Reading Department of Defense Publishes Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Disclosure of Computer and Source Code to Foreign Entities

As the world anticipates the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the European Union (“EU”) braces for significant impacts in various sectors. The first Trump administration’s approach to transatlantic relations was characterized by unpredictability, tariffs on imported goods, a strained NATO relationship, and withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement. If past is prologue, the EU must prepare for a renewed era of uncertainty and potential adversarial policies.

Trade Relations

Trump’s self-proclaimed identity as a “tariff man” suggests that trade policies would once again be at the forefront of his administration’s priorities. His campaign promises, which include imposing global tariffs on all goods from all countries in the range of 10 % to 20%, signal a departure from traditional U.S. trade policies. Such measures could have severe repercussions for the EU, both directly through increased tariffs on its exports and indirectly via an influx of dumped products from other affected nations, particularly China. Broad-based tariffs of this nature would likely provoke retaliatory measures from the EU.

The EU’s response toolkit would likely mirror many of the actions it employed between 2018 and 2020 in reaction to U.S. tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration. These measures would include retaliation on U.S. products to maximize political pressure by targeting Trump-supporting constituencies, pursuing chosen legal challenges against the U.S. at the World Trade Organization, and implementing safeguards to shield the EU market from an influx of Chinese and other diverted goods following U.S. tariff hikes. Very practically, the EU has suspended tariffs on US exports of steel and aluminum to its market worth €2.8 billion. The suspension expires on 1 March 2025, requiring an active decision on whether to reintroduce them or not.

In executing these measures, the EU is expected to collaborate with allies such as the UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, and South Korea to amplify its response. The EU may also explore smaller trade agreements or informal “packages” with the U.S. as part of a negotiated tariff truce. Broader protective measures could also be pursued, focusing on subsidies and industrial policies aimed at strengthening Europe’s strategic sectors, beyond actions specific to the U.S. Some cooperation with the U.S. on China may also be possible in areas like export control, investment control, and dual-use technologies.Continue Reading Policy Implications for Europe Under a Second Trump Administration