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Bart Szewczyk

Having served in senior advisory positions in the U.S. government, Bart Szewczyk advises on European and global public policy, particularly on technology, economic sanctions and asset seizure, trade and foreign investment, business and human rights, and environmental, social, and governance issues, as well as conducts international arbitration. He also teaches grand strategy as an Adjunct Professor at Sciences Po in Paris and is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

Bart recently worked as Advisor on Global Affairs at the European Commission's think-tank, where he covered a wide range of foreign policy issues, including international order, defense, geoeconomics, transatlantic relations, Russia and Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and China and Asia. Previously, between 2014 and 2017, he served as Member of Secretary John Kerry’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he covered Europe, Eurasia, and global economic affairs. From 2016 to 2017, he also concurrently served as Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, where he worked on refugee policy. He joined the U.S. government from teaching at Columbia Law School, as one of two academics selected nationwide for the Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. He has also consulted for the World Bank and Rasmussen Global.

Prior to government, Bart was an Associate Research Scholar and Lecturer-in-Law at Columbia Law School, where he worked on international law and U.S. foreign relations law. Before academia, he taught international law and international organizations at George Washington University Law School, and served as a visiting fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies. He also clerked at the International Court of Justice for Judges Peter Tomka and Christopher Greenwood and at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for the late Judge Leonard Garth.

Bart holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge University where he studied as a Gates Scholar, a J.D. from Yale Law School, an M.P.A. from Princeton University, and a B.S. in economics (summa cum laude) from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. He has published in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Harvard International Law Journal, Columbia Journal of European Law, American Journal of International Law, George Washington Law Review, Survival, and elsewhere. He is the author of three books: Europe’s Grand Strategy: Navigating a New World Order (Palgrave Macmillan 2021); with David McKean, Partners of First Resort: America, Europe, and the Future of the West (Brookings Institution Press 2021); and European Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Power (Routledge 2021).

Contact:Read more about Bart SzewczykEmail

On 8 May 2025, the European Union launched a public consultation on potential countermeasures in response to U.S. automotive tariffs and the potential imposition of a 20% “reciprocal” tariff on EU-origin goods—covering around €379 billion of EU exports to the U.S.  In particular, the EU is considering imposing tariffs on U.S. imports worth approximately €95 billion, covering a wide range of industrial and agricultural products.  The Commission is also evaluating possible restrictions on EU exports to the U.S., principally steel scrap and certain chemical products, valued at €4.4 billion.  If implemented, the export restrictions could take the form of export duties, quantitative restrictions such as quotas or licensing requirements, additional administrative charges, or a combination of these measures.  No specific tariff rates have been proposed at this stage and the consultation is open until 10 June.  Notably, the EU has not thus far targeted U.S. services as part of its retaliatory measures.

These countermeasures could be activated if ongoing EU-U.S. negotiations fail to deliver a mutually acceptable resolution, and the U.S. tariffs remain in place.  While the U.S. currently imposes a 10% global reciprocal tariff on most imports, the negotiations follow a decision by President Trump to pause higher, country-specific tariff rates that were scheduled to come into effect on April 9 and would have increased the reciprocal tariff rate on U.S. imports from the EU to 20%.  Those higher tariffs are paused for 90-days, or until 9 July 2025, absent an extension.  EU exports of autos and auto parts to the U.S. are also subject to 25% tariffs, while the U.S. is also considering imposing additional sector-specific tariffs on—among other sectors—imports of pharmaceuticals and related ingredients; semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment and their derivative products; critical minerals and their derivative products; as well as commercial aircraft, jet engines, and related parts.  Should it proceed with any of these measures, the EU is likely to increase the scope of its proposed response.

If adopted, the EU countermeasures would supplement the existing EU “Rebalancing Tariffs” previously introduced—and suspended until 14 July—in response to increased U.S. steel and aluminum duties.  Most of the products covered by the Rebalancing Tariffs would be subject to a 25% ad valorem duty, with some facing a reduced rate of 10%.  The Rebalancing Tariffs would apply to U.S. goods exports worth up to €26 billion.

The Enforcement Regulation and the Anti-Coercion Instrument

In preparing for a scenario in which negotiations with the U.S. fail to bring tariff relief, the EU has several legal instruments at its disposal to take responsive countermeasures, most notably the Enforcement Regulation and the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), with some overlapping and some distinguishing features.

A. Intended Use of the Two Instruments

The Enforcement Regulation is a long-standing mechanism designed to enforce the EU’s rights under international trade agreements, including under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.  Initially adopted in 2014 and amended in 2021, it empowers the EU to respond to breaches of trade obligations—particularly when a trading partner withdraws concessions granted under WTO agreements or fails to implement a ruling adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  Crucially, the amended Regulation now allows the EU to act unilaterally when multilateral adjudication is not possible, including in the absence of a functioning WTO Appellate Body (which has lacked the necessary quorum since late 2019, following a U.S. refusal to appoint additional members to the body).Continue Reading EU Consults on New Tariffs on €95 Billion of U.S. Imports

In March 2025, the European Union published a white paper for European Defense Readiness 2030, which identifies defense needs and envisions a massive €800 billion four-year “ReArm Europe” investment plan. This initiative is a significant step change from the EU’s prior defense industrial strategy and earlier funding programs.

Rearming Europe would be financed by €150 billion in EU common debt made available as loans to Member States and €650 billion in national spending that EU fiscal rules would not constrain. This new package is intended to support EU Member State efforts to ramp-up defense capabilities and, if implemented, it would effectively double the overall amount of defense spending in Europe. Covington is working with clients in defense industry sectors across the wider West to maximize business opportunities created by this new funding.

Unleashing Europe’s Defense Potential

Given the “rapid deterioration of the geopolitical context and rising tensions,” the white paper pledges to unleash the EU’s resources and latent industrial and technological power on defense. It aims to swiftly increase support for Ukraine and deter Russia’s further aggression, while reducing dependency on U.S. military support. Further, it paves the way to tackle long-term security threats such as the “systemic” challenge posed by China and growing hybrid threats.

The EU seeks to support collaborative capability development among Member States, to enhance coordination and generate economies of scale.  Here, joint procurements will be a privileged tool, notably by setting up a European Military Sales Mechanism. This mechanism will support manufacturing capabilities and deliver more complex projects through aggregated demand and increasing predictability for the sector. To do so, it will incentivise long-term common procurements, as envisioned also by the European defense common procurement act.

In the near-term, investments and procurements on defense industrial capabilities will focus on rebuilding Europe’s depleted stocks of military hardware and equipment. Key capability domains include air and missile defense, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, military mobility, artificial intelligence, quantum, cyber & electronic warfare, strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection.

To quickly expand its defense capabilities, Europe is also exploring strengthening its defense industrial collaboration with trusted partners such as the Republic of Korea, Norway, and Japan (with which the EU signed Security and Defence Partnerships last year), as well as its traditional allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.Continue Reading Rearming Europe with Trusted Partners

On 12 March, the European Commission responded to the imposition of new U.S. tariffs on EU steel and aluminum imports.  The Commission pledged to implement “swift and proportionate countermeasures on U.S. imports into the EU,” signaling a firm stance while leaving the door open for future negotiations.

Announced Countermeasures under the Enforcement Regulation

The EU’s response is made up of two measures:

  1. The reinstatement of 2018 and 2020 EU additional ad valorem duties on certain U.S. imports (“Old Rebalancing Measures”):  In 2018, the first Trump Administration introduced 25% and 10% tariffs on EU steel and aluminum exports, respectively, under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.  As a response, the EU adopted a list of additional ad valorem duties on certain U.S. imports.  In 2020, the first Trump Administration extended the tariffs to cover certain steel and aluminum derivative products.  The EU then adopted a broader list of additional ad valorem duties on certain U.S. imports.  Adopted under the Enforcement Regulation, these Old Rebalancing Measures were designed to maximize political pressure on the first Trump Administration to rescind its tariffs.  They were suspended in 2023 following an agreement with the Biden Administration.

    As the suspension of the Old Rebalancing Measures expires automatically on 31 March, the Commission will reimpose them.  These Old Rebalancing Measures cover approximately €8 billion worth of EU imports from the U.S., intended to be proportionate to addressing the economic damage inflicted by the U.S. tariffs, and concern products ranging from boats to bourbon to motorbikes.

  2. New EU measures under Article 5 of the Enforcement Regulation (“New Rebalancing Measures”):  In response to the fresh U.S. tariffs impacting another €18 billion of EU exports, the Commission now plans to roll out new or additional ad valorem duties under Article 5 of the Enforcement Regulation (see the suggested product list).  A stakeholder consultation is open for comment from 12–26 March, gathering input from affected industries.  Following this, the Commission will draft an implementing act and consult Member States through the comitology procedure (as provided by the Enforcement Regulation).  The implementing act is scheduled to take effect mid-April, bringing the total value of U.S. exports potentially impacted by the Old and New Rebalancing Measures to €26 billion.

Continue Reading EU’s Reaction to New U.S. Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

On 15 January 2025, the European Commission recommended that EU Member States review outbound investment in three critical technologies—semiconductors, AI, and quantum—with the aim of potentially creating an EU–wide regime to regulate such investment. EU Member States should report to the Commission on their findings and risk assessment within 18 months. These findings would inform a future policy proposal, so any introduction of outbound investment rules in the EU is likely to be several years away.

How did we get here?

Outbound investment mechanisms aim to regulate domestic companies making outward investments of capital, expertise, and knowledge that could contribute to the ‘leakage’ of critical and sensitive  technologies to third countries. Outbound investments typically take the form of EU firms purchasing equity in non-EU entities (e.g.  through joint ventures, greenfield investments), but can also take place through less structured arrangements such as R&D cooperation or transfer of employees.

The focus on outbound investment screening has its roots in transatlantic cooperation on China policy, and specifically the desire to minimize Western technology leakage to China. In particular, the U.S. Treasury Department issued new regulation prohibiting or otherwise requiring disclosure of outbound investment—in semiconductors, AI, and quantum—in Chinese entities as well as entities in other jurisdictions that hold certain interests in Chinese companies. The regulations entered into force on 2 January 2025.

Within the EU, outbound investment control was put on agenda with the European Economic Security Strategy and a subsequent white paper on outbound investment. Before then, only a few EU countries, such as Austria and Spain would screen outbound investment, and there had been no EU-wide approach on this topic.

What does it mean?

EU Member States are requested to monitor outbound investments in three critical technologies: semiconductors, AI, and quantum. The original white paper proposal also named biotechnologies amongst suggested critical technologies to be covered by the review, but this has been dropped in the new recommendation. The recommended scope of the monitoring exercise is as follows:Continue Reading Toward EU Outbound Investment Regulation

The new European Commission, which took office in December 2024, will likely rebalance its policy priorities, putting greater emphasis on competitiveness and innovation and less on risk-prevention and regulation. Over the past five years, the EU adopted several sweeping tech regulations, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the AI Act. For the next five years, the focus is likely to be on implementing and streamlining these rules, rather than adopting new overarching tech regulatory frameworks. The Commission will also seek to facilitate greater public and private investment in technology, a sector in which the EU has lagged over the past 20 years, as noted by Mario Draghi in his report on Europe’s competitiveness.

Tech Policy Central to the EU

For the 2024-2029 term, Henna Virkkunen has been appointed as the Executive Vice-President (EVP) for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy. Virkkunen’s portfolio places tech policy at the heart of the new Commission’s agenda, reflecting its strategic importance for EU competitiveness.

Virkkunen, a former Member of the European Parliament from Finland with a robust track record in tech policy, assumes leadership of the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CNECT). In contrast to the often-aggressive stance of her predecessor, Thierry Breton, towards industry leaders, Virkkunen is expected to be more collaborative. Virkkunen’s alignment with von der Leyen’s vision is anticipated to bring coherence to the Commission’s tech agenda. DG CNECT no longer reports to two Commissioners (Vestager and Breton in the last Commission), which will simplify its management. Placing it under EVP Virkkunen, who is relatively senior in the College of Commissioners, underscores that digital policy is a priority for this Commission.

Virkkunen will need to coordinate closely with other Commissioners, such as Stéphane Séjourné (EVP for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy), who will oversee the development of a European competitiveness fund to support emerging technologies. This initiative should align with Virkkunen’s efforts to strengthen EU capabilities in AI and semiconductors through Important Projects of Common European Interest. Virkkunen also effectively oversees four other Commissioners, including Ekaterina Zaharieva (Startups, Research and Innovation), who has been mandated to set up a European AI Research Council in order to bolster innovation, and Michael McGrath (Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection), who will revise data retention rules to address potential privacy and security concerns.

Virkkunen’s Ambitious Policy Agenda

Henna Virkkunen’s mission is both expansive and strategically aligned with the EU’s overarching goals of digital sovereignty and competitiveness. She has three core priorities: artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and quantum technologies.Continue Reading What Does the New European Commission Mean for EU Tech Policy?

From January to June 2025, Poland will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, presenting an ambitious agenda organized around the concept of security to tackle some of the EU’s most pressing challenges. This blog outlines the announced focus areas for technology, trade, defense, and ESG. Each of these topics is pivotal to ensuring the EU’s competitiveness, resilience, and sustainability in an increasingly complex global landscape.

Technology: Driving Innovation and Digital Transformation

The EU’s technological landscape is at a crossroads, driven by competition with the U.S. and China, and regulatory reforms such as the Digital Markets Act and the AI Act. The Polish Presidency will advance digital resilience by focusing on cybersecurity and AI governance. It commits to “promote the strengthening of European AI research, development and competence centres across the EU and support EU activities for entrepreneurs implementing disruptive technologies.” Poland also pledges to develop a “a comprehensive and horizontal approach to cybersecurity” by holding “a discussion on best practices in Member States on investing in cybersecurity” and creating a “new EU cybersecurity strategy.”

The EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which has facilitated transatlantic cooperation, faces uncertain prospects under evolving political landscapes. If disbanded, new bilateral arrangements like a UK-EU TTC may emerge. In technology diplomacy, the EU will likely prioritize collaborations on export control, investment screening, and dual-use technologies with allies​, including the U.S.

Trade: Enhancing Competitiveness and Reducing Dependencies

The EU’s trade policy faces heightened complexities in balancing openness with economic security. Amidst Russia’s destabilizing actions and the economic decoupling from China, the Polish Presidency prioritizes reinforcing the EU’s economic sovereignty. Enhancements to the EU Customs Union and trade components of the Association Agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are expected, aligning economic cooperation with strategic resilience.Continue Reading “Security, Europe!” Priorities of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council

As the world anticipates the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the European Union (“EU”) braces for significant impacts in various sectors. The first Trump administration’s approach to transatlantic relations was characterized by unpredictability, tariffs on imported goods, a strained NATO relationship, and withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement. If past is prologue, the EU must prepare for a renewed era of uncertainty and potential adversarial policies.

Trade Relations

Trump’s self-proclaimed identity as a “tariff man” suggests that trade policies would once again be at the forefront of his administration’s priorities. His campaign promises, which include imposing global tariffs on all goods from all countries in the range of 10 % to 20%, signal a departure from traditional U.S. trade policies. Such measures could have severe repercussions for the EU, both directly through increased tariffs on its exports and indirectly via an influx of dumped products from other affected nations, particularly China. Broad-based tariffs of this nature would likely provoke retaliatory measures from the EU.

The EU’s response toolkit would likely mirror many of the actions it employed between 2018 and 2020 in reaction to U.S. tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration. These measures would include retaliation on U.S. products to maximize political pressure by targeting Trump-supporting constituencies, pursuing chosen legal challenges against the U.S. at the World Trade Organization, and implementing safeguards to shield the EU market from an influx of Chinese and other diverted goods following U.S. tariff hikes. Very practically, the EU has suspended tariffs on US exports of steel and aluminum to its market worth €2.8 billion. The suspension expires on 1 March 2025, requiring an active decision on whether to reintroduce them or not.

In executing these measures, the EU is expected to collaborate with allies such as the UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, and South Korea to amplify its response. The EU may also explore smaller trade agreements or informal “packages” with the U.S. as part of a negotiated tariff truce. Broader protective measures could also be pursued, focusing on subsidies and industrial policies aimed at strengthening Europe’s strategic sectors, beyond actions specific to the U.S. Some cooperation with the U.S. on China may also be possible in areas like export control, investment control, and dual-use technologies.Continue Reading Policy Implications for Europe Under a Second Trump Administration

On July 18, 2024, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second five-year term. As part of the process, she delivered a speech before the Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which outlines the Commission’s political guidelines and…

Continue Reading The Future of EU Defence Policy and a Renewed Focus on Technology Security

The second round of France’s snap parliamentary elections delivered a surprising result on Sunday: with 182 seats, the coalition of left-wing parties—the Nouveau Front populaire (“NFP”) emerged as the unexpected victor. Centrist parties supporting President Emmanuel Macron finished second with 168 seats altogether, whereas the far-right Rassemblement National (“RN”) and its allies—which in the first round had seemed to be within striking distance of an outright victory—secured only 143 seats, thwarting its hopes of being able to form the next government. With 289 seats needed for any single party to reach a majority in the lower house and form a government, President Macron’s decision to call early legislative elections has delivered an outcome that threatens gridlock in the EU’s second-largest economy.

There seems to be limited scope out of this deadlock: either a government formed of a grand coalition spanning from the centre right to the centre left, but excluding both the extremes (the RN on the far right and La France insoumise, “LFI”, on the far left); or to the formation of a caretaker, technocratic government until a political situation is found. Either way, the negotiations to form the next government threaten to be lengthy and torturous and the French Constitution prevents new parliamentary elections being held within the next 12 months. This situation will have profound implications not only for France but also for decision-making in the EU.

Background Context

In 2017, Emmanuel Macron’s unexpected yet victorious bid in the presidential elections had reshuffled the cards of the French political landscape, with traditional governing parties marginalised by a powerful central force, which vowed to overcome old cleavages. Surfing on a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections following his own election, the President’s first mandate (2017-2022) was marked by a willingness to boost France’s economic attractiveness: a labour reform, a single 30% tax rate on capital gains, the abolition of a wealth tax, and the reduction of corporate taxes have all contributed to curbing unemployment levels.

The French President’s approach to power, sometimes seen as vertical, was perceived to have prevented flagship reforms from being passed. In late 2018, the Yellow Vest movement provoked a political crisis and a year later, President Macron withdrew a pensions reform bill due to a prolonged national strike movement. The Covid-19 outbreak heralded further complications, with France’s unmatched fiscal measures to buffer the impact of the crisis leading to deteriorated public finances: the government deficit rose to 8.9% of GDP, while public debt rose by almost 20 percentage points, to 114.6% of GDP in 2020.

President Macron’s re-election in 2022 against Marine Le Pen, albeit by a smaller margin than in 2017, confirmed his strong ability to mobilise his electoral base. Yet, he was able to muster only a limited majority in the National Assembly. This was notwithstanding the alignment of presidential and parliamentary mandates (in a 2000 revision of the Constitution) that until now had mechanically enabled the President to obtain an absolute majority in the Parliament (called the “fait majoritaire”).Continue Reading France drifts towards uncertainty after snap elections

In early March, the EU released its first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), accompanied by a proposed regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). The aim is to boost defence capabilities in Europe through greater and more efficient spending. In particular, the strategy seeks to reverse recent trends, whereby 78% of defence acquisitions by EU countries since Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine were made with non-EU producers, with U.S. firms accounting for 63%. It also addresses recent concerns by the defence industry over ESG constraints on obtaining private financing.

The ultimate benchmark for success, as recounted by one EU foreign minister, is whether these measures will help deter Russia and other adversaries. Nonetheless, it reflects greater operational focus of the EU on defence and security issues, and what in practice the European Commission and other EU institutions can do to bolster capabilities in a policy area that will remain the primary prerogative of EU Member States.

Plugging Defence Gaps

Since the end of the Cold War, European defence has suffered from perennial underinvestment and lack of policy support for the defence industry. Whereas Europe collectively spent on defence over half of the U.S. totals in the early 1990s, it now spends about one-third compared to the United States—arguably at a time of much greater security threats to Europe compared to America. There are simply not enough soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, missiles, guns, and ammunition in Europe, nor domestic facilities to produce the necessary weapons systems and materiel. Moreover, EU countries have procured defence products at a national level, exacerbating fragmentation within the European market. This fragmentation has led to the creation of national industrial silos and numerous defence systems that often lack interoperability.Continue Reading Mobilizing Greater Defence Capabilities in Europe: the EU’s Defence Industrial Strategy