Competition

Introduction

In the space of just one week, the EU’s top court, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), delivered two important judgments that clarify the scope of sport rule-making activities that can benefit from an antitrust exemption: the ROGON judgment on 9 July 2026, and the much more detailed RRC Sports judgment on 16 July 2026, which builds on and develops ROGON.  The sporting rules at play in these cases concerned football players’ agents, and more specifically those adopted by the German Football Association (ROGON judgment), and FIFA (RRC Sports judgment).  However, the principles set out in the ROGON and RRC Sports judgments will resonate beyond sport arenas to find potential application to rule-making by self-regulatory bodies in other sectors. 

Continue Reading ROGON and RRC Sports: The EU’s Top Court vindicates a pragmatic application of the antitrust sporting exemption to players’ agent regulations

For more than twenty years, FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”) have sought to balance the stability of football teams with player mobility. That balance was fundamentally challenged by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”) in Case C-650/22 FIFA v Diarra (“Diarra”).

Less than two years later, on 10 June 2026, FIFA approved a new version of the RSTP due to officially enter into force on 1 January 2027.

The reform represents the most comprehensive overhaul of the transfer system since the introduction of the modern RSTP in 2001. While it responds directly to Diarra, it also reflects the ECJ’s insistence – primarily expressed in Superleague – that sports governing bodies must pursue legitimate objectives through rules that are transparent, objective and proportionate. Moreover, alongside the substantive amendments to the RSTP, FIFA introduced a new governance model under which future changes to the RSTP will be developed through structured social dialogue among players, clubs and leagues.

This blog examines the key EU competition law and free movement implications of the new RSTP. In particular, it considers how the revised rules reflect the principles identified in previous ECJ case law and how they reshape the competitive and regulatory framework governing player transfers.

Continue Reading From Diarra to FIFA’s New Player Transfer System: How EU Law is Reshaping Football’s Transfer Rules and Governance

I. Introduction

On 3 August 2026, the President of the EU General Court issued an order addressing the scope of legal privilege under EU law. The order dismissed Broadcom’s application to suspend a decision by the European Commission requiring the production of documents in its investigation into Broadcom’s allegedly abusive software licensing practices.

The purpose of Broadcom’s application for interim measures was to enable it to withhold certain documents until the EU General Court rules on the main appeal against the decision.  In the main appeal, Broadcom had argued that the Commission’s decision was unlawful in so far as it compelled the production of documents that were privileged under the laws of third countries, such as the United States.

Although issued in interim proceedings and on well-established points of law, the order provides welcome guidance on the right balance between the European Commission’s investigative powers and the parties’ rights of defence. The President of the EU General Court highlights with unprecedented clarity the fundamental importance of legal privilege as a core part of procedural fairness in EU competition investigations.

That reasoning, and the further discussion on the European Commission’s practice in relation to legal advice from non-EU external lawyers, should help companies navigate the complexities of maintaining privilege over legal advice they receive, especially in global competition investigations.

Continue Reading In or out?  Navigating Legal Privilege in EU Competition Investigations post-Broadcom

Introduction

On August 5, 2026, NHV Group announced that its proposed acquisition by GD Helicopter Finance (“GDHF”), ultimately controlled by China-based GDAT Group, would not proceed after Belgian authorities blocked the transaction under Belgium’s foreign direct investment screening regime, following a review coordinated by the Interfederal Screening Committee (“ISC”). This marks the first public prohibition under Belgium’s foreign direct investment screening mechanism, which has been operational since July 1, 2023. The Committee did not publish detailed reasons for the decision.

While noteworthy, this should not be misread as a shift toward protectionism. Belgium’s FDI statistics show the regime has been overwhelmingly supportive of transactions. The NHV/GDHF case illustrates the regime’s core security function: transactions where critical infrastructure intersects with a geopolitically sensitive investor profile are at the heart of the ISC’s mandate. At the same time, the case sharpens existing criticisms of the regime’s opacity and complexity—criticisms that Belgian authorities are now actively addressing through a public consultation and upcoming EU-level harmonization.

Continue Reading First Prohibition Under Belgium’s FDI Regime: A Milestone, Not a Revolution

On 30 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the EU (the “Court”) delivered its judgment in Case C‑133/24 CD Tondela and Others (“Tondela”). The case arose from a preliminary ruling request submitted by a Portuguese court concerning a no-poach agreement entered into by Portuguese professional football clubs during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This is the first opportunity for the Court to examine a no-poach agreement in the sports industry in depth, and it comes at a time when labour-market restrictions feature high on EU competition authorities’ enforcement agenda (please see here for our coverage of key developments in this area). The judgment integrates the growing body of sports judgments, after Superleague, Royal Antwerp, ISU and FIFA, testing how EU competition law should factor in the specific features of sport.

The Court’s position is primarily driven by its assessment of the agreement’s context. The Court, in line with the Opinion of Advocate General (“AG”) Emiliou, confirms that no-poach agreements may amount to serious violations of Article 101 TFEU – that is, restrictions “by object”. But it recognises that the sports industry exhibits specificities that, in certain circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic here, may place no-poach agreements outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU altogether, or at least require a detailed analysis of their effects.

Continue Reading Tondela (Case C‑133/24): No-Poach Agreements in Sport: Context Always Matters

On 30 April, the UAE adopted Cabinet Decision No. (59) of 2026 (“the 2026 Executive Regulations”), setting out the executive regulations for Federal Decree-Law No. (36) of 2023 on the Regulation of Competition. The 2026 Executive Regulations replace the previous implementing regulations adopted in 2014 under the former UAE competition law. They are expected to enter into force on 30 July 2026.

Taken together, the adoption of Federal Decree-Law 36 on Regulating Competition of 2023, Cabinet Resolution No. (3) of 2025 establishing the new filing thresholds, and the subsequent adoption of the 2026 Executive Regulations complete a long-anticipated overhaul of the UAE merger control framework. These measures mark a decisive shift towards a fully operational and modern merger control regime. The 2026 Executive Regulations significantly streamline the notification process, introduce enhanced timing certainty, and create a clear pathway for third parties to engage with the Competition Department of the Ministry of Economy & Tourism (“Competition Department”) to influence the outcome of merger reviews.

More broadly, the 2026 Executive Regulations introduce important changes to various aspects of UAE’s competition law framework, including measures relating to behavioural competition enforcement and procedures. In combination with other recent competition policy and enforcement actions, the 2026 Executive Regulations signal the UAE’s ambition to bring its competition and merger control framework in line with international best practice.

This article focuses on the main revisions to the UAE merger control framework, before briefly outlining the wider changes introduced to the UAE’s behavioural competition regime by the 2026 Executive Regulations.

Continue Reading The UAE’s New Merger Control Framework: What the 2026 Executive Regulations Mean for Dealmakers

On 9 January 2026, the Commission adopted its Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the “FSR Guidelines”). The FSR Guidelines explain how the Commission assesses whether foreign subsidies distort the internal market, and, if so, whether their potential positive effects outweigh their potential negative impacts. They also explain how the Commission may exercise its call-in powers to request the prior notification of any concentration or any foreign financial contributions (“FFCs”) in the context of a public procurement procedure that falls below the notification thresholds.

This blogpost describes the FSR Guidelines. The FSR Guidelines were adopted after a little more than two years of application of the FSR, on which the Commission will report in July 2026, potentially leading to its revision. While they crystallize the Commission’s practice thus far, they do not address the frequently voiced concern that they are overbroad and, consequently, too many unproblematic concentrations or tenders must undergo a cumbersome reporting process. For more details on the FSR, please see our previous blogpost.

Key takeaways

  • The FSR Guidelines offer detailed guidance on how the Commission will conduct its assessment of distortions. While the responsibility for this assessment lies with the Commission, companies under investigation may need to demonstrate that the foreign subsidies they have received are not linked to their economic activities in the EU. If they are unable to do this successfully, they must then provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact those foreign subsidies have on the internal market.  
  • In balancing the potential negative impact of foreign subsidies with their potential positive effects, the FSR Guidelines rely on an approach similar to State aid assessment. However, unlike in State aid, they do not provide any presumption that certain categories of subsidies are on balance positive when defined conditions are met. Instead, they require a case-by-case assessment.  
  • Regarding the Commission’s approach to requesting notification of concentrations or FFCs in the context of a public procurement procedure, the FSR Guidelines leave the Commission broad discretion when it determines that those activities merit prior review given their impact on the EU. As a result, companies may need to consider their FSR risks even if they do not engage in large concentrations or public procurement procedures in the EU.   
Continue Reading The European Commission adopts the Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines

In a landmark judgement, the Higher Regional Court of Cologne has set new standards for pharmaceutical advertising with influencers. First, a key point from the decision is that the court qualifies paid influencers as agents of the drug company with respective consequences for the company (discussed below). Second, the court treats promotional social media reels/videos like TV ads which leads to subsequent disclosure obligations. Third, influencers can regularly qualify as “known persons” so that the restrictions under German law for drug advertising with known/famous persons can apply. Continue reading for more details on the case and its implications for pharmaceutical companies.

Continue Reading Influencer Marketing – German court sets new Guardrails for Pharmaceutical Advertising on Social Media

The figures are fresh off the press: the European Commission published its Fifth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments (“FDI”) into the European Union (“EU”) just a few days ago.[1] Like the previous editions, the Fifth Annual Report offers a statistical overview of the EU FDI framework’s activities in the previous year (2024 for the Fifth Annual Report).  Based on submissions from all 27 Member States, the report surveys both the performance of Member States’s national screening regimes and the functioning of the EU cooperation process for FDI. FDI screening has expanded its reach in the EU, from 14 Member States having active FDI screening tools in 2019,[2] to 24 today, with the remaining three Member States in the midst of enacting similar tools. [3] This post distils the five key trends that have emerged in the past year highlighted by the Fifth Annual Report.

Continue Reading EU’s Fifth FDI Annual Report: Five trends in Europe’s screening activities

The war in Ukraine, and other recent geopolitical conflicts, has underscored the need for EU-based defence capabilities to scale up to face these challenges. Several EU initiatives which have sought to stimulate investment are starting to bear fruit, as the European Defence Agency recently reported record high defence spendings in the EU (€350bn for 2024, a 19% increase to 2023). Political support for the sector has been demonstrated by Commission President Von Der Leyen proclaiming “a new era for European Defence and Security” in her latest State of the European Union address.

In this context, understanding the regulatory framework applicable to investments in the EU defence sector is proving increasingly important. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening regimes represent one of the most important regulatory checks to clear for investors.

This blog post reviews five key points for investors to consider when making investments in the defence sector given the current geopolitical context.

Continue Reading Five Key Points on FDI Screening in the EU Defence Sector