Competition

U.S. Secretary of Commerce nominee Howard Lutnick delivered a detailed preview of what to expect from the Trump Administration on key issues around technology, trade, and intellectual property.  At his nomination hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on Wednesday, January 29, Lutnick faced questions from senators about the future of the CHIPS and Science Act, global trade, and particularly U.S. technological competition with China, including export controls and artificial intelligence after the release of China’s AI model “DeepSeek.”  Lutnick, who was introduced by Vice President J.D. Vance, committed to implementing the Trump Administration’s America First agenda. 

If confirmed, Lutnick will lead the Commerce Department’s vast policy portfolio, including export controls for emerging technologies, broadband spectrum access and deployment, AI innovation, and climate and weather issues through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”).  In his responses to senators’ questions, Lutnick emphasized his pro-business approach and his intent to implement President Trump’s policy objectives including bringing manufacturing—particularly of semiconductors—back to the United States and establishing “reciprocity” with China in response to what he called “unfair” treatment of U.S. businesses.

Technology Competition with China, Export Controls, and Intellectual Property

Senators on both sides of the aisle asked Lutnick about the threat of Chinese competition in emerging technologies, such as AI.  Lutnick stated that it is evident the Chinese used “stolen” and “leveraged” U.S. technologies to develop DeepSeek and that the United States needs to stop China from “using our tools to compete with us.” 

Lutnick noted that China has found ways to evade U.S. export controls and that, under his direction, the Commerce Department will reinforce these controls with punitive tariffs to ensure compliance.  Lutnick also criticized the Chinese for refusing to respect U.S. innovators’ IP in China, stating that the Chinese should expect the same treatment in the United States under a new policy of “reciprocity.”  As Commerce Secretary, Lutnick will oversee the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), which he noted will carry out the Trump Administration’s America First agenda, including by preventing the Chinese from “abusing” the U.S. patent system.  In response to questioning from Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Lutnick also stated that he would work to reduce the backlog of patent applications pending at the USPTO. Continue Reading What Commerce Secretary Nominee Howard Lutnick’s Confirmation Hearing Tells us about Technology Policy in the Trump Administration

On 16 January 2025, the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) published a position paper, as it had announced last year, on the “interplay between data protection and competition law” (“Position Paper”).

In this blogpost, we outline the EDPB’s position on cooperation between EU data protection authorities (“DPAs”) and competition authorities (“CAs”) in the context of certain key issues at the intersection of data protection and competition law.

Key takeaways

  1. In the interest of coherent regulatory outcomes, the EDPB advocates for increased cooperation between DPAs and CAs.
  2. The Position Paper offers practical suggestions to that end, such as fostering closer personal relationships, mutual understanding, and a shared sense of purpose, as well as more structured mechanisms for regulatory cooperation.
  3. The EDPB is mindful of the Digital Markets Act’s (“DMA”) significance in addressing data protection and competition law risks.

Summary of the Position Paper

The EDPB first outlines certain overlaps between data protection and competition law (e.g., data serving as a parameter of competition). The EDPB argues that as both legal regimes seek to protect individuals and their choices, albeit in different ways, “strengthening the link” between data protection and competition law can “contribute to the protection of individuals and the well-being of consumers”.

The EDPB takes the view that closer cooperation between DPAs and CAs would therefore benefit individuals (and businesses) by improving the consistency and effectiveness of regulatory actions. Moreover, the EDPB emphasises that, based on the EU principle of “sincere cooperation” between regulatory authorities and pursuant to the European Court of Justice’s ruling in Meta v Bundeskartellamt (2023), cooperation between DPAs and CAs would be “in some cases, mandatory and not optional”.Continue Reading EDPB highlights the importance of cooperation between data protection and competition authorities

The new European Commission, which took office in December 2024, will likely rebalance its policy priorities, putting greater emphasis on competitiveness and innovation and less on risk-prevention and regulation. Over the past five years, the EU adopted several sweeping tech regulations, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the AI Act. For the next five years, the focus is likely to be on implementing and streamlining these rules, rather than adopting new overarching tech regulatory frameworks. The Commission will also seek to facilitate greater public and private investment in technology, a sector in which the EU has lagged over the past 20 years, as noted by Mario Draghi in his report on Europe’s competitiveness.

Tech Policy Central to the EU

For the 2024-2029 term, Henna Virkkunen has been appointed as the Executive Vice-President (EVP) for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy. Virkkunen’s portfolio places tech policy at the heart of the new Commission’s agenda, reflecting its strategic importance for EU competitiveness.

Virkkunen, a former Member of the European Parliament from Finland with a robust track record in tech policy, assumes leadership of the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CNECT). In contrast to the often-aggressive stance of her predecessor, Thierry Breton, towards industry leaders, Virkkunen is expected to be more collaborative. Virkkunen’s alignment with von der Leyen’s vision is anticipated to bring coherence to the Commission’s tech agenda. DG CNECT no longer reports to two Commissioners (Vestager and Breton in the last Commission), which will simplify its management. Placing it under EVP Virkkunen, who is relatively senior in the College of Commissioners, underscores that digital policy is a priority for this Commission.

Virkkunen will need to coordinate closely with other Commissioners, such as Stéphane Séjourné (EVP for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy), who will oversee the development of a European competitiveness fund to support emerging technologies. This initiative should align with Virkkunen’s efforts to strengthen EU capabilities in AI and semiconductors through Important Projects of Common European Interest. Virkkunen also effectively oversees four other Commissioners, including Ekaterina Zaharieva (Startups, Research and Innovation), who has been mandated to set up a European AI Research Council in order to bolster innovation, and Michael McGrath (Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection), who will revise data retention rules to address potential privacy and security concerns.

Virkkunen’s Ambitious Policy Agenda

Henna Virkkunen’s mission is both expansive and strategically aligned with the EU’s overarching goals of digital sovereignty and competitiveness. She has three core priorities: artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and quantum technologies.Continue Reading What Does the New European Commission Mean for EU Tech Policy?

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has announced revised thresholds for determining whether transactions need to be filed under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act, along with an updated HSR filing fee schedule. The new minimum “size of transaction” notification threshold for acquisitions of voting securities, assets, or controlling interests in non-corporate entities will be $126.4 million, an increase from the prior threshold of $119.5 million. The new thresholds and fee schedule will be effective February 21, 2025, 30 days after their publication in the Federal Register.

The FTC also announced an increase in the maximum daily civil penalty amount for HSR violations from $51,744 to $53,088 for each day of the violation. The new maximum applies to civil penalties assessed on or after January 17, 2025.

Finally, the FTC also announced slightly higher caps for the de minimis exceptions of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits certain interlocking directorates between competing corporations. The new Section 8 exception levels became effective on January 22, 2025, when they were published in the Federal Register.

HSR Act Thresholds and Filing Fees

The HSR Act requires parties to certain mergers and acquisitions to notify the FTC and Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and observe a waiting period (usually 30 days) prior to consummating a reportable transaction. The notification thresholds are adjusted annually based on changes in the gross national product, with the new, revised thresholds as follows:Continue Reading FTC Increases HSR Filing Thresholds and Fees, Penalties, and Thresholds Applicable to Board “Interlocks” for 2025

On December 12, 2024, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) authorized its staff to file a complaint against alcohol distributor Southern Glazer’s Wine and Spirits, LLC (“Southern Glazer’s”). The complaint alleges that the company engaged in price discrimination—charging higher prices to independent businesses and lower prices to large national and regional chains—in violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act (“RPA”). The Commission voted 3-2 along party lines to file the lawsuit in federal district court, with the two Republican-appointed Commissioners—Commissioners Melissa Holyoak and Andrew Ferguson—issuing strongly worded dissenting statements (see here and here, respectively). Prior to this case, the federal antitrust agencies—the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “Antitrust Division”)—had not brought an enforcement action under the RPA in more than two decades.

The Robinson-Patman Act:

According to the Supreme Court in Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.,546 U.S. 164, 175 (2006), Congress enactedthe RPA in 1936 to “target the perceived harm to competition occasioned by powerful buyers” in response to the advent of large chain stores. At the time, Congress was worried that large firms could extract lower prices from manufacturers or suppliers than smaller businesses. Id.

The RPA covers several categories of conduct. Most relevant here, Section 2(a) makes it unlawful for any person “engaged in commerce” to “discriminate in price between purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality” where the effect of such discrimination may be to lessen competition, tend to create a monopoly, or injure competition with any person who receives the benefit of such discrimination or their customers. There are several potential legal defenses to this provision, including that the price difference was justified by costs incurred by the seller, that the lower price was available to all customers, that the price differential did not cause the customer that paid a higher price to lose sales, and that the price difference was the result of meeting a competitor’s price.Continue Reading FTC Brings First Robinson-Patman Act Case in More Than Two Decades

On October 10, 2024, the federal antitrust agencies finalized the most significant changes to the U.S. merger notification regime since the enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act in 1976. The Final Rule—which was issued by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) with the concurrence of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (together, “the Agencies”)—will significantly increase the burden on companies whose transactions must be notified to the Agencies pursuant to the HSR Act.

The Final Rule will become effective 90 days after publication in the Federal Register, meaning that the expanded filing requirements will take effect no earlier than mid-January 2025.

Although the Agencies significantly scaled back the changes they originally proposed in June 2023, the Final Rule will still fundamentally reshape the HSR process. According to the Agencies themselves, filings in most cases will take additional time to prepare and become much more expensive, which could extend deal timelines.

Notable new requirements include:

  • adding a “supervisory deal team lead” to the individuals from whom transaction-specific documents must be collected;
  • requiring production of certain non-transaction specific documents that analyze competitive overlaps relevant to the Transaction that were provided to the CEO (or CEOs of subsidiaries involved in the transaction) or members of the board;
  • submission of narrative descriptions of each strategic rationale for the transaction and of any horizontal overlaps or vertical relationships between the parties; and
  • providing the most recent year’s sales data for each overlapping product or service between the parties.

The FTC vote to issue the Final Rule was unanimous. The FTC and DOJ each issued press releases to accompany the issuance of the Final Rule, FTC Chair Lina M. Khan issued a statement (joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya), and Commissioners Andrew N. Ferguson (here) and Melissa Holyoak (here) each issued a statement as well. Commissioner Holyoak’s statement identifies many of the key differences between the Final Rule and the proposed rule.Continue Reading FTC and DOJ Announce Final Rule Reshaping HSR Filing Requirements

What are the key take-aways of the mission letter to Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, EVP-designate responsible for EU competition policy?

On 17 September 2024, European Commission (“Commission”) President Ursula von der Leyen (“President”), announced her proposed College of Commissioners (“College”) for her second 5-year term. The Commissioners-designate still need to be confirmed by the European Parliament (“EP”).

Of particularly interest from a competition policy perspective is the President’s mission letter (“Mission Letter”) to Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, the designated Executive Vice-President (“EVP-designate”) for a “Clean, Just and Competitive Transition”. The Mission Letter sets out the priorities and action plans of the European Commission for the next 5 years.

In this blogpost, we introduce EVP-designate Ribera and the tasks which the President has set for her, specifically on competition policy. 

About EVP-designate Ribera

Like many of her colleague Commissioners, past and present, EVP-designate Riberahas held several national ministerial posts: she has been serving as Spain’s Minister for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge since 2018 and has had two consecutive terms as Vice-President of the Spanish Government since 2020. She has also been serving as a member of the Spanish Parliament since 2019.

A lawyer by training, EVP-designate Riberahas also held high-level private and public posts focusing on sustainable development and climate change. She served as Spain’s State Secretary for Climate Change (2008-2011) and as director of the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (2014-2018) – likely suitable experience given indications in her Mission Letter that these topics will only gain in relevance, both for the Commission and its competition portfolio.Continue Reading New Commissioner, New Mission, New Policy for Competition?

In the past several months, two state courts in the District of Columbia and California decided motions to dismiss in cases alleging that the use of certain revenue management software violated state antitrust laws in the residential property rental management and health insurance industries.  In both industries, parallel class actions…

Continue Reading State Courts Dismiss Claims Involving the Use of Revenue Management Software in Residential Rental and Health Insurance Industries

The European Court of Justice released its long-awaited judgment1 in the Google Shopping saga last week, finally putting to bed close to fifteen years’ of scrutiny into Google’s practices of favouring its own comparison shopping service (Google Shopping) over rival shopping services.

In its ruling, the ECJ upheld the General Court’s earlier judgment2 which had rejected Google’s appeal over the European Commission’s decision3 to fine it €2.42 billion for abusing its market dominance as a search engine by systematically favouring Google Shopping in its general search results.

The overall outcome of the ECJ’s reasoning in Google Shopping is perhaps unsurprising to competition law practitioners – given the unwavering direction of travel of the case. The ECJ judgment nevertheless raises a number of interesting points and leaves a number of questions unanswered.

Key takeaways

  • Refusal to supply. The judgment confirmed that not every issue of access necessarily requires the application of the Bronner test of refusal to supply. The ECJ found the Bronner doctrine applies in circumstances where a dominant firm refuses to grant a competitor access to infrastructure which it has developed for its own business needs. However, the ECJ ruled that the Bronner test is not applicable in cases where there is no outright refusal of access to infrastructure – but rather access granted on discriminatory terms (such discrimination being assessed under separate forms of potential abuse).
  • Competition not on the merits. The ECJ accepted Google’s arguments that, to establish an abuse of dominance under Article 102, a two-pronged test applies: (i) that actual or potential anticompetitive effects arise from the abusive conduct; and (ii) that the conduct falls outside of “competition on the merits”. However, in assessing the latter requirement, the ECJ rejected Google’s arguments that only circumstances relating specifically to Google’s conduct are relevant to the assessment. Instead, the ECJ held that, in assessing “competition on the merits”, relevant circumstances regarding the characteristics of the market or the nature of competition are capable of characterising the conduct as falling outside of the scope of competition on the merits.
  • Causality and counterfactual. The ECJ maintained that the causal link is one of the essential elements of a competition law infringement and that, as a result, the burden of proof for such causal link (and hence the counterfactual analysis) lies with the Commission. However, the ECJ found that the counterfactual analysis is just one way to establish causality. Where establishing a credible counterfactual may be “arbitrary or even impossible” (para 231), the Commission cannot be required to systematically establish a counterfactual and can rely on other evidence to establish causality.
  • “As-efficient competitors”. The ECJ reiterated earlier case law that it is not the objective of Article 102 to ensure that less efficient competitors remain on the market but also remarked that this statement did not imply that an abuse of dominance finding does not always require a showing that the conduct was capable of excluding an as-efficient competitor. With respect to the AEC test, the Court held that this is just one way to establish an abuse of dominance.

Continue Reading ECJ’s Google Shopping Judgment: The End of a Long Saga

The European Commission’s draft guidelines on exclusionary abusive conduct by dominant firms under Article 102 TFEU (the “Draft Guidelines”) were published on 1 August 2024. They show a marked change from the 2009 Article 82 [now Article 102] Enforcement Priorities Guidance (the “Priorities Guidance”): economic concept has largely been replaced with the Commission’s interpretation of the European Courts’ caselaw.

The consultation on the Draft Guidelines is open until 31 October 2024. Practical suggestions rooted in and developing the caselaw appear more likely to influence the Commission’s final version of the Draft Guidelines than statements of economics.

Like the Priorities Guidance before it, the Draft Guidelines cover exclusionary conduct that the Commission views as concerning – conduct that benefits the dominant firm by excluding competitors from the market – and not exploitative conduct which benefits the dominant firm by exploiting its market power such as excessive pricing or the use of unfair trading conditions. Though in a departure from the Priorities Guidance, the Draft Guidelines do note overlaps between exclusionary and exploitative analysis: “the principles relevant to the assessment of dominance (section 2) and the justifications based on objective necessity and efficiencies (section 5) are also relevant for the assessment of other forms of abusive conduct, such as exploitative abuses” (paragraph 11 of the Draft Guidelines) and “the same conduct by a dominant undertaking may have both exclusionary and exploitative effects” (footnote 17 of the Draft Guidelines).

The Draft Guidelines also now cover collective dominance and not only single dominance, of which more below.

The Draft Guidelines are important because they signal not only how the Commission intends to apply Article 102 to dominant companies – arguably it is already doing so – but also how the Commission interprets the European Courts’ caselaw since the Priorities Guidance was adopted, and how the Commission wishes to influence the development of the caselaw in the future. In the period since the publication of the Priorities Guidance in 2009, the concepts set out in the Priorities Guidance have had mixed success in front of the European Courts. Some examples:

  • The Court of Justice in the Telia Sonera preliminary ruling said that there can be a margin squeeze even absent an obligation to deal (paragraph. 59), in implicit contradiction of the Priorities Guidance;
  • The General Court in Qualcomm, overturning the Commission’s decision, seemingly extends the relevance of the as efficient competitor test beyond the area of pricing abuses in the Priorities Guidance to exclusivity arrangements;
  • The Court of Justice in the Unilever Italia preliminary ruling and the Intel appeal affirming the use of the as efficient competitor test; and
  • The Court of Justice in the Post Danmark II preliminary ruling noting that less efficient competitors can sometimes constrain dominant companies (paragraph. 60).

Continue Reading From Concept to Precedent: The 2024 Draft Guidelines on Article 102