Photo of Laurie-Anne Grelier

Laurie-Anne Grelier

Laurie-Anne Grelier assists global companies, especially Asian multinationals, with navigating the competition law aspects of their activities and investments in Europe. Laurie-Anne cumulates more than 10 years of experience advising these companies on complex, high-stake European competition law issues, including antitrust and cartel investigations, the clearance of mergers and other transactions, the structuring of licensing, distribution, collaborative and other commercial arrangements, issues related to abuse of dominant position, and the structuring of compliance programs.

Laurie-Anne further represents these companies in litigation before the European Courts, whether in their challenges of regulatory decisions or in the defense of multi-million private antitrust claims.

Laurie-Anne also advises Asian companies on the application of new regulations in the technology sector, such as the EU Digital Markets Act as well as on state aid and foreign direct investment.

Laurie-Anne has elementary proficiency in Korean.

On 10 February 2026, the EU released the agreed compromise text of the new Regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the EU (the “New FIR Regulation”).  The three EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council) reached the compromise on the text in December 2025 (see our blog) following several months of trilogues (see our blog).  The text, while not yet officially published, is expected to remain unchanged.  The New FIR Regulation will repeal and replace the current FDI Screening Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the “2019 FDI Regulation”).  The New FIR Regulation further integrates the EU’s investment screening framework into the EU’s economic security strategy.

Against the backdrop of rising geopolitical friction, the New FIR Regulation aims to address the risk that investors structure transactions to get access to the EU market by anchoring their investments in Member States with lighter FIR controls.  To do so, the New FIR Regulation establishes a unified minimum screening framework across the Member States (e.g., through mandatory national screening mechanisms, harmonised review timelines, and strengthened cooperation obligations), whilst preserving Member States’ ultimate sovereignty on matters of national security.  This will be a major evolution from the 2019 FDI Regulation, which was limited to establishing an information-sharing mechanism while leaving Member States wide discretion as to whether and how to screen foreign investments.

This post discusses the five major areas of change for prospective investors, before offering a few forward-looking considerations.Continue Reading New Foreign Investment Screening Regulation – Key Takeaways from the Agreed Compromise Text

The figures are fresh off the press: the European Commission published its Fifth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments (“FDI”) into the European Union (“EU”) just a few days ago.[1] Like the previous editions, the Fifth Annual Report offers a statistical overview of the EU FDI framework’s activities in the previous year (2024 for the Fifth Annual Report).  Based on submissions from all 27 Member States, the report surveys both the performance of Member States’s national screening regimes and the functioning of the EU cooperation process for FDI. FDI screening has expanded its reach in the EU, from 14 Member States having active FDI screening tools in 2019,[2] to 24 today, with the remaining three Member States in the midst of enacting similar tools. [3] This post distils the five key trends that have emerged in the past year highlighted by the Fifth Annual Report.Continue Reading EU’s Fifth FDI Annual Report: Five trends in Europe’s screening activities

The war in Ukraine, and other recent geopolitical conflicts, has underscored the need for EU-based defence capabilities to scale up to face these challenges. Several EU initiatives which have sought to stimulate investment are starting to bear fruit, as the European Defence Agency recently reported record high defence spendings in the EU (€350bn for 2024, a 19% increase to 2023). Political support for the sector has been demonstrated by Commission President Von Der Leyen proclaiming “a new era for European Defence and Security” in her latest State of the European Union address.

In this context, understanding the regulatory framework applicable to investments in the EU defence sector is proving increasingly important. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening regimes represent one of the most important regulatory checks to clear for investors.

This blog post reviews five key points for investors to consider when making investments in the defence sector given the current geopolitical context.Continue Reading Five Key Points on FDI Screening in the EU Defence Sector

On 2 June 2025, the European Commission (“Commission”) fined the food delivery companies Delivery Hero and Glovo EUR 329 million for engaging into cartel conduct through agreeing not to poach each other’s employees, exchanging competitively sensitive information, and allocating geographic markets.

The decision signals increased antitrust scrutiny of labour-related arrangements between rivals  and underscores the need for companies to implement safeguards when holding non-controlling minority interests in competing businesses. For the time being, the Commission has only issued a press release and a statement; it will release a public version of its decision in the coming months.

Key takeaways

  • A first in two respects. This marks the Commission’s first cartel decision targeting labour-related practices (specifically in relation to a no-poach agreement), and the first time it has enforced concerns about holding a minority stake in a competitor.
  • Tighter enforcement in labour markets. The decision confirms the Commission’s known hard stance towards no-poach agreements between competitors, in line with the increased antitrust scrutiny of these and comparable arrangements in the EU Member States and elsewhere.
  • Minority shareholdings as a vector for collusion. The Commission’s decision underlines the collusive risk that may arise from owning a minority stake in rival companies. Minority shareholdings in a competitor may grant access to competitively sensitive information, enabling alignment of commercial strategies between the parties. As such, minority shareholders must ensure their rights are used only to protect the value of their investment and should implement safeguards to prevent access to competitively sensitive information.  

Background

Delivery Hero and Glovo are two large food delivery companies active in Europe. In July 2018, Delivery Hero acquired a non-controlling minority stake in Glovo and, during the following years, progressively increased its stake through subsequent share acquisitions until it acquired sole control of Glovo in July 2022.

The Commission’s investigation was triggered by information received from a national competition authority (likely the Spanish competition authority which reviewed Delivery Hero’s acquisition of Glovo in 2022) and an anonymous whistleblower.

The conduct

The Commission found that, from July 2018 until July 2022, Delivery Hero and Glovo engaged in the following multi-layered conduct:Continue Reading European Commission issues first no-poach decision in labour markets, warning against the collusive risks of minority shareholdings

Introduction

On Thursday 8 May 2025, the EU took another important step towards revamping its framework to screen foreign investment, with the European Parliament adopting an amended version of the bill (the “EP Bill”, available here). That vote has now cleared the way for the next step in the legislative process: the tri-partite negotiations between the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament (aka “trilogue”) to arrive to a final text that will become law.

The EP Bill endorses the Commission proposal[1] that sought to bring more harmonisation/oversight over Member States, but also goes further and makes several ambitious additions to the Commission proposal in particular, the EP Bill would: (i) give new decision-making powers to the Commission in an area where such powers previously have squarely rested in the hands of the EU Member States, (ii) expand the list and scope of sectors in which foreign investments could undergo screening, and (iii) require reporting and screening of greenfield investments above a certain amount in many sectors.

This post explains these key proposed changes for non-EU investors and sets out how we see the prospects of these changes surviving the remainder of the legislative process.

What key changes has the Parliament made to the European Commission’s Proposal?

1. New decision-making powers for the Commission

By way of context, the existing EU foreign investment screening regulation (“Current FIR Regulation”) establishes a complex mechanism requiring a Member State authority screening a given foreign investment into its country to notify it to the Commission and the other Member States.[2]  The screening Member State authority must then take “due consideration” of any comments from the Commission or other Member States, but it remains the ultimate decision maker.[3]Continue Reading EP Approves Draft FDI Regulation Giving Extensive Powers to EC

On March 5, 2025, the European Commission published the Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector. This plan outlines measures to strengthen the competitiveness of the European automotive industry and to accelerate the transition to zero-emission mobility in the EU.  This plan is the result of the “Strategic Dialogue” that has been taking place in Brussels in the last month between vehicle manufacturers in the EU and EU officials.  The plan announces a catalogue of initiatives to be adopted by the Commission, but the expected timelines and the interplay between different initiatives is not always clear.  This blog summarizes some of the initiatives likely to be relevant to stakeholders in the EU automotive industry—particularly those in the electric vehicle (“EV”) supply chain.Continue Reading European Commission Publishes Automotive Industrial Action Plan

On 18 July 2024, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second 5-year term. As part of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which lays down the Commission’s political program for the next five years.

A key pillar of the program – “A new plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness” – has the objective of combining competitiveness and prosperity with the achievement of the European Green Deal goals.

Specifically on competition policy, according to President von der Leyen, a new approach is needed to achieve this objective. This blog post projects where competition policy is likely headed in the 2024-2029 period by commenting on the most relevant paragraphs of the program.

Von der Leyen: “I believe we need a new approach to competition policy, better geared to our common goals and more supportive of companies scaling up in global markets – while always ensuring a level playing field. This should be reflected in the way we assess mergers so that innovation and resilience are fully taken into account. We will ensure competition policy keeps pace with evolving global markets and prevents market concentration from raising prices or lowering the quality of goods or services for consumers. We will look at all of our policies through a security lens.”

  • This statement reaffirms the classic principles underlying competition law, i.e., the focus on ensuring a level playing field, preventing market concentration, and ultimately avoiding a negative impact on prices/quality of goods or services.
  • However, the President’s comments recognize the impact of global dynamics and the need for EU companies to be able to respond to global pressures. In the context of Siemens/Alstom and Lufthansa/ITA, there is growing pressure from EU Member States to allow European champions and this program could signal an openness to that effect.
  • The President also calls for an increased focus on innovation and resilience in the substantive assessment of mergers. This could mean (i) that the Commission will expand its assessment of the impact of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) standards and security, (ii) that the Commission would be open to a greater role of wider efficiency justifications/public interest considerations in merger control and competition law assessments, and/or (iii) that the impact on the overall economic competitiveness of the EU, and the aim of geopolitical de-risking for critical supply chains and technologies, may play an increasingly important role in the assessment of mergers.

Continue Reading The 2024-2029 Commission Political Guidelines: Where Is Competition Policy Likely Headed?

With the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, the regulatory frameworks for AI in the Asia–Pacific (APAC) region continue to develop quickly. Policymakers and regulators have been prompted to consider either reviewing existing regulatory frameworks to ensure their effectiveness in addressing emerging risks brought by AI, or proposing new, AI-specific rules or regulations. Overall, there appears to be a trend across the region to promote AI uses and developments, with most jurisdictions focusing on high-level and principle-based guidance. While a few jurisdictions are considering regulations specific to AI, they are still at an early stage. Further, privacy regulators and some industry regulators, such as financial regulators, are starting to play a role in AI governance.

This blog post provides an overview of various approaches in regulating AI and managing AI-related risks in the APAC region.  

  • AI-Specific Laws and Regulations

Several jurisdictions in the region are moving toward AI-specific regulations, including the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China), South Korea, and Taiwan.

  • China has been most active in shaping regulations specific to generative AI technologies since 2023. It has taken a multifaceted approach that combines AI-specific regulations, national standards and technical guidance to govern generative AI services and the regulatory focus has been on services that are provided to the public in China. The Interim Administrative Measures for Generative Artificial Intelligence Services represent a milestone as the first comprehensive regulation specifically addressing generative AI services (a summary of this regulation can be found in our previous post here). Several non-binding technical documents and national standards have been issued or are being drafted to further implement this regulation. Prior to the regulation that specifically addresses generative AI services, China had issued regulations for deep synthesis and algorithmic recommendations. Further, China promulgated rules on conducting an ethical review of scientific activities involving generative AI.
  • Beyond a few provisions on narrow aspects scattered in other regimes, South Korea does not presently have a comprehensive AI-specific regulatory framework. Proposed in early 2023, the draft Act on Fostering the AI Industry and Securing Trustworthy AI remains currently pending before the National Assembly. If enacted, it would set out the first comprehensive legislative framework governing the usage of AI in South Korea, generally reflecting an approach that would permit AI usage and developments subject to subsequent safeguards if and as needed. In parallel, the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) has been advocating for a flexible approach to AI based on self-regulation, with support from the PIPC. Furthermore, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) will soon start a detailed study to identify potential AI-induced risks in terms of consumer protection as well as unfair or anti-competitive practices, which might result in KFTC-supervised self-regulation of certain AI aspects through industry codes of conduct supplemented by a set of guidelines on AI, or even proposed legislation or amendments to existing consumer protection or antitrust rules. 
  • Similarly, Taiwan is drafting a basic law governing AI, i.e., the Basic Law for Development of Artificial Intelligence, which will set out fundamental principles for AI development and for the government to promote the development of AI technologies. However, it is still uncertain whether and when Taiwan will pass this draft law.
  • Non-binding AI Principles and Guidelines

Continue Reading Overview of AI Regulatory Landscape in APAC

On 24 January 2024, the European Commission (the “Commission”) published its European Economic Security Package (the “EESP”), which included the long-awaited proposal to reform the EU Regulation which established a framework for Foreign Direct Investment screening (the “EU FDI Regulation”). The EESP’s proposed regulation (the “Proposed Regulation”) is one of the EESP’s five initiatives to implement the European Security Strategy (published in June 2023) – for an overview of the EESP, see our Global Policy Watch blog.

The Proposed Regulation seeks to improve the legal framework for foreign investment screening in the European Union and builds upon feedback that the Commission received during its public consultation in 2023. If adopted as proposed, it will significantly change the landscape of foreign investment screening regimes across the EU (for a full report of the public consultation see here).

This blog highlights the key changes under the proposed reform and analyses their impact on global deal making. We also provide an outlook on the next steps for the proposals.

Key takeaways and comment

  • Extended scope to include indirect foreign investments through EU subsidiaries and greenfield investments.
  • Minimum standards and greater harmonisation across the EU.
  • Introduction of call-in powers to review all transactions for at least 15 months after completion.
  • Coordinated submission of foreign investment filings in multi-country transactions.
  • Focus cooperation between Member States and the Commission on cases more likely to be sensitive.
  • More prescriptive guidance on substantive assessments and remedies, including a formal obligation for national screening authorities to prohibit or impose conditions on transactions they conclude are likely to negatively affect security or public order in one or more Member States.
  • Increased reporting, while protecting confidential information.

Continue Reading Draft EU Screening Regulation – a new chapter for screening foreign direct investments in the EU

The English High Court (“High Court”) has issued an important judgment in the claim that Gemalto group companies (“Gemalto”) brought against Infineon (“Infineon”) and Renesas Electronics (“Renesas”) companies, for damages arising from the smart card chips cartel (Gemalto NV and others v Infineon Technologies AG [2022] EWHC 156 (Ch),
Continue Reading English High Court issues warning shot to cartel damages Claimants who delay