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Laurie-Anne Grelier

Laurie-Anne Grelier assists global companies, especially Asian multinationals, with navigating the competition law aspects of their activities and investments in Europe. Laurie-Anne cumulates more than 10 years of experience advising these companies on complex, high-stake European competition law issues, including antitrust and cartel investigations, the clearance of mergers and other transactions, the structuring of licensing, distribution, collaborative and other commercial arrangements, issues related to abuse of dominant position, and the structuring of compliance programs.

Laurie-Anne further represents these companies in litigation before the European Courts, whether in their challenges of regulatory decisions or in the defense of multi-million private antitrust claims.

Laurie-Anne also advises Asian companies on the application of new regulations in the technology sector, such as the EU Digital Markets Act as well as on state aid and foreign direct investment.

Laurie-Anne has elementary proficiency in Korean.

Introduction

In the space of just one week, the EU’s top court, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), delivered two important judgments that clarify the scope of sport rule-making activities that can benefit from an antitrust exemption: the ROGON judgment on 9 July 2026, and the much more detailed RRC Sports judgment on 16 July 2026, which builds on and develops ROGON.  The sporting rules at play in these cases concerned football players’ agents, and more specifically those adopted by the German Football Association (ROGON judgment), and FIFA (RRC Sports judgment).  However, the principles set out in the ROGON and RRC Sports judgments will resonate beyond sport arenas to find potential application to rule-making by self-regulatory bodies in other sectors. 

Continue Reading ROGON and RRC Sports: The EU’s Top Court vindicates a pragmatic application of the antitrust sporting exemption to players’ agent regulations

I. Introduction

On 3 August 2026, the President of the EU General Court issued an order addressing the scope of legal privilege under EU law. The order dismissed Broadcom’s application to suspend a decision by the European Commission requiring the production of documents in its investigation into Broadcom’s allegedly abusive software licensing practices.

The purpose of Broadcom’s application for interim measures was to enable it to withhold certain documents until the EU General Court rules on the main appeal against the decision.  In the main appeal, Broadcom had argued that the Commission’s decision was unlawful in so far as it compelled the production of documents that were privileged under the laws of third countries, such as the United States.

Although issued in interim proceedings and on well-established points of law, the order provides welcome guidance on the right balance between the European Commission’s investigative powers and the parties’ rights of defence. The President of the EU General Court highlights with unprecedented clarity the fundamental importance of legal privilege as a core part of procedural fairness in EU competition investigations.

That reasoning, and the further discussion on the European Commission’s practice in relation to legal advice from non-EU external lawyers, should help companies navigate the complexities of maintaining privilege over legal advice they receive, especially in global competition investigations.

Continue Reading In or out?  Navigating Legal Privilege in EU Competition Investigations post-Broadcom

On 30 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the EU (the “Court”) delivered its judgment in Case C‑133/24 CD Tondela and Others (“Tondela”). The case arose from a preliminary ruling request submitted by a Portuguese court concerning a no-poach agreement entered into by Portuguese professional football clubs during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This is the first opportunity for the Court to examine a no-poach agreement in the sports industry in depth, and it comes at a time when labour-market restrictions feature high on EU competition authorities’ enforcement agenda (please see here for our coverage of key developments in this area). The judgment integrates the growing body of sports judgments, after Superleague, Royal Antwerp, ISU and FIFA, testing how EU competition law should factor in the specific features of sport.

The Court’s position is primarily driven by its assessment of the agreement’s context. The Court, in line with the Opinion of Advocate General (“AG”) Emiliou, confirms that no-poach agreements may amount to serious violations of Article 101 TFEU – that is, restrictions “by object”. But it recognises that the sports industry exhibits specificities that, in certain circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic here, may place no-poach agreements outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU altogether, or at least require a detailed analysis of their effects.

Continue Reading Tondela (Case C‑133/24): No-Poach Agreements in Sport: Context Always Matters

On 4 March 2026, the European Commission (the “Commission”) published its proposal for a regulation establishing a framework for the acceleration of its industrial capacity and decarbonisation in strategic sectors (“Proposed Industrial Accelerator Act”, or “Proposed IAA”), accompanied by four annexes. The initiative is intended to strengthen the EU’s industrial base while accelerating decarbonisation in key manufacturing sectors considered strategically important (i.e., energy-intensive industries, net-zero technology manufacturing, and the automotive manufacturing ecosystem). These sectors currently represent less than 15% of EU GDP, and the Commission’s objective is to increase this share to 20% by 2035. The Proposed IAA was delayed three times before publication and underwent significant rewriting, which reflects both internal debates within the Commission and diverging reactions from Member States.  It also reflects the challenges posed by the broader geopolitical context, as the Commission aims to address economic security concerns through industrial policies whilst navigating international trade relationships and commitments.

The Proposed IAA introduces a regulatory framework combining three policy tools. First, it establishes demand-side measures designed to create “lead markets” for low-carbon and “Made in EU” industrial products through public procurement and certain public support schemes. Second, it introduces conditions for allowing certain foreign direct and indirect investments (“FDI”) in strategic sectors, aimed at maximising the industrial benefits of such investments within the EU. Third, it includes measures to streamline permitting procedures and facilitate industrial clustering, with the objective of accelerating the deployment of manufacturing projects.

This blog summarises the key aspects of each tool and their potential implications for companies active in the covered industries or looking to invest in the covered industries.

Continue Reading European Commission Publishes the Proposed Industrial Accelerator Act

On 10 February 2026, the EU released the agreed compromise text of the new Regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the EU (the “New FIR Regulation”).  The three EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council) reached the compromise on the text in December 2025 (see our blog) following several months of trilogues (see our blog).  The text, while not yet officially published, is expected to remain unchanged.  The New FIR Regulation will repeal and replace the current FDI Screening Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the “2019 FDI Regulation”).  The New FIR Regulation further integrates the EU’s investment screening framework into the EU’s economic security strategy.

Against the backdrop of rising geopolitical friction, the New FIR Regulation aims to address the risk that investors structure transactions to get access to the EU market by anchoring their investments in Member States with lighter FIR controls.  To do so, the New FIR Regulation establishes a unified minimum screening framework across the Member States (e.g., through mandatory national screening mechanisms, harmonised review timelines, and strengthened cooperation obligations), whilst preserving Member States’ ultimate sovereignty on matters of national security.  This will be a major evolution from the 2019 FDI Regulation, which was limited to establishing an information-sharing mechanism while leaving Member States wide discretion as to whether and how to screen foreign investments.

This post discusses the five major areas of change for prospective investors, before offering a few forward-looking considerations.

Continue Reading New Foreign Investment Screening Regulation – Key Takeaways from the Agreed Compromise Text

The figures are fresh off the press: the European Commission published its Fifth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments (“FDI”) into the European Union (“EU”) just a few days ago.[1] Like the previous editions, the Fifth Annual Report offers a statistical overview of the EU FDI framework’s activities in the previous year (2024 for the Fifth Annual Report).  Based on submissions from all 27 Member States, the report surveys both the performance of Member States’s national screening regimes and the functioning of the EU cooperation process for FDI. FDI screening has expanded its reach in the EU, from 14 Member States having active FDI screening tools in 2019,[2] to 24 today, with the remaining three Member States in the midst of enacting similar tools. [3] This post distils the five key trends that have emerged in the past year highlighted by the Fifth Annual Report.

Continue Reading EU’s Fifth FDI Annual Report: Five trends in Europe’s screening activities

The war in Ukraine, and other recent geopolitical conflicts, has underscored the need for EU-based defence capabilities to scale up to face these challenges. Several EU initiatives which have sought to stimulate investment are starting to bear fruit, as the European Defence Agency recently reported record high defence spendings in the EU (€350bn for 2024, a 19% increase to 2023). Political support for the sector has been demonstrated by Commission President Von Der Leyen proclaiming “a new era for European Defence and Security” in her latest State of the European Union address.

In this context, understanding the regulatory framework applicable to investments in the EU defence sector is proving increasingly important. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening regimes represent one of the most important regulatory checks to clear for investors.

This blog post reviews five key points for investors to consider when making investments in the defence sector given the current geopolitical context.

Continue Reading Five Key Points on FDI Screening in the EU Defence Sector

On 2 June 2025, the European Commission (“Commission”) fined the food delivery companies Delivery Hero and Glovo EUR 329 million for engaging into cartel conduct through agreeing not to poach each other’s employees, exchanging competitively sensitive information, and allocating geographic markets.

The decision signals increased antitrust scrutiny of labour-related arrangements between rivals  and underscores the need for companies to implement safeguards when holding non-controlling minority interests in competing businesses. For the time being, the Commission has only issued a press release and a statement; it will release a public version of its decision in the coming months.

Key takeaways

  • A first in two respects. This marks the Commission’s first cartel decision targeting labour-related practices (specifically in relation to a no-poach agreement), and the first time it has enforced concerns about holding a minority stake in a competitor.
  • Tighter enforcement in labour markets. The decision confirms the Commission’s known hard stance towards no-poach agreements between competitors, in line with the increased antitrust scrutiny of these and comparable arrangements in the EU Member States and elsewhere.
  • Minority shareholdings as a vector for collusion. The Commission’s decision underlines the collusive risk that may arise from owning a minority stake in rival companies. Minority shareholdings in a competitor may grant access to competitively sensitive information, enabling alignment of commercial strategies between the parties. As such, minority shareholders must ensure their rights are used only to protect the value of their investment and should implement safeguards to prevent access to competitively sensitive information.  

Background

Delivery Hero and Glovo are two large food delivery companies active in Europe. In July 2018, Delivery Hero acquired a non-controlling minority stake in Glovo and, during the following years, progressively increased its stake through subsequent share acquisitions until it acquired sole control of Glovo in July 2022.

The Commission’s investigation was triggered by information received from a national competition authority (likely the Spanish competition authority which reviewed Delivery Hero’s acquisition of Glovo in 2022) and an anonymous whistleblower.

The conduct

The Commission found that, from July 2018 until July 2022, Delivery Hero and Glovo engaged in the following multi-layered conduct:

Continue Reading European Commission issues first no-poach decision in labour markets, warning against the collusive risks of minority shareholdings

Introduction

On Thursday 8 May 2025, the EU took another important step towards revamping its framework to screen foreign investment, with the European Parliament adopting an amended version of the bill (the “EP Bill”, available here). That vote has now cleared the way for the next step in the legislative process: the tri-partite negotiations between the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament (aka “trilogue”) to arrive to a final text that will become law.

The EP Bill endorses the Commission proposal[1] that sought to bring more harmonisation/oversight over Member States, but also goes further and makes several ambitious additions to the Commission proposal in particular, the EP Bill would: (i) give new decision-making powers to the Commission in an area where such powers previously have squarely rested in the hands of the EU Member States, (ii) expand the list and scope of sectors in which foreign investments could undergo screening, and (iii) require reporting and screening of greenfield investments above a certain amount in many sectors.

This post explains these key proposed changes for non-EU investors and sets out how we see the prospects of these changes surviving the remainder of the legislative process.

What key changes has the Parliament made to the European Commission’s Proposal?

1. New decision-making powers for the Commission

By way of context, the existing EU foreign investment screening regulation (“Current FIR Regulation”) establishes a complex mechanism requiring a Member State authority screening a given foreign investment into its country to notify it to the Commission and the other Member States.[2]  The screening Member State authority must then take “due consideration” of any comments from the Commission or other Member States, but it remains the ultimate decision maker.[3]

Continue Reading EP Approves Draft FDI Regulation Giving Extensive Powers to EC

On March 5, 2025, the European Commission published the Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector. This plan outlines measures to strengthen the competitiveness of the European automotive industry and to accelerate the transition to zero-emission mobility in the EU.  This plan is the result of the “Strategic Dialogue” that has been taking place in Brussels in the last month between vehicle manufacturers in the EU and EU officials.  The plan announces a catalogue of initiatives to be adopted by the Commission, but the expected timelines and the interplay between different initiatives is not always clear.  This blog summarizes some of the initiatives likely to be relevant to stakeholders in the EU automotive industry—particularly those in the electric vehicle (“EV”) supply chain.

Continue Reading European Commission Publishes Automotive Industrial Action Plan