On 4 June 2025, the European Commission published a decision recognising 13 critical raw material projects located in non-EU countries as “Strategic Projects” under the Critical Raw Materials Act (“CRMA”, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252). This first set of Strategic Projects based outside the EU adds to the 47 Strategic Projects based within the EU announced earlier this year. These Strategic Projects are recognized as significantly contributing to the security of the EU’s supply of strategic raw materials, and will benefit from preferential access to finance and other advantages. For more information on the CRMA and the framework for Strategic Projects, see our previous blog post here.Continue Reading EU Designates 13 Non-EU Critical Raw Materials Projects as Strategic

Matthieu Coget
Matthieu Coget counsels clients to develop and execute policy engagement strategies, to navigate through political risk, and to build and manage coalitions to accomplish their objectives at both the EU and Member State levels.
He also provides guidance on complex regulatory issues, particularly in EU trade, energy, and food law. He frequently advises on the evolving regulatory developments in EU industrial policies.
Matthieu’s practice primarily services clients in the food and beverage, automotive, energy, and technology sectors.
He also maintains an active pro bono practice, addressing EU regulatory matters and supporting policy engagement initiatives.
EU Consults on New Tariffs on €95 Billion of U.S. Imports
On 8 May 2025, the European Union launched a public consultation on potential countermeasures in response to U.S. automotive tariffs and the potential imposition of a 20% “reciprocal” tariff on EU-origin goods—covering around €379 billion of EU exports to the U.S. In particular, the EU is considering imposing tariffs on U.S. imports worth approximately €95 billion, covering a wide range of industrial and agricultural products. The Commission is also evaluating possible restrictions on EU exports to the U.S., principally steel scrap and certain chemical products, valued at €4.4 billion. If implemented, the export restrictions could take the form of export duties, quantitative restrictions such as quotas or licensing requirements, additional administrative charges, or a combination of these measures. No specific tariff rates have been proposed at this stage and the consultation is open until 10 June. Notably, the EU has not thus far targeted U.S. services as part of its retaliatory measures.
These countermeasures could be activated if ongoing EU-U.S. negotiations fail to deliver a mutually acceptable resolution, and the U.S. tariffs remain in place. While the U.S. currently imposes a 10% global reciprocal tariff on most imports, the negotiations follow a decision by President Trump to pause higher, country-specific tariff rates that were scheduled to come into effect on April 9 and would have increased the reciprocal tariff rate on U.S. imports from the EU to 20%. Those higher tariffs are paused for 90-days, or until 9 July 2025, absent an extension. EU exports of autos and auto parts to the U.S. are also subject to 25% tariffs, while the U.S. is also considering imposing additional sector-specific tariffs on—among other sectors—imports of pharmaceuticals and related ingredients; semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment and their derivative products; critical minerals and their derivative products; as well as commercial aircraft, jet engines, and related parts. Should it proceed with any of these measures, the EU is likely to increase the scope of its proposed response.
If adopted, the EU countermeasures would supplement the existing EU “Rebalancing Tariffs” previously introduced—and suspended until 14 July—in response to increased U.S. steel and aluminum duties. Most of the products covered by the Rebalancing Tariffs would be subject to a 25% ad valorem duty, with some facing a reduced rate of 10%. The Rebalancing Tariffs would apply to U.S. goods exports worth up to €26 billion.
The Enforcement Regulation and the Anti-Coercion Instrument
In preparing for a scenario in which negotiations with the U.S. fail to bring tariff relief, the EU has several legal instruments at its disposal to take responsive countermeasures, most notably the Enforcement Regulation and the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), with some overlapping and some distinguishing features.
A. Intended Use of the Two Instruments
The Enforcement Regulation is a long-standing mechanism designed to enforce the EU’s rights under international trade agreements, including under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Initially adopted in 2014 and amended in 2021, it empowers the EU to respond to breaches of trade obligations—particularly when a trading partner withdraws concessions granted under WTO agreements or fails to implement a ruling adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Crucially, the amended Regulation now allows the EU to act unilaterally when multilateral adjudication is not possible, including in the absence of a functioning WTO Appellate Body (which has lacked the necessary quorum since late 2019, following a U.S. refusal to appoint additional members to the body).Continue Reading EU Consults on New Tariffs on €95 Billion of U.S. Imports
Public Consultation for the Upcoming Industrial Decarbonization Accelerator Act
On 16 April 2025, the European Commission opened a consultation process, calling for input to prepare its proposal of the upcoming Industrial Decarbonization Accelerator Act (the “Act”), which is a key part of the Clean Industrial Deal. This initiative is designed to accelerate the decarbonization of…
Continue Reading Public Consultation for the Upcoming Industrial Decarbonization Accelerator ActEU’s Reaction to New U.S. Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum
On 12 March, the European Commission responded to the imposition of new U.S. tariffs on EU steel and aluminum imports. The Commission pledged to implement “swift and proportionate countermeasures on U.S. imports into the EU,” signaling a firm stance while leaving the door open for future negotiations.
Announced Countermeasures under the Enforcement Regulation
The EU’s response is made up of two measures:
- The reinstatement of 2018 and 2020 EU additional ad valorem duties on certain U.S. imports (“Old Rebalancing Measures”): In 2018, the first Trump Administration introduced 25% and 10% tariffs on EU steel and aluminum exports, respectively, under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. As a response, the EU adopted a list of additional ad valorem duties on certain U.S. imports. In 2020, the first Trump Administration extended the tariffs to cover certain steel and aluminum derivative products. The EU then adopted a broader list of additional ad valorem duties on certain U.S. imports. Adopted under the Enforcement Regulation, these Old Rebalancing Measures were designed to maximize political pressure on the first Trump Administration to rescind its tariffs. They were suspended in 2023 following an agreement with the Biden Administration.
As the suspension of the Old Rebalancing Measures expires automatically on 31 March, the Commission will reimpose them. These Old Rebalancing Measures cover approximately €8 billion worth of EU imports from the U.S., intended to be proportionate to addressing the economic damage inflicted by the U.S. tariffs, and concern products ranging from boats to bourbon to motorbikes.
- New EU measures under Article 5 of the Enforcement Regulation (“New Rebalancing Measures”): In response to the fresh U.S. tariffs impacting another €18 billion of EU exports, the Commission now plans to roll out new or additional ad valorem duties under Article 5 of the Enforcement Regulation (see the suggested product list). A stakeholder consultation is open for comment from 12–26 March, gathering input from affected industries. Following this, the Commission will draft an implementing act and consult Member States through the comitology procedure (as provided by the Enforcement Regulation). The implementing act is scheduled to take effect mid-April, bringing the total value of U.S. exports potentially impacted by the Old and New Rebalancing Measures to €26 billion.
Continue Reading EU’s Reaction to New U.S. Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum
European Commission Publishes Automotive Industrial Action Plan
On March 5, 2025, the European Commission published the Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector. This plan outlines measures to strengthen the competitiveness of the European automotive industry and to accelerate the transition to zero-emission mobility in the EU. This plan is the result of the “Strategic Dialogue” that has been taking place in Brussels in the last month between vehicle manufacturers in the EU and EU officials. The plan announces a catalogue of initiatives to be adopted by the Commission, but the expected timelines and the interplay between different initiatives is not always clear. This blog summarizes some of the initiatives likely to be relevant to stakeholders in the EU automotive industry—particularly those in the electric vehicle (“EV”) supply chain.Continue Reading European Commission Publishes Automotive Industrial Action Plan
“Security, Europe!” Priorities of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council
From January to June 2025, Poland will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, presenting an ambitious agenda organized around the concept of security to tackle some of the EU’s most pressing challenges. This blog outlines the announced focus areas for technology, trade, defense, and ESG. Each of these topics is pivotal to ensuring the EU’s competitiveness, resilience, and sustainability in an increasingly complex global landscape.
Technology: Driving Innovation and Digital Transformation
The EU’s technological landscape is at a crossroads, driven by competition with the U.S. and China, and regulatory reforms such as the Digital Markets Act and the AI Act. The Polish Presidency will advance digital resilience by focusing on cybersecurity and AI governance. It commits to “promote the strengthening of European AI research, development and competence centres across the EU and support EU activities for entrepreneurs implementing disruptive technologies.” Poland also pledges to develop a “a comprehensive and horizontal approach to cybersecurity” by holding “a discussion on best practices in Member States on investing in cybersecurity” and creating a “new EU cybersecurity strategy.”
The EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which has facilitated transatlantic cooperation, faces uncertain prospects under evolving political landscapes. If disbanded, new bilateral arrangements like a UK-EU TTC may emerge. In technology diplomacy, the EU will likely prioritize collaborations on export control, investment screening, and dual-use technologies with allies, including the U.S.
Trade: Enhancing Competitiveness and Reducing Dependencies
The EU’s trade policy faces heightened complexities in balancing openness with economic security. Amidst Russia’s destabilizing actions and the economic decoupling from China, the Polish Presidency prioritizes reinforcing the EU’s economic sovereignty. Enhancements to the EU Customs Union and trade components of the Association Agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are expected, aligning economic cooperation with strategic resilience.Continue Reading “Security, Europe!” Priorities of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council
Policy Implications for Europe Under a Second Trump Administration
As the world anticipates the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the European Union (“EU”) braces for significant impacts in various sectors. The first Trump administration’s approach to transatlantic relations was characterized by unpredictability, tariffs on imported goods, a strained NATO relationship, and withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement. If past is prologue, the EU must prepare for a renewed era of uncertainty and potential adversarial policies.
Trade Relations
Trump’s self-proclaimed identity as a “tariff man” suggests that trade policies would once again be at the forefront of his administration’s priorities. His campaign promises, which include imposing global tariffs on all goods from all countries in the range of 10 % to 20%, signal a departure from traditional U.S. trade policies. Such measures could have severe repercussions for the EU, both directly through increased tariffs on its exports and indirectly via an influx of dumped products from other affected nations, particularly China. Broad-based tariffs of this nature would likely provoke retaliatory measures from the EU.
The EU’s response toolkit would likely mirror many of the actions it employed between 2018 and 2020 in reaction to U.S. tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration. These measures would include retaliation on U.S. products to maximize political pressure by targeting Trump-supporting constituencies, pursuing chosen legal challenges against the U.S. at the World Trade Organization, and implementing safeguards to shield the EU market from an influx of Chinese and other diverted goods following U.S. tariff hikes. Very practically, the EU has suspended tariffs on US exports of steel and aluminum to its market worth €2.8 billion. The suspension expires on 1 March 2025, requiring an active decision on whether to reintroduce them or not.
In executing these measures, the EU is expected to collaborate with allies such as the UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, and South Korea to amplify its response. The EU may also explore smaller trade agreements or informal “packages” with the U.S. as part of a negotiated tariff truce. Broader protective measures could also be pursued, focusing on subsidies and industrial policies aimed at strengthening Europe’s strategic sectors, beyond actions specific to the U.S. Some cooperation with the U.S. on China may also be possible in areas like export control, investment control, and dual-use technologies.Continue Reading Policy Implications for Europe Under a Second Trump Administration
Regulatory Insights from the IEA’s New Report on Recycling Critical Raw Materials
On 18 November 2024, the International Energy Agency (“IEA”) published a detailed 163-page Report titled “Recycling of Critical Minerals: Strategies to Scale Up Recycling and Urban Mining” (the “Report”). The Report emphasizes the importance of recycling in securing the supply of essential minerals – such as copper, lithium…
Continue Reading Regulatory Insights from the IEA’s New Report on Recycling Critical Raw MaterialsThe EU Net-Zero Industry Act enters into force
On 29 June 2024, the Net-Zero Industry Act (“NZIA”) entered into force. The primary aim of the NZIA is to ensure that the EU has access to secure and sustainable net-zero technologies by scaling up their manufacturing capacity within the EU.
Here are the key takeaways:
- The NZIA focuses on 19 Net-Zero Technologies (“NZTs”), including renewable fuels of non-biological origin (“RFNBOs”), solar, wind, nuclear, batteries, and carbon capture and carbon storage technologies. The Regulation sets non-binding benchmarks for 40% local production of such technologies by 2030 and 15% global market share by 2040.
- To reach those benchmarks, Net-Zero Technologies Manufacturing Projects (“NZT Manufacturing Projects”) will benefit from streamlined permitting procedures. Further, NZT Manufacturing Projects that are deemed “strategic” will benefit from expedited permitting timelines.
- The NZIA introduces a target of achieving an annual injection capacity of at least 50 million tons of CO2 by 2030. Oil and gas producers identified by Member States must contribute to this target, according to a proportion to be defined by the Commission for each individual producer. Member States must adopt penalties for non-compliance.
- National public procurement procedures for NZTs must include requirements for achieving a minimum level of environmental sustainability, to be set out in future implementing regulations. In addition, for any given public contract having NZTs as part of their subject matter, the contracting authorities and entities must consider the project’s so-called “resilience contribution”, which relates to supply chain diversification. When the majority (or a near majority) of a specific NZT (or any of its main components) originates from a third country, the contracting authority or entity must impose specific public procurement conditions to reduce dependency on that country. Auctions to deploy renewable energy sources and schemes that incentivize households, companies, and consumers to purchase NZT final products must also be designed to favor bidders that contribute to increasing the sustainability and resilience of the supply of NZTs within the EU.
- Auctions to deploy renewable energy sources and schemes that incentivize households, companies, and consumers to purchase NZT final products must also be designed to favor bidders that contribute to increasing the sustainability and resilience of the supply of NZTs within the EU.
- Member States may establish regulatory sandboxes, i.e., schemes enabling companies to test technologies in a controlled real-world environment under monitoring by a competent authority.
Continue Reading The EU Net-Zero Industry Act enters into force
The EU Critical Raw Materials Act enters into force
On 23 May 2024, the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (“CRMA”) entered into force. The Regulation’s adoption within just one year after it was first proposed in March 2023 signals the EU’s political commitment to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy on the supply of Strategic Raw Materials (“SRMs”) and the broader category of “Critical Raw Materials” (“CRMs”).
Here are the key takeaways for companies:
- The CRMA sets non-binding capacity targets within the EU for the extraction, processing, refining, and recycling of SRMs that are key to achieve the green and digital transition.
- To reach such targets, the CRMA empowers the European Commission (“the Commission”) to recognize projects that extract, process, refine or recycle SRMs, including projects outside the EU, as Strategic Projects (“SPs”) so that they may benefit from easier access to financing, expedited permitting process, and matchmaking with off-takers. The Commission is expected to recognize the first SPs by the end of 2024.
- The Commission must monitor disruption risks and propose mitigation measures, if needed, to ensure a secure supply of CRMs. To enable the Commission to do this effectively, companies may be subject to new specific obligations, such as participating in surveys, carrying out risk assessments of SRMs supply chains, mitigating possible vulnerabilities, reporting on the implementation and the financing of their SPs, labelling some products, and recycling a minimum content of permanent magnets.
- The Commission will also create and operate a Joint Purchasing Mechanism to aggregate the demand of interested EU off-takers consuming SRMs and seek offers from suppliers to match that aggregated demand.
Critical and Strategic Raw Materials and Capacity Targets
SRMs are indispensable raw materials for strategic sectors that facilitate transition to a greener, digital economy. They are characterized by high forecasted demand growth and significant challenges in scaling up production in Europe to meet such demand. Annex I to the CRMA lists 17 SRMs, including copper, gallium, lithium, manganese, and titanium metal.Continue Reading The EU Critical Raw Materials Act enters into force