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Ross Evans

Ross Evans is a leading foreign investment controls lawyer, who focuses on helping clients navigate the shifting global landscape of foreign direct investment (FDI) and national security reviews and regulations, and other regimes providing for security and public interest related geopolitical interventions in corporate, commercial and financial transactions.

His practice covers foreign investment and international trade laws, encompassing FDI, national security and public interest review and approvals, inbound and outbound investment screening, and export control/sanctions matters, alongside related licensing and compliance and internal and regulator-facing investigations.

Ross regularly advises major multinational companies and a broad range of strategic and financial investors. With nearly a decade of global experience managing engagement with UK, EU and international authorities, and a deep understanding of the trade and investment issues connected to critical and strategic assets and technologies, Ross provides strategic and commercial guidance to clients, general counsel and C-suite decision makers, across industries including technology and telecommunications, infrastructure, life sciences, aerospace and defence, engineering, and financial services.

Ross frequently presents on legal developments and trends to industry bodies and trade groups in the United Kingdom and internationally. He has worked in Singapore and Stockholm, and has spent over a year on two separate secondments with a multinational technology company in London and California.

As an elected member of the National Security Committee of techUK, a technology industry trade association, Ross works alongside committee members drawn from the technology and security sector to break down the impact of new law and policy and to advance engagement and understanding between industry and government in the UK. In connection with his expertise in sensitive and emerging technologies, Ross provided industry focused input at the request of the UK Government on drafting secondary legislation and guidance in connection with the UK's National Security and Investment Act (NSIA).

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The UK Parliament has passed emergency legislation to enable the government to direct the use of assets of British Steel, and to take control of assets if directions are not followed.

The government’s stated intention is “continuing the support of steel production in the UK [which] involves preserving current production capacity to ensure resilience in the production of steel”. The new law creates new powers for the government to intervene in relation to steelmaking businesses whose assets are at risk of ceasing to be used. If the operation of a steelmaking blast furnace, such as those operated by British Steel, is stopped, restarting its operation can be prohibitively expensive and it may be permanently unusable.

Following negotiations with its current owners (the Chinese steelmaker Jingye Group) on the future of British Steel, the government announced on Friday its intention to recall Parliament the following day to introduce a draft bill and complete the full legislative process within a single day. The bill was passed by both Houses of Parliament and received royal asset on Saturday 12 April, coming into force on the same day, as the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act 2025 (the “Act”).

This is the first time that Parliament has responded to a perceived crisis in a UK industry by extending the government’s powers to intervene in specific industries for “public interest” reasons since 2008, in the context of the Global Financial Crisis. In that case, Parliament passed legislation to enable the government to nationalise the Northern Rock bank (and subsequently other banks), and later that year the government’s public interest intervention powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 were expanded in order to allow the government to override competition concerns in the Lloyds/HBOS merger. In contrast to previous measures that provide the government with powers to acquire businesses and to intervene in potential mergers and acquisitions between businesses, the new Act applies outside of the context of a transaction or takeover. Specifically, the new Act applies where specific assets may cease (or have ceased) to be used in a steel manufacturing business but the government considers that it is in the public interest that the use of the assets should continue.

New powers to give directions on use of assets and take control of assets

The Act gives the government the power to issue a notice to a steel manufacturing business to direct how assets (in England and Wales) used by this business are to be used. This power is available when (a) it appears to the government that the assets concerned have ceased to be used or are at risk of ceasing to be used by the business, and (b) where the government considers that it is in the public interest that the use of specified assets should resume or continue. Directions can include requirements to use (or not to use) the assets in a specified way, or requirements for the undertaking to take (or not to take) steps to secure the continued and safe use of the assets. Notably this can include requirements to enter into agreements and contracts of employment, the appointment of officers, management decisions, making payments, and preventing insolvency proceedings.Continue Reading UK passes emergency legislation to authorize “public interest” directions on use of British Steel assets

On 15 January 2025, the European Commission recommended that EU Member States review outbound investment in three critical technologies—semiconductors, AI, and quantum—with the aim of potentially creating an EU–wide regime to regulate such investment. EU Member States should report to the Commission on their findings and risk assessment within 18 months. These findings would inform a future policy proposal, so any introduction of outbound investment rules in the EU is likely to be several years away.

How did we get here?

Outbound investment mechanisms aim to regulate domestic companies making outward investments of capital, expertise, and knowledge that could contribute to the ‘leakage’ of critical and sensitive  technologies to third countries. Outbound investments typically take the form of EU firms purchasing equity in non-EU entities (e.g.  through joint ventures, greenfield investments), but can also take place through less structured arrangements such as R&D cooperation or transfer of employees.

The focus on outbound investment screening has its roots in transatlantic cooperation on China policy, and specifically the desire to minimize Western technology leakage to China. In particular, the U.S. Treasury Department issued new regulation prohibiting or otherwise requiring disclosure of outbound investment—in semiconductors, AI, and quantum—in Chinese entities as well as entities in other jurisdictions that hold certain interests in Chinese companies. The regulations entered into force on 2 January 2025.

Within the EU, outbound investment control was put on agenda with the European Economic Security Strategy and a subsequent white paper on outbound investment. Before then, only a few EU countries, such as Austria and Spain would screen outbound investment, and there had been no EU-wide approach on this topic.

What does it mean?

EU Member States are requested to monitor outbound investments in three critical technologies: semiconductors, AI, and quantum. The original white paper proposal also named biotechnologies amongst suggested critical technologies to be covered by the review, but this has been dropped in the new recommendation. The recommended scope of the monitoring exercise is as follows:Continue Reading Toward EU Outbound Investment Regulation

On 18 July 2024, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second 5-year term. As part of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which lays down the Commission’s political program for the next five years.

A key pillar of the program – “A new plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness” – has the objective of combining competitiveness and prosperity with the achievement of the European Green Deal goals.

Specifically on competition policy, according to President von der Leyen, a new approach is needed to achieve this objective. This blog post projects where competition policy is likely headed in the 2024-2029 period by commenting on the most relevant paragraphs of the program.

Von der Leyen: “I believe we need a new approach to competition policy, better geared to our common goals and more supportive of companies scaling up in global markets – while always ensuring a level playing field. This should be reflected in the way we assess mergers so that innovation and resilience are fully taken into account. We will ensure competition policy keeps pace with evolving global markets and prevents market concentration from raising prices or lowering the quality of goods or services for consumers. We will look at all of our policies through a security lens.”

  • This statement reaffirms the classic principles underlying competition law, i.e., the focus on ensuring a level playing field, preventing market concentration, and ultimately avoiding a negative impact on prices/quality of goods or services.
  • However, the President’s comments recognize the impact of global dynamics and the need for EU companies to be able to respond to global pressures. In the context of Siemens/Alstom and Lufthansa/ITA, there is growing pressure from EU Member States to allow European champions and this program could signal an openness to that effect.
  • The President also calls for an increased focus on innovation and resilience in the substantive assessment of mergers. This could mean (i) that the Commission will expand its assessment of the impact of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) standards and security, (ii) that the Commission would be open to a greater role of wider efficiency justifications/public interest considerations in merger control and competition law assessments, and/or (iii) that the impact on the overall economic competitiveness of the EU, and the aim of geopolitical de-risking for critical supply chains and technologies, may play an increasingly important role in the assessment of mergers.

Continue Reading The 2024-2029 Commission Political Guidelines: Where Is Competition Policy Likely Headed?