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Kevin Coates

Kevin Coates advises clients on strategic antitrust and other government investigation issues drawing on twenty years of public sector experience in the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission ("DG COMP") and ten years of private sector experience as in-house counsel and in private practice.

Kevin advises on all aspects of EU, UK and international competition law, including abuse of dominance, cartels and leniency, mergers and compliance, as well as related EU regulations such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA). He has extensive experience in technology, software and e-commerce sectors.

Kevin worked in the Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission for twenty years, including seven years reporting directly to the Director General, and nearly ten years as a head of unit, latterly as Head of a Cartel Unit. While working for the Director General he advised on case, policy and communications issues, worked closely with the Competition Commissioner and their Cabinet, and was one of the team that produced the Guidance on Enforcement Priorities under Article 102.

Kevin also served as in-house Counsel at AOL Europe where he was responsible for antitrust and regulatory issues for AOL subsidiary companies in the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands.

He co-wrote the IP and the telecoms and media chapters in Faull & Nikpay’s "EC Law of Competition," and is the author of “Competition Law and Regulation of Technology Markets” published by Oxford University Press in 2011. He was a Hauser Global Fellow at NYU School of Law in 2009/2010.

Drawing on his substantive antitrust experience in government and private practice, Kevin counsels clients on business-critical issues. He is known for combining a deep knowledge of the law with an ability to communicate clearly and convincingly.

Our webinar series on the European Commission’s draft guidelines on Article 102 is now available on demand here. The series, hosted by Kevin Coates, a former European Commission head of unit and an antitrust partner in Covington’s Brussels office, is in three parts. 

In the first webinar, Massimiliano

Continue Reading European Commission’s draft guidelines on Article 102 – webinar series

The European Commission’s draft guidelines on exclusionary abusive conduct by dominant firms under Article 102 TFEU (the “Draft Guidelines”) were published on 1 August 2024. They show a marked change from the 2009 Article 82 [now Article 102] Enforcement Priorities Guidance (the “Priorities Guidance”): economic concept has largely been replaced with the Commission’s interpretation of the European Courts’ caselaw.

The consultation on the Draft Guidelines is open until 31 October 2024. Practical suggestions rooted in and developing the caselaw appear more likely to influence the Commission’s final version of the Draft Guidelines than statements of economics.

Like the Priorities Guidance before it, the Draft Guidelines cover exclusionary conduct that the Commission views as concerning – conduct that benefits the dominant firm by excluding competitors from the market – and not exploitative conduct which benefits the dominant firm by exploiting its market power such as excessive pricing or the use of unfair trading conditions. Though in a departure from the Priorities Guidance, the Draft Guidelines do note overlaps between exclusionary and exploitative analysis: “the principles relevant to the assessment of dominance (section 2) and the justifications based on objective necessity and efficiencies (section 5) are also relevant for the assessment of other forms of abusive conduct, such as exploitative abuses” (paragraph 11 of the Draft Guidelines) and “the same conduct by a dominant undertaking may have both exclusionary and exploitative effects” (footnote 17 of the Draft Guidelines).

The Draft Guidelines also now cover collective dominance and not only single dominance, of which more below.

The Draft Guidelines are important because they signal not only how the Commission intends to apply Article 102 to dominant companies – arguably it is already doing so – but also how the Commission interprets the European Courts’ caselaw since the Priorities Guidance was adopted, and how the Commission wishes to influence the development of the caselaw in the future. In the period since the publication of the Priorities Guidance in 2009, the concepts set out in the Priorities Guidance have had mixed success in front of the European Courts. Some examples:

  • The Court of Justice in the Telia Sonera preliminary ruling said that there can be a margin squeeze even absent an obligation to deal (paragraph. 59), in implicit contradiction of the Priorities Guidance;
  • The General Court in Qualcomm, overturning the Commission’s decision, seemingly extends the relevance of the as efficient competitor test beyond the area of pricing abuses in the Priorities Guidance to exclusivity arrangements;
  • The Court of Justice in the Unilever Italia preliminary ruling and the Intel appeal affirming the use of the as efficient competitor test; and
  • The Court of Justice in the Post Danmark II preliminary ruling noting that less efficient competitors can sometimes constrain dominant companies (paragraph. 60).

Continue Reading From Concept to Precedent: The 2024 Draft Guidelines on Article 102

On 18 July 2024, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second 5-year term. As part of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which lays down the Commission’s political program for the next five years.

A key pillar of the program – “A new plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness” – has the objective of combining competitiveness and prosperity with the achievement of the European Green Deal goals.

Specifically on competition policy, according to President von der Leyen, a new approach is needed to achieve this objective. This blog post projects where competition policy is likely headed in the 2024-2029 period by commenting on the most relevant paragraphs of the program.

Von der Leyen: “I believe we need a new approach to competition policy, better geared to our common goals and more supportive of companies scaling up in global markets – while always ensuring a level playing field. This should be reflected in the way we assess mergers so that innovation and resilience are fully taken into account. We will ensure competition policy keeps pace with evolving global markets and prevents market concentration from raising prices or lowering the quality of goods or services for consumers. We will look at all of our policies through a security lens.”

  • This statement reaffirms the classic principles underlying competition law, i.e., the focus on ensuring a level playing field, preventing market concentration, and ultimately avoiding a negative impact on prices/quality of goods or services.
  • However, the President’s comments recognize the impact of global dynamics and the need for EU companies to be able to respond to global pressures. In the context of Siemens/Alstom and Lufthansa/ITA, there is growing pressure from EU Member States to allow European champions and this program could signal an openness to that effect.
  • The President also calls for an increased focus on innovation and resilience in the substantive assessment of mergers. This could mean (i) that the Commission will expand its assessment of the impact of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) standards and security, (ii) that the Commission would be open to a greater role of wider efficiency justifications/public interest considerations in merger control and competition law assessments, and/or (iii) that the impact on the overall economic competitiveness of the EU, and the aim of geopolitical de-risking for critical supply chains and technologies, may play an increasingly important role in the assessment of mergers.

Continue Reading The 2024-2029 Commission Political Guidelines: Where Is Competition Policy Likely Headed?

On 27 January 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) confirmed in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v European Commission that financial investors can be liable where they hold 100% voting rights over an indirect entity that participated in a cartel, even though the investor does not own


Continue Reading Goldman Sachs v Commission: The CJEU further expands the parental liability doctrine — private equity businesses and investors tread carefully

On 16 July 2020, the European Commission (“Commission”) announced that it has launched an antitrust sector inquiry into “consumer-related products and services that are connected to a network and can be controlled at a distance, for example via a voice assistant or mobile device.

Commission Executive


Continue Reading The European Commission launches an antitrust sector inquiry into the sector of Internet of Things for consumer-related devices and services

With the assistance of Covington, Unilever submitted the attached paper to the European Commission and a number of National Competition Authorities.  It suggests a possible framework for the application of EU competition law to sustainability collaborations between competitors.

The paper reflects insights from experts across Unilever and puts forward examples


Continue Reading Sustainability and Competition: Covington Assists Unilever on Submission to European Competition Authorities on the Competition Implications of Sustainability Cooperation

In November 2018, following an in-depth Phase 2 investigation, the European Commission (“Commission”) unconditionally approved the acquisition of Tele2 NL by T-Mobile NL, respectively the fourth and third largest players in the Dutch retail mobile telecoms market. The merged entity remains the third largest player in this market after KPN and VodafoneZiggo. This transaction is the first “four-to-three” telecom merger approved without remedies under Commissioner Vestager’s term, following earlier Commission decisions on four-to-three mergers in (i) H3G/Wind, where approval of a joint venture was conditional on the divestment of sufficient assets to allow a new MNO to enter the market; and (ii) Three/O2, an acquisition that was blocked by the Commission. It shows that there is no “magic number” for players in the telecoms market and that much will depend on the specifics of the merger.

Background

T-Mobile NL and Tele2 NL are both mobile network operators (“MNOs”) active in the Netherlands. T-Mobile owns a mobile network with nationwide coverage over which it provides 2G, 3G, 4G and NarrowBand-Internet of Things mobile communication services. It also provides fixed broadband, TV and telephony services based on wholesale access to other operators’ fixed network. Tele2 NL has operated a 4G-only mobile network since 2015, and also offers fixed broadband services. In December 2017, the parties announced that T-Mobile would acquire 75% of Tele2’s shares for EUR 190 million.

In June 2018 the Commission launched an in-depth investigation “to ensure that the proposed transaction between T-Mobile NL and Tele2 NL will not lead to higher prices or less choice in mobile services for Dutch consumers“. The Commission outlined the following preliminary concerns:

  1. The reduction in the number of MNOs and the limited incentives of the merged entity to compete with KPN and VodafoneZiggo, could lead to higher prices and less investment in mobile telecommunications networks.
  2. The lessening of competitive pressure in the Dutch retail mobile market, could increase the potential for the coordination of competitive behaviour between the three remaining MNOs.
  3. Prospective and existing mobile virtual network operators (“MVNOs”), who rely on wholesale access to MNOs’ networks to offer their retail mobile services, could potentially face greater difficulties in obtaining favourable wholesale access terms from MNOs.

Continue Reading “Four-to-three” mergers no longer taboo? The Commission unconditionally approves the acquisition of Tele2 NL by T-Mobile NL