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Paul Maynard

Paul Maynard is special counsel in the technology regulatory group in the London office. He focuses on advising clients on all aspects of UK and European privacy and cybersecurity law relating to complex and innovative technologies such as adtech, cloud computing and online platforms. He also advises clients on how to respond to law enforcement demands, particularly where such demands are made across borders.

Paul advises emerging and established companies in various sectors, including online retail, software and education technology. His practice covers advice on new legislative proposals, for example on e-privacy and cross-border law enforcement access to data; advice on existing but rapidly-changing rules, such the GDPR and cross-border data transfer rules; and on regulatory investigations in cases of alleged non-compliance, including in relation to online advertising and cybersecurity.

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On 3 June 2026, the European Commission published several legislative and policy measures wrapped up in one “tech sovereignty” package (see our posts summarising the package as a whole here, and diving deeper into the Cloud and AI Development Act here). But the EU’s tech sovereignty drive has a long history, and is by no means limited to this package.

In this post, we take a closer look at the current and forthcoming EU legislative measures aimed at increasing the resilience of services provided in the EU against external, malicious influence, a key aspect of tech sovereignty. Relevant legislation falls into two broad categories: (1) laws promoting cyber resilience generally, to prevent malicious actors from disrupting services and critical infrastructure; and (2) laws focused on building supply chain resilience and reducing dependencies on certain external actors by building European industrial capacity in key tech sectors.

Continue Reading Looking beyond the tech sovereignty package: how the EU is moving to ensure tech sector resilience

A key benefit of quantum computing is that it may, in the future, enable a very substantial increase in computing power.  This could create significant benefits, in the life sciences and financial services sectors (see our prior posts on the potential implications for these sectors here and here).  However, it also creates potential risks.  In particular, it could lead to the breaking of many of the encryption methods currently used by governments and businesses alike.  As commercially-viable quantum computers become an increasing reality, organisations must prioritise “quantum readiness” and specifically migration to post-quantum cryptography (“PQC”).

In this post, we set out a brief overview of the main steps that regulators and industry bodies (including the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), the UK National Cyber Security Centre (“NCSC”), and the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (“ENISA”)) have indicated businesses should take to move towards PQC and protect their data and systems from the risks posed by quantum computing.

Continue Reading Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Practical Guide

On 3 June 2026, the European Commission (“Commission“) published its proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem—the Cloud and AI Development Act (“CADA Proposal“). The CADA Proposal sits at the heart of the Commission’s broader Tech Sovereignty Package (which we describe at a high level here), and aims to address what the Commission perceives as two critical vulnerabilities in the EU’s digital landscape: a structural deficit in data centre capacity and a dependence on a limited number of non-EU cloud computing service providers.

Continue Reading The EU Cloud and AI Development Act in Depth

On June 3, the European Commission published its Tech Sovereignty Package, a set of legislative and policy initiatives designed to address what the Commission characterizes as Europe’s technological dependencies on non-European suppliers. The Package marks a further step in the evolution of the EU’s technology policy, with initiatives spanning the full tech stack—from chips and infrastructure to software, cloud, and artificial intelligence. Through this “ecosystem” approach, the Commission seeks to reduce supply-side dependencies by strengthening domestic capabilities in Europe and stimulating demand in downstream sectors.

The Package comprises four components: two legislative proposals—(i) the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), and (ii) the Chips Act 2.0—as well as two non-legislative initiatives—(iii) the EU Open Source Strategy and (iv) a Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in Energy.

Continue Reading EU Tech Sovereignty Package

On 19 March 2026, Advocate-General Capeta issued an opinion in the case of Elisa Eesti AS v Estonian Government Security Committee (C-354/24). This case concerned, among other things, whether a 2022 order from the Estonian Government for Elisa Eesti AS—a 5G network operator—to remove Huawei components from its network for national security reasons was subject to EU law, constituted a lawful restriction on the right to offer an electronic communications network, and amounted to a “deprivation of property” requiring compensation.

AG Capeta concluded that the relevant Estonian regime was within scope of EU law—specifically the European Electronic Communications Code (“EECC”)—even though that regime allowed for the imposition of orders on electronic communications network (“ECN”) providers for national security reasons. She also concluded that the requirement to obtain prior authorization from the Estonian government for use of network equipment constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide an ECN, but that this could be justified on national security grounds if the decision was based on a genuine risk assessment that meets the requirements for proportionality under EU law. She stated that this determination should be left to the referring court. Finally, she concluded that the Estonian Government’s order did not amount to a “deprivation” of property for which compensation would be required, as it was instead a mere “restriction” on the use of property.

Below, we describe these non-binding conclusions in more detail. The Court’s final ruling in this case will have significant implications for the European Commission’s proposed revisions to the EU Cybersecurity Act, which as drafted would—among other things—allow the Commission to require ECN providers to remove and cease using components from designated high-risk jurisdictions in their networks. See our prior blog post on the proposal for a revised Cybersecurity Act here.

Continue Reading CJEU Advocate-General indicates that communications network operators can lawfully be required to remove Chinese components, and that compensation is not required

On February 19, 2026, the UK Court of Appeal handed down its decision in DSG Retail Limited v The Information Commissioner [2026] EWCA Civ 140. The Court ruled that a controller’s data security duty applies to all personal data for which it acts as controller – irrespective of whether the information would constitute personal data in the hands of a third party (in this case, an attacker). Note that the case is concerned with events before the GDPR came into force, so the legal context is provided by UK Data Protection Act 1998 (“DPA 1998”), although the Court did take into account more recent jurisprudence, including CJEU case law.

The case adds useful colour to ongoing debates surrounding the definition of “personal data.” The Court of Appeal confirmed that a controller’s duty to implement appropriate measures to protect personal data applies to data that is “personal” from the perspective of the controller —even if a third-party attacker could not identify individuals from the exfiltrated dataset. This dovetails with the SRB v EDPS’s clarification that whether data is “personal” can depend on the context, while a controller’s obligations (such as transparency) must be assessed from the controller’s perspective at the relevant time (which, for the transparency principle, is at the time of collection of the data). (For more information on SRB v EDPS, see our prior post here.)

Continue Reading UK Court of Appeal Rules on the Concept of Personal Data in the Context of Data Security

On 20 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal for a Regulation to update and replace the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation 2019/881). The proposal—known as the Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2)—forms part of a wider package aimed at modernizing and streamlining the EU’s cybersecurity framework and is closely linked to the Commission’s parallel proposal to amend Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2). We cover that proposal in a separate blog post.

CSA2 covers two main areas that will be relevant to private companies. First, it would introduce the EU’s first horizontal framework for ICT supply chain security—this is an entirely new addition that is not contained in the Cybersecurity Act, and could have significant implications for organizations in sectors that procure components from providers located in high-risk jurisdictions (e.g., telecoms). Second, it would update and expand the existing framework for cybersecurity certifications (the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework, or ECCF). In addition, it would significantly expand the role of the EU cybersecurity agency, ENISA.

Below, we summarize the main elements of the proposal.

Continue Reading European Commission Proposes Cybersecurity Act 2: New EU Supply Chain Rules and Certification Reforms

On 20 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal to amend the Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) as part of a broader package to streamline the EU’s cybersecurity framework. The Commission also issued a proposal to revise the EU Cybersecurity Act (CSA2), which we cover in a separate blog post.

The proposed amendments build on earlier streamlining efforts in the Commission’s Digital Omnibus Package—published on 19 November 2025—which introduced the first wave of technical adjustments to NIS2. Those earlier amendments focused on creating a single framework for reporting cyber incidents and clarifying how NIS2 interacts with sectoral regimes such as the CER Directive and DORA.

With this proposal, the Commission now aims to clarify the scope of the law, harmonize technical measures, introduce certification‑based compliance pathways, and strengthen cross‑border supervision through an expanded role for ENISA.

Below, we summarize the main elements of the proposal and what they could mean for entities in scope of NIS2.

Continue Reading European Commission Proposes Targeted Amendments to NIS2 to Simplify Compliance and Align With Proposed Cybersecurity Act 2

On 21 January 2026, the European Commission (“Commission”) unveiled its landmark proposal for the Digital Networks Act (“DNA Proposal”), an ambitious attempt to overhaul the framework for the regulation and development of electronic communications networks and services across the EU. The Commission’s stated aim with the DNA Proposal is to establish a “modern and simplified legal framework that incentivises the transition from legacy networks to fibre, high quality 5G and 6G networks, and cloud-based infrastructures, as well as increased scale through service provision and cross-border operation.” To do this, the DNA Proposal would replace and consolidate several existing EU laws, including the European Electronic Communications Code (“EECC”), the BEREC Regulation, and parts of the Open Internet Regulation and e-Privacy Directive.

A key theme of the proposal is harmonization of rules—arising first and foremost from the fact that this is a directly-applicable Regulation rather than a Directive like the current European Electronic Communications Code. Several of the substantive provisions in the DNA Proposal may take a significant amount of influence over the communications networks and services away from Member State governments and up to EU level. In turn, the Commission clearly hopes to promote larger-scale communications network and service providers that can operate across the EU, and that have the funds to invest in modern communications infrastructure. The DNA Proposal could, therefore, have a substantial and long-lasting impact on the connectivity and communications markets in the EU, although we anticipate significant debate about many of the provisions of the DNA Proposal throughout the legislative process.

Below, we summarize seven of the most eye-catching changes to the regulatory framework for communications providers in the DNA Proposal.

Continue Reading Seven Major Changes in the European Commission’s Proposal for an EU Digital Networks Act

On November 12, 2025, UNESCO’S General Conference adopted its Recommendation on the Ethics of Neurotechnology (“the Recommendation”)–the first attempt at establishing a global legal framework for the ethical development and use of neurotechnology. The Recommendation aims to set out a comprehensive rights-based framework for the entire life cycle of neurotechnology, from the design of neurotechnology products and services to their disposal.

While not legally-binding, the Recommendation states that its provisions should be considered by, among others, UNESCO Member States, research organizations, and private companies involved in neurotechnology, and that they establish how best to honor fundamental human rights in the development, deployment and disposal of this technology. It is therefore possible that in the future, they may be a starting point for binding legislation, or could be used as persuasive authority to support enforcement actions arising under existing legislation protecting fundamental human rights, e.g., the GDPR and other privacy laws around the world. In that regard, it is notable that the EU AI Act was inspired, at least in part, on UNESCO’s November 2021 Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. There is, therefore, a real possibility that private sector companies developing neurotechnologies will be subject to rules specifically regulating such technologies in the future.

Continue Reading UNESCO Adopts First Global Framework on Neurotechnology Ethics