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Lasse Luecke

Lasse Luecke advises clients on EU regulatory and policy matters with a focus on environmental, technology, and product safety legislation. He has particular expertise in radio equipment legislation, including radiofrequency (RF) spectrum use and availability, data center regulation, and ESG reporting frameworks, where he supports companies in meeting complex and rapidly evolving compliance obligations. Lasse also helps clients anticipate legislative developments, shape regulatory strategy, and engage constructively with EU institutions and policymakers.

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The Spanish Ministry for Ecologic Transition and Demographic Challenge (“MITECO”) has launched a public consultation on a Draft Royal Decree (“Draft Royal Decree”) that would impose strict energy efficiency and sustainability requirements on data centers in Spain.  The proposed requirements of the Draft Royal Decree are broader and stricter than the requirements on data centers set out in the EU’s Directive (EU) 2023/1791 (the “Energy Efficiency Directive” or “EED”) that the Draft Royal Decree aims to transpose.  Among other things, the Draft Royal Decree imposes requirements to report on the socio-economic impact of data centers; and to comply with the European Code of Conduct on Data Centre Energy Efficiency (“EU CoC”), and with industry best practices.  The Draft Royal Decree is subject to an ongoing public consultation and interested parties may submit their comments until September 15, 2025.

In this blog post we outline the requirements of the Draft Royal Decree that are stricter than those of the EED.Continue Reading Spain Proposes Strict Sustainability Requirements for Data Centers

There is an ongoing debate in Brussels about the circumstances under which AI-based safety components integrated into radio equipment are subject to the requirements for high-risk AI systems of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act 2024/1689 (the “AI Act”). The debate is particularly relevant because, if AI-based safety components are considered high-risk under the AI Act, they will be subject to a comprehensive set of regulatory requirements under the AI Act as of August 2, 2027. These requirements include risk management, data quality measures, transparency towards users, human oversight, as well as obligations relating to accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity.

The discussion affects devices like smartphones with AI-driven emergency call features, smart home safety systems, smart home appliances and drones using AI for obstacle avoidance and emergency landing. In effect, many, if not all, of the AI-based safety components of internet-connected radio equipment could be subject to the AI Act’s requirements for high-risk AI systems.

Below we briefly outline the framework of the current debate.Continue Reading When is a Safety Component of Radio Equipment a High-Risk AI System Under the EU Artificial Intelligence Act?

This year’s Munich Security Conference reemphasized the need for Europe to invest in greater defense capabilities and foster a regulatory environment that is conducive to building a defense and technological industrial base. In Munich, President Ursula von der Leyen committed to appointing a European Commissioner for Defence, if she is reselected later this year by the European Council and European Parliament. And the EU is also due to publish shortly a new defense industrial strategy, mirroring in part, the first-ever U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) released earlier this year by the Department of Defense.

The NDIS, in turn, recognizes the need for a strong defense industry in both the U.S. and the EU, as well as other allies and partners across the globe, in order to strengthen supply chain resilience and ensure the production and delivery of critical defense supplies. And global leaders generally see the imperative of working together over the long-term to advance integrated deterrence policies and to strengthen and modernize defense industrial base ecosystems. We will continue tracking these geopolitical trends, which are likely to persist regardless of electoral outcomes in Europe or the United States.

These developments across both sides of the Atlantic follow on a number of significant new funding streams in Europe over the past couple of years, for instance:

  • The 2021 revision of the European Defense Fund Regulation allocated €8 billion for common research and development projects, meant to be spent during the 2021-2027 multi-annual financial framework (MFF).
  • As a direct response to Ukraine’s request for assistance with the supply of 155 mm-caliber artillery rounds, the EU adopted the 2023 Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), with a €500 million fund to scale up production of ammunition and missiles.
  • Most recently, the EU adopted the 2023 European Defense Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), introduced a joint procurement fund of €300 million to facilitate Member States’ collective acquisition of defense products.
  • The European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget instrument, with an overall financial ceiling exceeding €12 billion, is primarily destined toward procurement of military material and large-scale financing of weapon supplies to allied third countries (including €6.1 billion for Ukraine).

Continue Reading Insights from the Munich Security Conference: Towards an Expanding U.S.-EU Defense Taxonomy?

Last month, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) met in Paris-Saclay for the second time since its launch in June 2021. (The first ministerial took place in Pittsburgh in September. France hosted this session as holder of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.) The meeting was co-chaired by Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Commerce Raimondo, and U.S. Trade Representative Tai, and European Commission Executive Vice Presidents Vestager and Dombrovskis. European Commissioner Breton also joined the discussions and the French ministers for foreign affairs, economy, and trade (Le Drian, Le Maire, and Riester) hosted the opening dinner.

The TTC is a new model of economic integration through regulatory coordination. Although both sides reserve their “regulatory autonomy,” they have also invested significant political capital, time, and effort into this process. The TTC spans broad policy areas including tech standards, climate, supply chains, export controls, and investment screening. It operates through ten working groups, which meet at staff working levels and seek input from outside stakeholders. For instance, the European Commission sponsors a “Trade and Technology Dialogue” facility to conduct outreach to the private sector and civil society. Through this technical work, the TTC’s aim is to shape the “rules of the road” for the global economy to favor liberal democracies, leveraging the transatlantic community’s half of global GDP. The ministerials set the themes and political direction for the working groups.

Against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. and EU noted that the TTC has become a “central pillar” of the transatlantic partnership, “indispensable” in facilitating coordination on sanctions and export controls. It will serve as a forum to monitor and discuss the Russia sanctions and may coordinate their eventual removal. Indeed, the TTC has arguably become more of a geopolitical tool than originally intended. Its 48-page joint statement reflects the breadth and depth of the underlying discussions and signals various future policy directions.Continue Reading U.S.-EU Trade and Tech Council: Paris Takeaways and Next Steps