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John Graubert

John Graubert has more than 30 years of experience in a wide range of complex antitrust and consumer law matters. John came to the firm after serving for ten years as Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission. John is the former co-chair of the firm’s Advertising and Consumer Protection Investigations practice group, an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, and a vice-chair of the Global Private Litigation Committee of the ABA Antitrust Section.

From 1998-2008, John served as Principal Deputy General Counsel (including several stints as Acting General Counsel) at the Federal Trade Commission. In that position John managed all litigation, legal counsel, policy studies, and administrative functions within the Office of General Counsel. He also advised the Commission and agency staff on antitrust and consumer protection matters and administrative law. He was involved in dozens of litigated matters for the Commission, including FTC v. Swedish Match, et al. (D.D.C. 2000) and FTC v. Schering-Plough, et al. (11th Cir. 2005), and received the A. Leon Higginbotham Award and the Award for Distinguished Service.

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July 10, 2024, Covington Alert

On July 3, 2024, Judge Ada Brown of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted the motions for a preliminary injunction—filed by Ryan LLC (“Ryan”) and several trade associations, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”)—to prevent the FTC’s rule banning non-compete clauses from going into effect, but the court’s order only applies to the named plaintiffs (i.e., it is not a nationwide injunction). The court has indicated that it will issue a final order on the merits by August 30, 2024, just a few days before the FTC’s rule is scheduled to go into effect on September 4. It is possible that Judge Brown enjoins the non-compete ban nationwide in her final order.

Background

In April, the FTC issued a final rule banning almost all non-competes with U.S. workers, with narrow exceptions, pursuant to its claimed authority to issue competition-related rules under Sections 5 and 6(g) of the FTC Act. That same day, Ryan challenged the FTC’s rule and, shortly thereafter, filed a motion to stay and preliminarily enjoin the rule, arguing that the FTC has no statutory authority to promulgate the rule, that the rule is the product of an unconstitutional exercise of power, and that the FTC’s acts were arbitrary and capricious. The Chamber and other trade groups intervened as plaintiffs on May 8, making substantially the same arguments.

The Order

In its Order, the court found that the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success that (1) the FTC does not have the statutory authority to engage in competition-related rulemaking, (2) the non-compete rule is arbitrary and capricious, and (3) the plaintiffs and intervenors had satisfied the standard to obtain injunctive relief.Continue Reading Texas District Court Enjoins FTC’s Rule Banning Non-Compete Clauses

On Monday, November 7, the Supreme Court heard argument in Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC and SEC v. Cochran to decide whether a party subject to an FTC or SEC administrative proceeding can simultaneously challenge the constitutionality of an administrative proceeding, or even of the agency itself, in federal district court rather than waiting for final agency action.  At least five Justices expressed some measure of support for the private parties’ arguments, which indicates that the Court may permit certain kinds of collateral constitutional attacks (e.g., due process and appointments clause claims) at the outset of administrative proceedings.

Although predicting the outcome of any case from the oral argument is extremely difficult, three Justices – Neil Gorsuch, Samuel Alito, and Clarence Thomas – expressed strong support for finding in Axon’s and Cochran’s favor. Through their questions, they implied that 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, which grants federal district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution of the United States,” provides a clear grant of jurisdiction over constitutional claims and neither the FTC Act nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”) could strip district courts of that jurisdiction. They also suggested that Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB requires a finding for the companies. In PCAOB, the Court held that a district court had jurisdiction to hear an appointments clause challenge to PCAOB’s structure despite the fact that the SEC had not yet issued a final order against Free Enterprise Fund.

Other justices appeared to favor the private parties, but not as overtly. Chief Justice John Roberts’s questions suggested that PCAOB may prove to be an insurmountable barrier to the government’s claims and that the availability of jurisdiction in other forums (i.e., the court of appeals) under the FTC Act and the Exchange Act clearly does not act as an implied removal of jurisdiction from Section 1331. Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s questions indicated that he believes that the issue may be decided solely by reference to the “wholly collateral” factor of the Thunder Basin test, which courts have used to guide determinations about when a party may bring an Article III challenge to agency proceedings before those proceedings have concluded. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (holding that the statutory review scheme of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 precludes a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act). He stated that clarity, certainty, and speed counseled in favor of permitting district courts to hear constitutional claims.Continue Reading Supreme Court Considers Whether to Allow Early Constitutional Challenges to FTC and SEC Administrative Proceedings