The European Court of Justice released its long-awaited judgment¹ in the Google Shopping saga last week, finally putting to bed close to fifteen years’ of scrutiny into Google’s practices of favouring its own comparison shopping service (Google Shopping) over rival shopping services.

In its ruling, the ECJ upheld the General Court’s earlier judgment² which had rejected Google’s appeal over the European Commission’s decision³ to fine it €2.42 billion for abusing its market dominance as a search engine by systematically favouring Google Shopping in its general search results.

The overall outcome of the ECJ’s reasoning in Google Shopping is perhaps unsurprising to competition law practitioners – given the unwavering direction of travel of the case. The ECJ judgment nevertheless raises a number of interesting points and leaves a number of questions unanswered.

Key takeaways

• Refusal to supply. The judgment confirmed that not every issue of access necessarily requires the application of the Bronner test of refusal to supply. The ECJ found the Bronner doctrine applies in circumstances where a dominant firm refuses to grant a competitor access to infrastructure which it has developed for its own business needs. However, the ECJ ruled that the Bronner test is not applicable in cases where there is no outright refusal of access to infrastructure – but rather access granted on discriminatory terms (such discrimination being assessed under separate forms of potential abuse).
• Competition not on the merits. The ECJ accepted Google’s arguments that, to establish an abuse of dominance under Article 102, a two-pronged test applies: (i) that actual or potential anticompetitive effects arise from the abusive conduct; and (ii) that the conduct falls outside of “competition on the merits”. However, in assessing the latter requirement, the ECJ rejected Google’s arguments that only circumstances relating specifically to Google’s conduct are relevant to the assessment. Instead, the ECJ held that, in assessing “competition on the merits”, relevant circumstances regarding the characteristics of the market or the nature of competition are capable of characterising the conduct as falling outside of the scope of competition on the merits.
• Causality and counterfactual. The ECJ maintained that the causal link is one of the essential elements of a competition law infringement and that, as a result, the burden of proof for such causal link (and hence the counterfactual analysis) lies with the Commission. However, the ECJ found that the counterfactual analysis is just one way to establish causality. Where establishing a credible counterfactual may be “arbitrary or even impossible” (para 231), the Commission cannot be required to systematically establish a counterfactual and can rely on other evidence to establish causality.
• “As-efficient competitors”. The ECJ reiterated earlier case law that it is not the objective of Article 102 to ensure that less efficient competitors remain on the market but also remarked that this statement did not imply that an abuse of dominance finding does not always require a showing that the conduct was capable of excluding an as-efficient competitor. With respect to the AEC test, the Court held that this is just one way to establish an abuse of dominance.

Continue Reading ECJ’s Google Shopping Judgment: The End of a Long Saga