foreign direct investment

Barely noticed in the firehose stream of presidential activity since the inauguration was a brief Oval Office mention of cutting a deal with Ukraine for access to its critical minerals. Securing steady access to uranium, the rare earth elements, and other critical minerals is a natural priority for an America First agenda, so President Trump’s February 3 statement is unlikely to be his last. Changes to the tax code, permitting reform, regulatory incentives, and partnerships with allies as well as troubled nations are among the actions to watch for.

A Bipartisan Issue

Leaders of both parties agree that action is needed. “Whether it’s critical minerals with China … or uranium from Russia, we can’t be dependent on them,” Secretary of the Interior Doug Bergum asserted in his confirmation hearing. “We’ve got the resources here. We need to develop them.” Virginia Senator Mark Warner (D, VA) recently charged, “China dominates the critical mineral industry and is actively working to ensure that the U.S. does not catch up.” He urged, “The U.S. must, alongside allies, take meaningful steps to protect and expand our production and procurement of these critical minerals.” President Biden’s State Department was even more blunt, asserting that China is intentionally oversupplying lithium to “lower the price until competition disappears.”

Several recent developments have increased U.S. policymakers’ concerns about future supplies of critical minerals. New technologies, including artificial intelligence, promise to dramatically boost demand. China, meanwhile, is using new export control laws to curtail exports to the United States. A resurgent war in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), ostensibly over tribal rivalries, is actually a fight over the country’s rich mineral resources. These include gold and diamonds, but also coltan, an ore from which tantalum is extracted. Tantalum is extremely valuable for its use in the capacitors found in smartphones, laptops, and medical equipment.

The number of minerals in question (51), the usual number of steps in the production chain (4), and the variety of international agreements, public laws, private initiatives, and emerging technologies add up to a dizzyingly complex set of issues. Nevertheless, the bipartisan alignment evident in the above statements signals that impacted industries should watch closely for fast-moving legislative and regulatory developments.

Market Overview

Critical minerals are essential for a long list of industrial and defense-related needs. Attention is often focused on the 17 ‘rare earth elements,’ (REEs) but the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has a broader list of 50 mineral commodities that are critical to the nation’s economy and national security. Uranium is excluded by a statutory definition but is often tracked in parallel. Together, these 51 elements are used for a far wider array of products than is often recognized. The 17 REEs alone are also needed for oil refining, guided missiles, radar arrays, MRI machines, computer chips, hydrogen electrolysis, lasers, aluminum manufacturing, cameras, jet engines, satellite manufacturing, and a long list of other advanced applications.Continue Reading What President Trump Might Do on Critical Minerals

Over the summer, the UK Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”) delivered the first decisions, in the form of final orders, under the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (“NSIA”).  We consider these decisions and other cases in the context of the first nine months of the UK’s new (quasi) Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) regime.

Key takeaways:

  • The NSIA has broad reach, and BEIS has shown willingness to exercise the powers to review transactions that can stretch beyond mergers and acquisitions, for example, to licensing agreements.
  • NSIA review involves the weighing of a number of factors relating to the target, the acquirer and the level of control being obtained.  Early decisions suggest that target’s products/services and activities are just as important a factor as the acquirer’s identity, among the cases that have engaged the attention of the Investment Security Unit (“ISU”).
  • “Behavioural” undertakings, e.g. involving implementation of security controls or granting of audit rights to regulators appear to be a continuation of trends seen in the predecessor UK ‘public interest’ regime, and similar to other EU FDI procedures.

Continue Reading UK FDI: Decision-making practice emerging under the National Security and Investment Act

 On 30 June 2022, the Council of the EU (the “Council”) and the European Parliament (the “Parliament”) reached a much awaited agreement on the proposal of the European Commission (the “Commission”) for the Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the “FSR”) (see our alert on the proposal). This political agreement swiftly concludes the trilogue discussions initiated in the beginning of May this year, after the Council (see our blog post) and the Parliament (see our blog post) each adopted their own positions. The agreement has been approved by the Permanent Representatives Committee (“COREPER”) of the Council on 13 July and the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament on 14 July.

The FSR grants substantial new powers to the Commission and “will help close the regulatory gap whereby subsidies granted by non-EU governments currently go largely unchecked”, according to remarks from Executive Vice-President of the Commission, Margrethe Vestager. It will be deeply transformative for M&A and public procurement in the EU.

The agreement on the FSR did not lead to any major changes in the proposal made by the Commission. The most notable points of discussion between the Parliament and Council and the outcome of this agreement are:

  • The thresholds above which companies are obliged to inform the Commission about their foreign subsidies remain unchanged compared to the Commission’s proposal;
  • The time period in which the Commission has to investigate foreign subsidies in large public procurement has been reduced. In the same way, the retroactive application of the FSR has been limited to foreign subsidies granted in the five years prior to the application of the regulation;
  • The Commission will issue guidelines on the existence of a distortion, the balancing test and its power to request notification of non-notifiable transactions, at the latest three years after the entry into force of the FSR; and
  • A commitment to a multilateral approach to foreign subsidies above the FSR and the possibility for the Commission to engage in a dialogue with third countries has been included.

Continue Reading The Council of the EU and the European Parliament agree on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation

The UK government has reported a successful start to the implementation of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (the “NSIA” or “Act”). During the first three months (Jan-March 2022) in which the new NSIA regime has been active, the Investment Screening Unit (“ISU”) received 222 filings and reviewed 17 transactions in depth. Of those 17 transactions, three have been cleared unconditionally, with the other 14 transactions still under review at the end of the reporting period.

Mandatory NSIA filings, which represented 196 of the total flings, were most commonly made in six sectors: defence, military and dual-use, critical suppliers to government, artificial intelligence, data infrastructure and advanced materials.  There were significantly fewer filings in other sectors, with fewer than five filings per sector in areas such as synthetic biology, civil nuclear, advanced robotics and transport.

Collectively, these figures and other data suggest that the NSIA regime is operating, so far, broadly in line with expectations. While there are fewer filings than expected overall, this may reflect a broader global slowdown in M&A and investment activity. The ISU further reports that it is meeting, and often working well within, the maximum statutory time periods for the assessment of filings. The ISU indicates its willingness to complete reviews expeditiously where possible, including for in-depth assessments.Continue Reading UK National Security and Investment Regime Working Well

Russia’s continued invasion of Ukraine is broadly impacting foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening. A range of governments have announced they will apply close scrutiny to investments from Russia and its allied countries in general, and not only to investors that are subject to sanctions or other restrictive measures. The European Commission (“Commission”) has published guidance on the screening of investments from Russia and Belarus.

The German government has already intervened, appointing a fiduciary for an operator of critical gas infrastructure. Canada issued a policy statement targeting Russian investors and Italy permanently broadened its FDI regime. Our blog provides a summary of these developments below.

Commission Communication calls for systematic assessment of Russian and Belarusian investments

On 6 April 2022, the Commission published a Communication (“Communication”) with guidance on screening of FDI from Russia and Belarus. The Communication emphasizes greater vigilance towards Russian and Belarusian investments into the EU and stresses that FDI screening goes beyond investments by persons or entities that are subject to sanctions. While the Communication is a direct response to the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, it also elaborates on more general principles of FDI screening in the EU.

The Commission calls upon Member States to systematically assess and prevent threats related to Russian and Belarusian investments. In particular, the Commission encourages Member States to ensure close cooperation both on the national and EU level in relation to FDI screening activities, as well as in the implementation of EU sanctions. The EU FDI Regulation already provides for such cooperation and facilitates information exchange among Member States and the Commission. In particular, Member States may learn about a transaction through the cooperation mechanism and assess FDI filing requirements within their own jurisdiction. As discussed in our blogpost concerning “One Year of the EU FDI Regulation”, Member States have found the cooperation mechanism to be “a very useful instrument” and to have fostered valuable discussions in relation to transaction screening and critical sectors.

But a number of Member States do not have FDI screening regimes in place, including Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Where FDI regimes are not yet in place or do not allow for pre-investment screening, the Commission calls to urgently set up a comprehensive FDI screening mechanism and in the meantime to use other suitable legal instruments to address security or public order risks. For those Member States that are in the process of setting up a screening mechanism, the Commission calls on them to accelerate adoption and prepare implementation, including supporting it with appropriate resources.

The Communication notes the potential screening of FDI after the completion of a transaction. While FDI screening is usually undertaken before closing of a transaction, the EU FDI Screening Regulation also allows for the screening of FDI post-closing. If a Member State launches the formal screening of an FDI, it is subject to EU cooperation mechanism irrespective of its planned or completed status. Furthermore, the cooperation mechanism may be initiated within 15 months after the investment has been completed when an investment is not subject to screening at national level. This may occur when the Member State does not have a screening mechanism or when the Member State maintains a screening mechanism but the specific FDI transaction was not submitted by the parties for ex-ante screening.

The Commission reports that based on 2020 data, Russian individuals or entities control about 17,000 EU companies, and have potentially controlling stakes in another 7,000 companies and minority stakes in a further 4,000 companies. The Commission strongly encourages Member States to apply FDI screening to intra-EU investments that are ultimately controlled by Russian or Belarusian persons or entities. In that context, the Communication describes the conditions under which Member States may be permitted to impose restrictions on the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment.
Continue Reading FDI regulators show their teeth – Close scrutiny and firm intervention in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine