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Marney Cheek

On Sunday, July 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree putting shares of Danone Russia JSC, owned by French yogurt maker Danone, and of Baltika Brewing Company, owned by Danish brewer Carlsberg A/S, under “temporary management.”

The Kremlin has since reportedly appointed Yakub Zakriev, deputy prime minister and agriculture minister of Chechnya, as head of the Danone business.[1] Mr. Zakriev has been described as a close ally of Ramzan Kadyrov, the notorious leader of the Chechen Republic, and himself a close ally of President Putin.[2] Meanwhile, Taimuraz Bolloev, a longtime friend of Putin, has been installed as director of Carlsberg’s Baltika business.[3]

These recent seizures follow a decree Putin signed in April, laying the groundwork to expropriate, damage, or otherwise impair the investments of companies from “unfriendly” countries—including the U.S., UK, Canada, all EU member states, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea.[4] This is the second time Russia has used the decree to seize assets. Previously, Russia took control of utilities owned by Finland’s Fortum Oyj and Germany’s Uniper SE.[5]

These Russian actions demonstrate the significant risks for foreign companies that continue to operate in Russia and signal further potential asset seizures, including the possible transfer of foreign assets to regime-friendly owners. Russia’s measures appear to constitute uncompensated expropriations, for which investors could seek redress under Russia’s network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).[6]

In prior Covington alerts, we have discussed how foreign investors in Russia can protect their investments from Russian retaliatory measures by ensuring that they have access to international arbitration, including through BITs. We also have highlighted certain key protections available under BITs that may provide recourse to foreign investors affected by Russia’s recent measures. In this alert, we focus on those protections under Russian BITs of most direct relevance to foreign investors whose assets have been expropriated or that have had the management of that investment obstructed by Russia’s actions, present and future.

Key Protections in Russian BITs

Russia has BITs in force with over 60 countries, including many EU members (such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden) and countries such as Canada, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine. There is no BIT between Russia and the United States, but U.S. companies may nonetheless benefit from BIT protection if they hold their investments in Russia through a third country that does have a Russian BIT.

In its BITs, Russia has committed to, among other things, treat investors from the relevant countries in a fair and equitable manner, not to discriminate against such investors on the basis of nationality, not to expropriate their investments except under certain conditions and upon payment of adequate compensation, and to guarantee their right to freely transfer payments related to their investments out of Russia. All of these protections are relevant in the present context.Continue Reading Protecting Against Russia’s Asset Seizures: Investment Treaties May Provide a Remedy for Foreign Investors

UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution Requesting Advisory Opinion on States’ Obligations Concerning Climate Change

On March 29, 2023, the UN General Assembly (“UNGA”) adopted by consensus a resolution (A/77/L.58) requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”) on the obligations of states in respect of climate change. The resolution results from coordinated efforts by the Republic of Vanuatu, along with a “Core Group” of states, including Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, the Federated States of Micronesia, Morocco, Mozambique, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Uganda, and Viet Nam. The efforts of the Core Group drew on grassroots and civil society support, and the resolution was ultimately co-sponsored by more than 130 UN member states (although not the United States, Brazil, India, China, or Russia).

This marks the latest effort to ask international courts and tribunals to clarify the legal obligations of states in relation to climate change. In the last few months, similar requests for advisory opinions have been submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”).

Questions in the UNGA Resolution

The UNGA resolution observes that “as temperatures rise, impacts from climate and weather extremes […] will pose an ever-greater social, cultural, economic and environmental threat.” It asks the ICJ to issue its opinion on the following questions:

a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations;Continue Reading The World Court Set to Become the Latest Venue for Climate Change Jurisprudence

On September 8 and 9, top trade officials of the United States and the other Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (“IPEF” or “Framework”) partner countries—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—launched formal negotiations in Los Angeles.

This marked the first in-person ministerial-level meeting since the IPEF launched on May 23, 2022 and follows three informal meetings since May 2022, the latest event being the virtual ministerial on July 26-27, discussed in detail in our previous post.

The Los Angeles ministerial involved intensive discussions on what to include in the scope of the Framework. Ultimately, the IPEF partners reached consensus on ministerial statements for each of the four IPEF framework pillars: Trade, Supply Chain, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy. All 14 IPEF partners have joined three of the pillars, and 13 joined the fourth—with just India opting out of the Trade pillar. While this near unanimous support for the four pillars is certainly a positive sign, the real work begins now.

This blog post summarizes how the ministerial statements characterize the four pillars and outlines next steps for the Framework and key remaining questions.

Takeaways from the Ministerial Statements

The ministerial statements confirmed the four pillars of negotiation and provided added clarity on the scope and content of each pillar. While the statements add little to the substance, they indicate a political commitment among the partners to the Framework.Continue Reading IPEF Partners Adopt Ministerial Statement and Negotiation Objectives

On July 26-27, 2022, the Biden Administration hosted a two-day virtual meeting with top trade officials from the 13 other partners of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (“IPEF” or “Framework”)—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This was the first ministerial meeting since the 13 initial participants[1] agreed on May 23, 2022 to launch “collective discussions towards future negotiations” on the Framework. The IPEF currently focuses on four “pillars”: (1) Trade; (2) Supply Chains; (3) Clean Energy, Decarbonization, and Infrastructure; and (4) Tax and Anti-Corruption. Touted as a “21st century economic arrangement designed to tackle 21st century economic challenges,” the IPEF is said to offer what Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo calls a “innovative and flexible approach,” and is “internationally designed not to be a ‘same old, same old’ traditional free trade agreement.”

The Framework’s novel approach, however, has raised a flurry of unanswered questions. Key U.S. stakeholders, for instance, have questioned the Biden Administration’s decision not to discuss tariff reductions or market access as part of the IPEF negotiations. Concerns have been raised about the enforceability of any agreements concluded among Framework partners. Potential agreements within each pillar remain largely unknown or undisclosed, even though the Framework partners have spent months engaged in a “scoping exercise” to define the components of each pillar.

This latest ministerial meeting added little clarity. No joint statement was released at the end of the meeting, suggesting that more remains to be done before formal, text-based negotiations begin. But as negotiators approach the one-year anniversary of President Biden’s announcement of the initiative at the October 2021 East Asia Summit meeting, there is growing expectation of more concrete outcomes. The dates for the next ministerial meeting have not been formally announced, though informal reports speculate that the Framework partners may hold the next meeting in September 2022, possibly as the first in-person ministerial.

This alert outlines the scope and objectives of the IPEF’s four pillars, the progress to date and next steps, key remaining questions, and stakeholder reactions thus far.Continue Reading Biden Administration Hosts the First Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Ministerial: Updates, Outlook, and Remaining Questions

On March 11, 2022, President Biden announced that the United States, acting in coordination with the European Union (“EU”) and leaders of major economies belonging to the Group of Seven (“G7”), would begin taking steps to revoke most-favored-nation (or “MFN”) trade status for Russia. MFN trade status—known as Permanent Normal Trade Relations (“PNTR”) status in the United States—is a term used to describe the nondiscriminatory treatment granted among most of the world’s trading partners. Days after the President’s address, on March 16, the House passed to formally revoke PNTR for Russia, and also stripping Belarus of MFN treatment. The bill now moves to the Senate, where timing for its consideration is uncertain.

MFN status is a fundamental principle in the international trading system established under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), and as a general rule, WTO Members are required to accord MFN status to all other WTO Members. Having acceded to the WTO in 2012, Russia is generally entitled to MFN treatment by other WTO Members. In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, several other WTO Members have joined the United States, the EU, and the G7 in stating an intent to revoke MFN treatment for Russia, invoking an “essential security” exception that permits WTO-inconsistent measures where a Member considers such measures to be “necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.” Statements issued by the White House and G7 Leaders emphasized the coordinated nature of the initiative across economies, and the intent to continue to pursue additional collective action to deny Russia the benefits of WTO membership.

While certain G7 countries, such as Canada, have already withdrawn Russia’s trade benefits by means of executive action, revocation of Russia’s PNTR status in the United States will require congressional action. While the House has passed a bill to do so, specific timing for consideration of that legislation in the Senate is still unknown. A revocation of Russia’s MFN status will increase tariff rates applicable to certain U.S. imports from Russia, and may also provoke Russia to take responsive, retaliatory actions against international firms. This alert provides background on Russia’s current trade status, analyzes congressional action to date on the issue, and describes the potential international trade implications for U.S. firms of a change in Russia’s trade status.

Background on Russia’s Trade Status

Under the principle of MFN treatment, WTO Members are required to treat imports of goods and services from any WTO Member as favorably as they treat the imports of like goods and services from any other WTO Member. In practice, this means that MFN treatment is the basic “non-discriminatory” treatment to which all WTO Members are generally entitled. Russia has been accorded MFN treatment by most major economies since it became a WTO Member in August 2012.
Continue Reading Revocation of Russia’s Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status: What Companies Need to Know

Last month, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) held its inaugural ministerial in Pittsburgh: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, and Trade Representative Katherine Tai met with European Commissioners Margrethe Vestager and Valdis Dombrovskis. Only three months after the TTC process was launched at the US-EU summit, the two sides

Three summits last week—G-7, NATO, and U.S.-EU—launched a wide range of transatlantic initiatives to coordinate policy, particularly on trade, technology, and defense. These new formats and dialogues can ensure a much deeper level of regulatory cooperation between the United States and Europe by exchanging perspectives, briefing materials, and in some cases, staff. For companies on both sides of the Atlantic, these emerging policy trends also open up new opportunities to engage decision-makers both in Washington and European capitals.
Continue Reading Transatlantic Summits: Main Takeaways for Tech and Defense

March 22, 2018

Earlier today, the administration announced its findings that China’s theft of U.S. technologies and intellectual property (“IP”) have caused at least $50 billion in harm to the U.S. economy per year. In response, President Trump issued an order announcing its intent to impose additional tariffs on Chinese imports, curtail Chinese investment in

Following the recent U.S. announcement of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the United States is now poised to implement trade sanctions against China stemming from an investigation of that country’s intellectual property (“IP”) practices. Such sanctions, which could include significant and maybe even unprecedented

President-elect Donald Trump made trade policy a key issue in his campaign and has declared his interest in either withdrawing from or renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Government officials from Mexico and Canada have publicly stated that their respective governments are open to renegotiating the treaty. As a result, companies that do