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Pauline Agius

Pauline Agius is an associate in the firm’s Public Policy Practice group. With extensive work experience across the EU and APAC regions, Pauline helps clients navigate complex regulatory issues internationally. Her practice focuses on pharmaceutical and medical devices, energy, and infrastructure sectors.

  • Pharmaceutical and medical devices: Pauline has helped clients raise Japanese Diet members’ awareness of the benefits of cannabis-derived medicine for people with severe Autism Spectrum Disorder and of the importance of access to non-invasive prenatal testing. Pauline counsels clients on the regulation of medical devices in the EU.
  • Energy: Pauline provided regulatory advice and assisted with a bid submission to the first ever offshore wind project off the coast of Japan. Pauline has project finance and project development experience, as part of which she advised on a number of solar, LNG and hydropower transactions across Southeast Asia, Africa and South America.
  • Infrastructure: Pauline provided regulatory advice and assisted with a bid submission for a prospective integrated resort – a first in Japan.

Pauline has an MBA from INSEAD, a degree in Accounting and Finance from LSE, and speaks fluent Mandarin and Japanese.

On 18 July 2024, Ursula von der Leyen, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second term. Ahead of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, accompanied by a 30-page program (the “Guidelines”) that lays down the next five-year policy agenda she proposes for the Commission. This blog outlines the key points to look out for in the “mission letters” she is expected to issue to her Commissioners-designate later this week.

A European “Christmas Tree”

The Guidelines were designed to secure a majority in the European Parliament ahead of the crucial 18 July vote. They affirm that the “priorities set out draw on […] consultations and on the common ideas discussed with the democratic forces in the European Parliament” (a reference to the cordon sanitaire – the agreed common exclusion of far-right parties from political discussions).

However, whilst the Commission has the monopoly on the right of initiative in EU law-making, the European Council (the strategic body that comprises the EU heads of state and government) defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. Hence, the European Council is the ultimate agenda-setter. At their 27 June 2024 meeting, the European Council agreed on a draft 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda (“Strategic Agenda”). This sets in stone the European Council’s policy priorities and invites the Commission to put these “into action during the next institutional cycle”. Thus, the Strategic Agenda acted as the basis upon which Von der Leyen prepared her Guidelines.

Other workstreams also influenced the drafting of the Guidelines. Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the EU Single Market advocated for the Commission to propose the establishment of the European Savings and Investments Union. Mario Draghi’s report on competitiveness (published on September 9, 2024) also fed into the Guidelines. Finally, the Guidelines seek to establish a sense of continuity, allowing von der Leyen’s second mandate to build on her first, notably with regards to the Green Deal: “we have achieved a lot together in the last five years, […] we must and will stay the course on all of our goals, including those set out in the European Green Deal”.Continue Reading What do European Commission President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines Mean for the 2024-2029 Mandate?

On December 14, 2023, the U.S. Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2024 (NDAA), authorizing $886 billion in defense spending. Amid its numerous provisions, there is the concept of the “national technology and industrial base,” which now includes the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand and could potentially serve as the basis for wider industrial cooperation with European and other global partners. This could provide useful synergies with ongoing efforts in Europe to galvanize defense production and help ensure an enduring competitive edge for the wider West over potential adversaries—within NATO and with global partners.

The Global “National Technology and Industrial Base”

The national technology and industrial base (NTIB) is defined in U.S. law as “the persons and organizations that are engaged in research, development, production, integration, services, or information technology activities” in national security and dual-use areas. First established in 1994, NTIB initially included only Canada in addition to the United States. In 2016, however, United Kingdom and Australia were added, followed by New Zealand in 2022. NTIB entities may receive preference for certain limited procurement actions and may be exempted from certain foreign ownership or control/influence requirements.

The logic behind this initial expansion was to foster industrial defense cooperation among the Five Eyes allies, which already had provisions for intelligence sharing potentially required for sophisticated military projects. And the expected benefits were to leverage economies of scale, promote innovation, and increase interoperability.

Given Russia’s large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and the longer-term challenge from China, the NTIB could be expanded further to ensure that the wider West is able to produce the military materiel required to deter and confront any security challenges. The United States and its NATO Allies have already faced stockpile constraints in providing weapons supply to Ukraine to continue waging its defense. Now, the 2024 NDAA has added Israel and Taiwan to a program started to expedite delivery and replenishment of munitions to Ukraine, which will put further pressure on existing production. The NTIB could also serve as the fulcrum to leverage European defense initiatives in light of Russia’s war of aggression.

European Defense Initiatives

The European defense landscape has long been characterized by severe under-investment and fragmentation among Member States, with less than one-fifth of investments in defense programs conducted in cooperation. In 2009, the European Union expressed its willingness to facilitate joint procurement with the adoption of procurement rules for munitions, arms, and war material in the Defense Procurement Directive. However, implementation was lacking, and most procurement contracts were still awarded without an EU-wide tender.Continue Reading U.S. Defense Bill’s Implications for European and Global Partners