Financial

On June 3, President Donald Trump sent a package of $9.4 billion in rescissions to Congress for expedited consideration under Section 1017 of the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) of 1974. The House of Representatives reportedly plans to introduce, debate, and pass a bill to implement the President’s proposed rescissions as soon as next week. The Senate would have until mid-July to send the bill to the President for his signature.  While previous presidents have proposed rescissions, Congress has never fully deployed the ICA’s procedures to rescind appropriated funds.  Because the ICA provides a statutory limit on debate for rescissions bills in the Senate, the recissions process could be a powerful tool for a Congress and a President—when both chambers and the White House are under single-party control—to cut discretionary spending.

The Impoundment Control Act and Rescission Procedure

Congress adopted the ICA in 1974 to limit executive branch authority to decline to spend (“impound”) congressionally appropriated funds.  Until the Nixon Administration, presidents generally viewed appropriation levels as “ceilings” on permissible spending.  If a project came in under budget, an executive branch agency could simply return the leftover funds to the Treasury.  Presidents Truman and Nixon both used this impoundment power aggressively.  The ICA codified an assertion that spending of congressionally appropriated funds was not optional, requiring the president to send a “special message” to Congress specifying the amount of the proposed recission and the justification for why the funds should not be spent, before withholding funds. If Congress does not pass legislation to approve the President’s recommendation within 45 legislative days, the executive branch must then spend the funds and the President may not propose to rescind them again. 

The ICA specifically limits debate on rescissions bills on the Senate floor to 10 hours, meaning these measures are not subject to the Senate filibuster and may become law if passed by a simple majority vote in both chambers.  A rescissions bill can be amended, but amendments must be germane. If a rescissions measure passes through both chambers of Congress within 45 days of the president’s transmission of the special message, the president may impound the funds.

Congress has never in the 51-year history of the ICA deployed these procedures in full.  Instead, Congress can, and often does, rescind funding through ordinary legislation (including annual appropriations bills that are subject to the Senate filibuster, and budget reconciliation bills, which are not).  In several instances, the Senate has also approved rescission bills by unanimous consent, bypassing the filibuster but also skipping the ICA procedure.

History and Precedent

According to the Congressional Research Service, four presidents have submitted rescissions packages under Section 1017 of the ICA, but the procedure has never successfully been used on a partisan basis. Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter used the rescission authority ten times, but those rescissions were not controversial and passed the Senate by unanimous consent. George H.W. Bush submitted $7.9 billion in rescissions in 1992, which also passed on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, with 404 votes in the House and 90 votes in the Senate. In his first term, President Trump proposed $15 billion in rescissions. The measure narrowly passed the House, 210 votes to 206, but failed in the Senate, 48 votes to 50. Consequently, Section 1017 has never successfully been used to rescind funds on a partisan basis. In current case, the President’s proposal would rescind funding from bills signed by his predecessor.Continue Reading Trump Rescissions May Revive Dormant Process to Fast Track Spending Cuts

President Trump recently issued two separate Executive Orders (EOs) that will have implications for how federal agencies seek to promote the administration’s goal of attracting domestic and foreign investment to industrial projects in the United States, with particular implications for the semiconductor and critical minerals industries. 

  1. An EO on March 31st establishes an “Investment Accelerator” office within the Department of Commerce that will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the CHIPS Program—including the negotiation of agreements under the CHIPS Act.  This office will also provide technical and regulatory support for investors, and seek to facilitate research collaborations between private industry and national labs. 
  2. An earlier EO issued on March 20th seeks to mobilize federal lending and leasing authorities at the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and other federal agencies to support the development of domestic critical mineral projects.  Per an accompanying fact sheet, the White House is taking a broad interpretation of covered minerals under this March 20th Order and will seek to include materials such as coal. 

Both EOs are notable efforts by the White House to align federal spending and financial assistance programs with the Trump Administration’s priorities, which have variously included calls to promote self-sufficiency in critical materials and promoting “energy independence” and “energy dominance.”  These efforts come against a backdrop under which the Administration is also pursuing the use of tariffs to promote U.S. manufacturing, and taking steps to review and in some cases modify or terminate infrastructure or energy-related grants from the Biden-era.  More details are provided below.  Continue Reading Trump Administration Issues Executive Orders that Seek to Shape CHIPS Program and Promote Domestic Mineral Production

On 15 January 2025, the European Commission recommended that EU Member States review outbound investment in three critical technologies—semiconductors, AI, and quantum—with the aim of potentially creating an EU–wide regime to regulate such investment. EU Member States should report to the Commission on their findings and risk assessment within 18 months. These findings would inform a future policy proposal, so any introduction of outbound investment rules in the EU is likely to be several years away.

How did we get here?

Outbound investment mechanisms aim to regulate domestic companies making outward investments of capital, expertise, and knowledge that could contribute to the ‘leakage’ of critical and sensitive  technologies to third countries. Outbound investments typically take the form of EU firms purchasing equity in non-EU entities (e.g.  through joint ventures, greenfield investments), but can also take place through less structured arrangements such as R&D cooperation or transfer of employees.

The focus on outbound investment screening has its roots in transatlantic cooperation on China policy, and specifically the desire to minimize Western technology leakage to China. In particular, the U.S. Treasury Department issued new regulation prohibiting or otherwise requiring disclosure of outbound investment—in semiconductors, AI, and quantum—in Chinese entities as well as entities in other jurisdictions that hold certain interests in Chinese companies. The regulations entered into force on 2 January 2025.

Within the EU, outbound investment control was put on agenda with the European Economic Security Strategy and a subsequent white paper on outbound investment. Before then, only a few EU countries, such as Austria and Spain would screen outbound investment, and there had been no EU-wide approach on this topic.

What does it mean?

EU Member States are requested to monitor outbound investments in three critical technologies: semiconductors, AI, and quantum. The original white paper proposal also named biotechnologies amongst suggested critical technologies to be covered by the review, but this has been dropped in the new recommendation. The recommended scope of the monitoring exercise is as follows:Continue Reading Toward EU Outbound Investment Regulation

On 1 December 2024 the 2025-2029 College of Commissioners took office, led by President Ursula von der Leyen in her second term.

This blog explores what companies can expect from the new European Commission in the field of EU State aid.

Key takeaways

  • The Commission will establish a new State aid framework to allow EU Member States to grant State aid for (i) accelerating the roll-out of renewable energy, (ii) deploying industrial decarbonisation, and (iii) ensuring sufficient manufacturing capacity for clean tech “made in Europe” while preserving cohesion objectives.
  • Approval of State aid for Important Projects of Common European Interest (“IPCEIs”) will be made simpler and faster. The Commission may further expand the scope of IPCEIs to include innovations more broadly and possibly manufacturing projects.
  • The Commission will create a ‘European Competitiveness Fund’, aimed at supporting the development of strategic technologies and their manufacturing in the EU. Depending on its design, this fund may help level the playing field among EU Member States.
  • State aid rules will be revised to enable wider housing support measures, notably for energy efficiency and social housing. Other State aid rules will also undergo a revision during the 2025-2029 mandate, such as aid to the transport sector or for companies in difficulty.

Perpetuation of relaxed State aid rules for the green transition?

President Ursula von der Leyen announced in her political programme for the 2025-2029 mandate the need to have a new Clean Industrial Deal, to decarbonise, and to bring down energy prices.

As a key pillar of the EU Clean Industrial Deal, she called for the establishment of “a new State aid framework” (see mission letter to Executive Vice-President (“EVP”) Ribera, responsible for the ‘Clean, Just and Competitive Transition’ and thus for EU competition policy). This new framework will allow EU Member States to grant State aid for (i) accelerating the roll-out of renewable energy, (ii) deploying industrial decarbonisation, and (iii) ensuring sufficient manufacturing capacity for clean tech in the EU. It will build on the experience of the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (“TCTF”) and preserve cohesion objectives.

This new State aid framework may make more permanent the relaxed State aid rules in relation to the green transition.

As a response to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, heavily subsidising the green transition, the Commission relaxed the EU State aid rules for the roll-out of renewable energy, industrial decarbonisation, and manufacturing in the EU/EEA of relevant equipment for the transition towards a net-zero economy (for more details, see our blogpost). The TCTF was remarkable in terms of industrial policy because, under general State aid rules, support to large businesses pursuing manufacturing projects is generally considered unnecessary – large companies have access to capital and those measures may be considered highly distortive. Such aid could traditionally only have been authorised by the Commission under strict conditions and in support of a new economic activity in disadvantaged areas under the Commission’s Regional Aid Guidelines (“RAG”).Continue Reading State aid – Outlook for the European Commission’s 2025-2029 Mandate

Executive Summary

  • On November 27, Brazil’s Finance Minister Fernando Haddad announced a package of spending cut measures and the outline of an income tax reform.  The package was a reaction to market unease over the perceived weakness of the country’s fiscal framework, which built up over the past year.
  • The announced spending cuts were poorly received by market players prompting the Brazilian real to reach a record devaluation against the U.S. dollar.  They perceived the announcements as lacking spending cut ambition and including future spending through income tax exemption.  There is also uncertain congressional support and no fixed timeframe for the approval of these measures.
  • Investors might reap short-term gains from the heated economy and low-priced assets in Brazil, but a fiscal framework in peril points to medium-term problems, including high inflation and reduced economic growth.

Analysis

On November 27 and after two months of internal government discussions, Brazil’s Finance Minister Fernando Haddad announced a package of spending cuts in an effort to rescue the country’s fiscal framework.  In addition, Haddad announced President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration proposal for an income tax reform.

The following day, Haddad and five other ministers provided details on these measures.  The package was not well-received by market players, with the Brazilian real reaching a record devaluation against the U.S. dollar.

Brazil’s fiscal framework, proposed by the Lula administration in March 2023 and approved by Congress in August 2023, has been progressively weakened due to the Brazilian federal government’s lax fiscal policy and refusal to address structural spending issues.Continue Reading Brazil’s Fiscal Framework in Peril: Impact on Businesses

On May 16, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted amendments to Regulation S-P, which implements the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (“GLBA”) for SEC-regulated entities such as broker-dealers, investment companies, registered investment advisers, and transfer agents.

Among other requirements, the amendments require SEC-regulated entities to adopt written policies and procedures…

Continue Reading SEC Adopts Amendments to Regulation S-P

In December 2023, the Dutch SA fined a credit card company €150,000 for failure to perform a proper data protection impact assessment (“DPIA”) in accordance with Art. 35 GDPR for its “identification and verification process”.

First, the Dutch SA decided that the company was required to perform a DPIA because…

Continue Reading Dutch SA Sanctions Credit Card Company for Failure to Perform Data Protection Impact Assessment

Earlier this month, the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) announced that it had finalized the Second Amendment to its “first-in-the-nation” cybersecurity regulation, 23 NYCRR Part 500.  This Amendment implements many of the changes that NYDFS originally proposed in prior versions of the Second Amendment released for public comment in November 2022 and June 2023, respectively.  The first version of the Proposed Second Amendment proposed increased cybersecurity governance and board oversight requirements, the expansion of the types of policies and controls companies would be required to implement, the creation of a new class of companies subject to additional requirements, expanded incident reporting requirements, and the introduction of enumerated factors to be considered in enforcement decisions, among others.  The revisions in the second version reflect adjustments rather than substantial changes from the first version.  Compliance periods for the newly finalized requirements in the Second Amendment will be phased over the next two years, as set forth in additional detail below.

The finalized Second Amendment largely adheres to the revisions from the second version of the Proposed Second Amendment but includes a few substantive changes, including those described below:

  • The finalized Amendment removes the previously-proposed requirement that each class A company conduct independent audits of its cybersecurity program “at least annually.”  While the finalized Amendment does require each class A company to conduct such audits, they should occur at a frequency based on its risk assessments.  NYDFS stated that it made this change in response to comments that an annual audit requirement would be overly burdensome and with the understanding that class A companies typically conduct more than one audit annually.  See Section 500.2 (c).
  • The finalized Amendment updates the oversight requirements for the senior governing body of a covered entity with respect to the covered entity’s cybersecurity risk management.  Updates include, among others, a requirement to confirm that the covered entity’s management has allocated sufficient resources to implement and maintain a cybersecurity program.  This requirement was part of the proposed definition of “Chief Information Security Officer.”  NYDFS stated that it moved this requirement to the senior governing bodies in response to comments that CISOs do not typically make enterprise-wide resource allocation decisions, which are instead the responsibility of senior management.  See Section 500.4 (d).
  • The finalized Amendment removes a proposed additional requirement to report certain privileged account compromises to NYDFS.  NYDFS stated that it did so in response to public comments that this proposed requirement “is overbroad and would lead to overreporting.”  However, the finalized Amendment retains previously-proposed changes that will require covered entities to report certain ransomware deployments or extortion payments to NYDFS.  See Section 500.17 (a).

Continue Reading New York Department of Financial Services Finalizes Second Amendment to Cybersecurity Regulation

On 26 June 2023, the International Sustainability Standards Board (“ISSB”) published its inaugural International Financial Reporting Standards Sustainability Disclosure Standards (the “ISSB Standards”) (read our previous blog post on this here).  In August 2023, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) published Primary Market Bulletin 45, confirming its intentions…

Continue Reading Corporate Reporting in the UK: The International Sustainability Standards Board

On 26 June 2023, the International Sustainability Standards Board (the “ISSB”) issued its inaugural International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) Sustainability Disclosure Standards (the “Standards”), heralding progress in the development of a global baseline of sustainability-linked disclosures. The Standards build on the concepts that underpin the IFRS Accounting Standards, which are required in more than 140 jurisdictions, but notably not in the United States for domestic issuers subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which must apply US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“US GAAP”).  Despite broad investor appetite for  transparent, uniform and comparable disclosure rules, the scope of required sustainability disclosure and timing for adoption of the SEC’s pending climate disclosure rule remains unresolved.

  1. IFRS S1 General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information (“IFRS S1”) requires an entity to disclose information about all sustainability-related risks and opportunities that could reasonably be expected to affect the entity’s prospects. The effect on the entity’s prospects refers to the effect on the entity’s cash flows, its access to finance, or cost of capital over the short, medium or long term.
  2. IFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures (“IFRS S2”) requires an entity to provide information about its exposure to climate-related risks and opportunities. Information to be disclosed includes both physical risks—such as extreme weather events—as well as transition risks, such as changes in customer behaviour.

Both IFRS S1 and IFRS S2 are effective for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2024. Accordingly, where the Standards have been adopted for a 2024 reporting cycle, relevant disclosures will begin to be published in 2025 in an entity’s general purpose financial reports (subject to transitional provisions), alongside an “explicit and unreserved statement of compliance” when disclosing against the Standards. Whilst the launch of the Standards has been a welcome step, seeking to provide greater uniformity in corporate reporting, individual jurisdictions will decide whether entities will be required to comply with the Standards.Continue Reading ISSB issues inaugural global sustainability disclosure standards